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Legitimizing violence: military operations within Brazilian borders

São Paulo

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Dissertation submitted to Programa de Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais San Tiago Dantas of Universidade Estadual Paulista “Júlio de Mesquita Filho” (Unesp), Universidade de Campinas (Unicamp), and Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP), in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations, concentration area “Peace, Defense and International Security”, and research line “International Security Studies, Regional Security, new themes and approaches”.

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ABSTRACT

The distinction between armed forces and police is traditionally addressed through the division between the domestic and international realms, which equates three different and independent kinds of boundaries: physical borders, the reach of political authority, and the belonging to a community. Drawing upon this conception, scholars have claimed that contemporary security policies blurred these lines. However, the blurring argument, grounded on an aprioristic conception about how the state's instruments of force are to be organized, fails to explain both cases in which military domestic deployment is not a historical exception, being instead socially and legally institutionalized, and the processes through which a particular kind of the state's use of force becomes accepted or rejected. The present thesis tackles this gap by moving away from the aprioristic inside/outside framework and focusing on the question of how certain uses of the armed forces are legitimated and delegitimated. It provides an analytical framework to empirically address the legitimation of military operations, which is applied to the domestic mobilization of the armed forces but is also appropriate to analyze other uses of violence. Legitimacy is regarded as the process of shaping and reshaping the line of the acceptable action, which is grasped through discursive patterns forging an apparent consensus around the adequacy or inadequacy of a course of action. The instrument of analysis proposed here is applied to the Brazilian case, mapping out the public debate on three major domestic military operations against crime – Operation Rio (1994-1995), Operation Arcanjo (2010-2012), and Operation Rio de Janeiro (2017-2018).

Keywords: Legitimacy; Violence; Armed Forces; Brazil; Blurring; Security.

RESUMO

A distinção entre forças armadas e policiais é tradicionalmente abordada com base na divisão entre a esfera doméstica e o âmbito internacional, que sobrepõe três delimitações diversas e independentes: fronteiras físicas, alcance da autoridade política e o pertencimento a uma comunidade. Valendo-se desta concepção, acadêmicos argumentam que políticas contemporâneas de segurança borraram estas divisões. No entanto, esta abordagem, baseada em uma concepção apriorística sobre como os instrumentos de força do Estado devem ser organizados, falha em explicar os casos em que o emprego doméstico dos militares não é uma exceção histórica, estando socialmente e legalmente institucionalizado, assim como os processos pelos quais um tipo específico de emprego da força estatal é aceito ou rejeitado. A presente tese enfrenta esta lacuna afastando-se do modelo apriorístico do interno/externo e focando na questão sobre como certos usos das forças armadas são legitimados ou deslegitimados. A tese fornece um modelo analítico para endereçar empiricamente a legitimação de operações militares, que é aplicado à mobilização doméstica das forças armadas, mas é também útil para analisar outros usos da violência. Legitimidade é considerada como o processo de definir e redefinir os limites da ação aceitável, que é apreendido por meio de padrões discursivos que forjam um consenso aparente sobre a adequação ou inadequação de um tipo de ação. O instrumento de análise proposto aqui é aplicado ao caso brasileiro, mapeando o debate público sobre três operações militares domésticas contra o crime organizado – Operação Rio (1994-1995), Operação Arcanjo (2010-2012) e Operação Rio de Janeiro (2017-2018)

Palavras-chave: Legitimidade; Violência; Forças Armadas; Brasil; Blurring; Segurança.

RESUMEN

La distinción entre fuerzas armadas y policía se aborda tradicionalmente a través de la división entre los ámbitos nacional e internacional, que equipara tres tipos diferentes e independientes de fronteras: las fronteras físicas, el alcance de la autoridad política y la pertenencia a una comunidad. Basándose en esta concepción, los académicos afirman que las políticas de seguridad contemporáneas desdibujaron estas líneas. Sin embargo, este enfoque, basado en una concepción apriorística sobre cómo deben organizarse los instrumentos de fuerza del Estado, no logra explicar los casos en los que el despliegue militar doméstico no es una excepción histórica, estando social y jurídicamente institucionalizados, y los procesos mediante los cuales se acepta o rechaza un tipo particular de uso de la fuerza por parte del Estado. La presente tesis aborda esta brecha, alejándose del marco apriorístico dentro/fuera y centrándose en la cuestión de cómo se legitiman y deslegitiman ciertos usos de las fuerzas armadas. Proporciona un marco analítico para abordar empíricamente la legitimación de las operaciones militares, que se aplica a la movilización interna de las fuerzas armadas pero también es apropiado para analizar otros usos de la violencia. La legitimidad se considera como el proceso de dar forma y remodelar la línea de la acción aceptable, que se capta a través de patrones discursivos que forjan un aparente consenso en torno a la adecuación o insuficiencia de un curso de acción. El instrumento de análisis propuesto se aplica al caso brasileño, mapeando el debate público sobre tres grandes operaciones militares internas contra el crimen: la Operación Río (1994-1995), la Operación Arcanjo (2010-2012) y la Operación Río de Janeiro (2017). -2018).

Palabras llave: Legitimación; Violencia; Fuerzas Armadas; Brasil; Blurring; Seguridad.

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 –	Legitimation Process	59
Figure 2 –	Parameters general frequency	80
Figure 3 –	Parameters frequency per case	81
Figure 4 –	Codes Intersection Texto.....	83
Figure 5 –	Normality: coded segments.....	88
Figure 6 –	Technicity: codes frequency.....	91
Figure 7 –	Terrorism in articles of opinion.....	98
Figure 8 –	Community’s Boundaries: coded segments.....	102
Figure 9 –	Sovereignty: coded segments.....	108
Figure 10 –	Newspapers word-tree: territorial.....	109

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 – Primary Sources.....	75
Table 2 – Criticality: terms frequency and context.....	84
Table 3 – “Crime as war” metaphor terms frequency.....	103
Table 4 – Articles in Defesa Nacional review.....	116

SUMÁRIO

1	INTRODUCTION.....	10
2	“BLURRING”, RUPTURE, AND EXCEPTION: THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AS NORMATIVE DISCOURSE.....	19
2.1	Domestic, international, and force employment.....	28
2.2	Territory, community, political authority, and force employment.....	31
2.2.1	Political Authority.....	34
2.2.2	Community.....	38
2.2.3	Border and Territory.....	43
3	LEGITIMACY AND VIOLENCE LEGITIMATION.....	46
3.1	Beliefs, ideas, and interest.....	53
3.2	Legitimation discourse.....	58
3.2.1	Parameters of legitimation.....	61
3.2.2	Rhetorical strategies.....	66
3.2.3	Ideational Sources.....	69
3.3	Legitimacy as apparent consensus.....	70
4	NATURALIZING MILITARY DOMESTIC OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL: LEGITIMATING DISCOURSES.....	74
4.1	Operations.....	76
4.2	Legitimizing discourses.....	80
4.2.1	Criticality.....	82
4.2.2	Normality.....	87
4.2.3	Technicity.....	90
4.2.4	Community Boundaries.....	100
4.2.5	Sovereignty.....	107
4.3	Conclusion.....	111
5	NATURALIZING MILITARY DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: THE IDEATIONAL TOPOGRAPHY.....	113
5.1	Duque de Caxias and Pacification.....	116
5.2	The ideal citizen: army as a school of morality.....	118
5.3	The apolitical politician: armed forces as the most prepared institution...	128

5.4	Ideational sources and the legitimating discourses.....	136
6	CONCLUSIONS.....	140
	REFERENCES.....	145

1 INTRODUCTION

Defining the limits and attributions of the state's instruments of force is a fundamental part of every society's inescapable task of organizing and regulating violence. It entails questions about acceptable and unacceptable behaviors, such as who can use violence, where, in which circumstances, against whom, and to which purpose. The Hobbesian foundational myth of the modern state, for instance, consists of the collective decision to organize violence around a central authority, aiming at eliminating violence among the members of this group, as well as protecting them from external threats. In this sense, it would be acceptable to use force to impose non-violence within a political unit, and to tackle external aggressions.

Violence is not only the object of regulation, it is mainly the instrument for instituting, maintaining, or subverting the institutional order, which provides that regulation in the first place (BENJAMIN, 2021). It is the case of revolutions, military coups, or state-building. In this sense, beyond the theoretical image of the state's foundation, pictured by authors of the natural law, historically, the state's formation did not result from a voluntary social arrangement. It came about through the violent imposition of a social and political order that justifies all violence needed for its establishment and conservation, describing as unacceptable violence or radical behavior every attempt against this particular order (BENJAMIN, 2021; BUTLER, 2021; RAE, 2003; TILLY, 1985). Therefore, state-making is not the collective denial of widespread violence in name of nonviolence, but a coercive process through which the line of acceptable violence is forged. In fact, the state's violence is usually named force as a way to legitimate and distinguish it from coercive means used by other actors (CRETTEZ, 2009).

Another emblematic definition of the state is the Weberian formulation, which conceives the centralization of the use of force as legitimate. In turn, it requires identifying the criteria tracing its legitimacy, which leads us back to the questions about the righteousness of a violent act, as well as the endeavor to name certain coercive – or even noncoercive – actions as violent and others as normal. Quests about what can be legitimately done through violence have pervaded different areas of social thinking, with different degrees of acceptance or rejection of violence. One of the most commonsensical ideas in this regard is that everyone has the right to self-defense. Elsa Dorlin (2020), however, comprehensively showed us that this is not an equally distributed right. The disproportionately violent behavior of certain groups is often framed as self-defense, such as police officers attacking a handcuffed suspect, as illustrated by her. She also points out that when the struggle to preserve one's own life comes from

marginalized groups it is often explicitly forbidden or framed as an act of aggression. Certain groups or movements, such as workers on strike or protesters, have commonly been characterized as violent to justify repression or police brutality against them, even when they are not directly engaged in physical violence (BUTLER, 2021).

On the other hand, revolutionary thought has for long regarded violence as a necessary and justifiable means of fighting back against the oppressor and achieving emancipation. Georges Sorel (2004), for instance, wrote, in 1908, that while force is the name given to the coercive actions undertaken to impose a social order ruled by a minority, violence is the instrument proletariat can righteous use to react to this very bourgeois order. Likewise, with some differences, Lenin and Trotsky also regarded not to be possible to liberate the working classes from oppression without a violent revolution, replacing the holders of the monopoly of force (SAINT-PIERRE, 1999).

Perhaps the most notable advocate of violence as an instrument to stop violent and oppressive dynamics, more specifically, the colonial domains, Frantz Fanon (1963) sustained that decolonization is violent by its nature. It is the clash of two forces, whose coexistence started and was maintained by violence, therefore, cannot be ended without it. From a more individual-centered perspective, Simone de Beauvoir (1948), regarded that, given the interdependence among the members of a society, the most ethical behavior in face of a situation of oppression is to intervene and to do so with violence if necessary. More recently, Judith Butler (2021) relied on a similar notion of mutual dependence among individuals to advocate the exact opposite, i.e. the commitment to nonviolence.

Accordingly, Johan Galtung (1969), well-known for his contribution to peace studies, is also reluctant in acknowledging force as an effective or acceptable way to halt a cycle of violence. He broadened the concepts of peace and violence, by defining the former as the absence of violence, and the latter as everything staying between the potential and the real. In this way, violence is not only physical and personal but also structural and non-physically manifested. Under this token, he questions whether physical violence is necessary to abolish structural violence and claims there is no absolute response to this quest. Empirically, he argues, one could identify both examples where it worked and cases in which physical violence was not capable of changing the structural limitations imposed upon certain groups. Theoretically, according to him, it could be seen as the fetishization of physical violence, and axiologically, one should look for how to end this indispensability, if it exists.

Hanna Arendt (1970), by her turn, was more starkly opposed to what she called glorification of violence, criticizing Jean-Paul Sartre's preface to Fanon's book "The wretched

of the earth” as irresponsible. According to Arendt (1970, p. 79), violence is only useful for short-term goals, since it does not “promote causes, neither history nor revolution, neither progress nor reaction; but it can serve to dramatize grievances and bring them to public attention”.

The field of International Relations (IR) was founded on concerns about organized violence, specifically interstate warfare. Thereby, theorists and practitioners have extensively attempted to identify what triggers and drives war, often with predictive intents, as well as endeavored to normatively regulate or transform violence among states. These efforts were crystallized in international organizations and in international law, which put forward regulations about who can use lethal violence, when and how it can be used, as well as how to end violence after the conflict. This founding perspective assumes a division of work between the instruments of violence states have. As will be extensively discussed in the next chapter, under this perspective, police tasks are deemed to be circumscribed by the state’s territorial borders and to apply only a limited amount of coercive force, while the armed forces are deemed to be the institution responsible for guarantying the state’s existence in conflicts with homologous counterparts, and therefore, are expected to employ the maximum degree of force available.

The theme of violence and force deployment expanded in the field, particularly in the nineties, both in terms of objects of study and ontological and epistemological perspectives (KRAUSE; WILLIAMS, 1996), which raised questions about what is security and how to theorize and research it. In terms of objects of study, a set of organized violence phenomena that exceed the strict realm of the state, such as transnational organized crime, terrorism, migratory flows, privatization of security and war, counterinsurgency, and humanitarian operations, came to the fore in the studies of international security. As for the epistemological and ontological questioning, explanatory variables, other than material capability and rational choice theory, were regarded, such as ideas, identity, ontological security, gender, and race. This intellectual turn, or turns, in IR raised important concerns about what had been taken for granted in the discipline. While engaging with the “silent ontological claims” in the field, Rob Walker (1993, p. 130) urged that “historical and social constructs, conceptions of space and time cannot be treated as some uniform background noise, as abstract ontological conditions to be acknowledged and then ignored”.

The object of analysis of the present thesis is the deployment of the armed forces within the states’ borders, more specifically the use of the military instrument in domestic operations aimed at applying force. The second part of this assertion must be stressed, since the armed

forces can be domestically used for a variety of tasks that do not involve the use of force, such as assisting victims of natural disasters, water and food distribution, vaccination campaigns, among others. These usages of the military instrument deserve research of their own, the concern here is with operations involving the actual or potential use of violence. Another caveat should be made at this point. The terms inside, outside, domestic, and international, are employed here to characterize certain military operations. They are used exclusively to indicate the geographical location where the armed forces were deployed, that is, within or externally to the state's physical territorial borders. It does not imply embracing any ontological assumption about what the international or the domestic realms are. This disclaimer and the theoretical stance this work distance itself from will be clearer to the reader in the next chapter.

The kind of military deployment at stake here, on the one hand, fits the set of security phenomena that has been permeating the contemporary concerns in international security studies. It challenges the focus on interstate dynamics of violence, which constituted this field, as well as the sharp division between internal and external instruments of force. On the other hand, and most importantly, from a theoretical point of view, the departure point of the present work is a sense of distress with a set of dubious assumptions that have been taken as background noise in the studies about military missions.

The next chapter engages with the literature on the domestic use of the armed forces and argues that the traditional inside/outside division, and the related distinction between police and the military, have been assumed as the benchmark for tracing what is normal or abnormal in terms of violence deployment. Consequently, the domestic deployment of the armed forces is regarded as a disruption of the normal organization of the state's violence. However, by taking for granted the theoretical delimitation between the military and police scopes of action, analysts neglect the fact that in many countries, the domestic military operations, rather than an exception, are historically recurrent, socially accepted, and legally provided, such as in many Latin American countries.

As problematic as domestically deploying the state's instrument of lethal force might be, regarding it as an abnormality in the distribution of the state's instruments of violence, precludes us from fully understanding how mobilizing the apparatus of lethality against part of the national community can become socially naturalized and legally institutionalized. Moreover, this theoretical framework hinders addressing the process of change in terms of violence acceptance. Responding to this gap requires moving away from the essentialist endeavor to define what is a normal military or police task, which has dominated this research

agenda. Therefore, this work focuses on investigating the process through which particular uses of the state's violence are legitimated.

The use of violence is always mediated, it needs explanation and interpretation to be framed as justifiable or despicable. Therefore, it always entails politics of legitimation. As will be discussed in the third chapter, legitimation is conceived here as the process of drawing and redrawing the line of the acceptable action (JACKSON, 2006a). In this sense, we address legitimacy empirically, which means identifying and scrutinizing the vicissitudes of the process through which the domestic deployment of the armed forces is forged as acceptable, necessary, and even desirable. The struggle to legitimate a particular course of action takes place as a communicational dynamic through which an apparent consensus is forged. It builds a sense of obviousness about the decision of using force. Identifying patterns and transformations in the discourses of legitimation allows us to unravel the set of ideas, beliefs, and prejudices socially shared and historically perpetuated that underpin the use of the military force, as well as the armed forces' role in a certain society.

Under this token, the third chapter proposes an analytical framework to operationalize an inquiry on violence legitimation. Grounded on an empirical perspective of legitimacy, it consists in mapping out discursive patterns on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the use of force. In this sense, discourses of legitimation are the basic unit of analysis and are scrutinized through five components: referred object, valuation, parameters of legitimation, rhetorical strategies, and ideational sources. The first serves mainly to select the statements explicitly referring to the use of force, while the second classifies them according to the positive or negative appraisal of the deployment of force. The parameter of legitimation is the main criteria used to sustain the rightfulness of the action at stake, while the rhetorical strategy refers to the form in which parameters are expressed and conveyed to the audience. Finally, ideational sources are a set of intersubjectively shared ideas, constructed and disseminated over time, which both provide the raw material for actors to craft their claims and limit what can be authoritatively said.

While the parameters of legitimation and the rhetorical strategies capture the agency side of this process, that is, how actors choose to hinge their arguments, investigating ideational sources acknowledges that these actors are embedded in a social arrangement and, while articulating their arguments, they move within an ideational topography that facilitate or hinder their claims. The intersection between parameters, rhetorical strategies, and ideational sources reveals a tridimensional image of the process of legitimation, in which it is possible to observe not only what is said and how it is said but the socially shared images and representations allowing certain claims to thrive.

Under this token, the framework proposed here to tackle the legitimation of domestic military operations is focused not on causation but constitution. It means that it answers how-possible questions. That is, instead of seeking to establish that variable *x* causes phenomenon *y*, it is aimed at identifying the properties of the system analyzed, its constituting components, and conditions. Constitutive explanations “explain not by telling us how or why a thing came about, or what it is, but by telling us how its elements are composed and organized so that it has the properties that it does” (WENDT, 1998, p. 112). Examples of constitutive questions are: how is it possible that until the early twentieth century states could militarily intervene in other sovereign states to collect debts? (FINNEMORE, 2004); or how come greatly populated areas were seen as no man’s land, available to colonial domination? (CLAPHAM, 1999). Answering how-possible questions is not a matter of description but of identifying the conditions of possibility of a particular behavior. It is essential not only to those who want to make sense of a phenomenon but to those who aim to politically engage with a particular practice, seeking either to sustain or change it.

In our approach to legitimacy, nothing is intrinsically legitimate or illegitimate but legitimated. The constitutive explanation provided by the proposed analytical framework is aimed at addressing the question of how the military domestic deployment is legitimated, i.e. how it is included in the realm of normal and acceptable actions, in a particular time and space. It is important to stress that empirically acknowledging, describing, and explaining how a specific kind of use of force is legitimated does not mean naturalizing or vouching for it. Something is not unproblematic just because it has been legitimated, we have abundant historical examples of obnoxious forms of violence that were legitimated and institutionalized. At the same time, particular behaviors and actions are not automatically illegitimate just because the analyst regards them as despicable. In this sense, claiming that the domestic deployment of the armed forces is historically recurrent, legally provided, and socially expected in some countries, does not mean regarding it as inevitable and unproblematic. Rather, disclosing the discursive and ideational logic that underpins its acceptability favors the challenging its internal logic, as well as its political contestation.

To explore its explanatory gain, this thesis’ empirical object of analysis is the use of the armed forces to fight organized criminal groups in Brazil. This case is paradigmatic to study the normalization of internal military operations since the Brazilian armed forces performed operations within its borders throughout the country’s whole history (MATHIAS; GUZZI, 2010; MCCANN, 2007; ROUQUIÉ, 1984). From the nineties, the domestic operations carried out by the military focused particularly on combating narcotraffic and urban violence,

especially in Rio de Janeiro. From June 1992 to June 2021, 144 operations have been performed by the armed forces within the Brazilian territory, of which 88 were related to public security – including crime-fighting, replacing police forces during strikes, and securing international events – and 22 took place in Rio de Janeiro. (MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA, 2021a).

This case also differs from other countries in the region, such as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay where the domestic deployment of the military was strongly restricted after the end of the dictatorship, as part of the process of democratization. In Brazil, instead, in the decades succeeding the end of the military regime, the domestic military mobilization against criminal activities was increasingly institutionalized. Many laws were established to regulate the so-called Law and Order Assurance Operations (GLO, in Portuguese), such as complementary laws 69/1991, 97/1999, 117/2004, 136/2010, and the presidential decree 3897/2001. In 2005, the army established a training center specialized in this kind of operation and, in 2013, released a manual, specifying its legislation and the rules of engagement. Moreover, the dimensions of these operations consistently grew in this period in terms of the number of troops deployed, as well as in the operations budget (MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA, 2021b).

This surging can be observed in the three operations selected for the present inquiry: Operation Rio (1994-1995), Operation Arcanjo (2010-2012), and Operation Rio de Janeiro (2017-2018). Operation Rio was the first big military deployment against organized crime in Rio de Janeiro after the end of the dictatorship (FUCCILLE, 1999; SOARES, 2006). Operation Arcanjo was the longest military occupation in an urban area of this period and encompassed the constitution of a so-called Force of Pacification (*Força de Pacificação*, in Portuguese), a term used for the first time in GLO actions (LIMA, 2012), in reference to international peacekeeping operations (SAVELL, 2016). Finally, Operation Rio de Janeiro took place alongside an unprecedented federal intervention in the public security administration of the state of Rio de Janeiro, which transferred the administrative authority in the realm of security to an army general, appointed by the president as a federal intervenor.

Beyond the significance of these events in terms of the number of soldiers deployed, the budgetary resources assigned, and the vast public attention they attracted, the selection of these operations followed a threefold rationale. First, they represent a progressive deepening and institutionalization of the military internal employment, being, therefore, useful to analyze how the naturalization of a particular form of force deployment came about. Second, their distribution in time allows us to identify patterns of continuity, as well as points of transformation in the dominant discourse legitimating it. Finally, they were authorized by governments with distinct political

stands, suggesting that the patterns observed are not particular to a political stance, instead, it represents the crystallization of a continuous understanding of military missions.

For each of these three operations, the primary sources used to investigate the discourses of legitimation were the transcriptions of parliamentary sessions, both House of Representatives and the Senate, statements of military leaders, presidents, and ministers, as well as newspapers' reports and articles of opinion. In chapter four, these documents were scrutinized using a content analysis methodology, through which the parameters of legitimation and rhetorical strategies structuring the public debate about domestically deploying the Brazilian armed forces were mapped out, thoroughly detailing how they were articulated to sustain the legitimacy or illegitimacy of this course of action.

Five parameters shaped the public debate about military domestic operations: criticality, i.e. the depiction of a situation as urgent and pressing; technicity, that is, arguments sustained on claims about technical necessities or adequacy, which circumscribes arguments on effectiveness, preparedness, political neutrality, and pragmatism; community boundaries, i.e. notions of 'we' and 'them'; normality, mainly grounded on legal conformity claims; and sovereignty, defined by discourses on territorial control. Combined, they forged a dominant apparent consensus that framed this kind of military deployment as obvious, necessary, and desirable.

Finally, chapter five inserts the dominant discourse, mobilized to legitimate the armed forces' operations against criminal groups, in the social arrangement that allowed their claims to be presented as authoritative and credible. The ideational topography, on which struggles for legitimation unfolded, is constituted of social expectations about the armed forces' role in society, as well as the military identity, i.e. their self-understanding about their place in the Brazilian society. The shared image of the Brazilian armed forces, particularly the army, is structured around the figure of the military as an agent of pacification (*Pacificador*, in Portuguese), which is centered on the military narratives about the army's patron, Luiz Alves de Lima e Silva, known as Duke of Caxias, who was responsible for many operations of pacification in the nineteenth century. His figure is central to the military identity. By analyzing Caxias's official biographies and military papers about him, it was possible to trace the construction and recurrence over time of two ideational sources: the ideal citizen and the apolitical politician.

The first is forged through individual moral virtues, attributed to the military, and defined as the yardstick of citizenship. Under this perspective to be a true national citizen means to emulate these characteristics. Accordingly, the armed forces assign themselves an educative

role, aimed at controlling the illiterate masses and moralizing corrupt political elites. The most highlighted characteristics are religiosity, honesty, patriotism, as well as explicitly racist arguments. The second, on the other hand, is grounded on public attributes, framing the military as the most technically prepared institution in the country, the most diligent public administrators, and as politically neutral, even when its members are holding political positions. This apologetic narrative is used to forward the image that the armed forces can fulfill all civilian deficiencies and deal with problems that the civilian governments are not able to solve.

Investigating the process of legitimation reveals a deeper layer of a society's relation with its instruments of violence, which endeavors to establish universal definitions of military and police tasks cannot disclose. It helps us, for instance, to understand why military practices that proved themselves to be ineffective in ceasing criminal violence endured, and why claims for its replication are still convincing. It also points to why arguments that frame certain individuals and groups as violent by nature, and present state agents – often involved in power and violence abuses – as reliable, have social adherence. Ultimately, it helps to shed light on how the restriction to kill is lifted, i.e. how the killing of certain individuals by particular actors is accepted. Asking these questions stresses the inherently political nature of deciding who can use violence, how, and against whom. It, consequently, emphasize that this decision is open to dispute and change, despite dominant discourses, based on an emergency or technical impositions arguments, aimed at making us to believe otherwise.

2 “BLURRING”, RUPTURE, AND EXCEPTION: THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AS NORMATIVE DISCOURSE

with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming. (Campbell, 1992, p.11).

There is not a universal form of violence organization. Each political unity is supposed to structure its security system in the way that better suits its necessities. However, the differentiation between the state's instruments of force is traditionally grounded on the idea of a pacified domestic sphere sharply divided from an anarchical international system. Under this conception, while the armed forces must guarantee the existence of the polity against its foreign counterpart, the police is responsible for enforcing the law domestically.

This framework has been challenged since the armed forces of different countries are increasingly assuming tasks within their national territory, such as fighting organized crime and terrorism, controlling borders, policing streets, and managing migratory flows (CLARKE, 2013; HEAD; SCOTT, 2009; LUTTERBECK, 2005; SCHNABEL; HRISTOV, 2010), while police forces are progressively adopting military tactics and equipment (KRASKA 2007; CAMPBELL; CAMPBELL 2016). This convergence is also expressed in international missions of counterinsurgency (FELDMAN, 2006), stabilization international operations (HARIG, 2019a), as well as in the so-called intermediary forces (LUTTERBECK, 2004; ZIMMERMANN, 2005).

The literature concerned with these phenomena recurrently frames them as a rupture, dissolution, exception, overlapping, or blurring of the division between internal and international security (BIGO, 2001, 2016; ERIKSSON; RHINARD, 2009; LUTTERBECK, 2005), military forces and police (CELI, 2016; EDMUNDS, 2006; FRIESENDORF, 2012; OJO, 2008; WEISS, 2011), defense and public security (SAINT-PIERRE, 2011), as well as crime and war (ANDREAS; PRICE, 2001; FELDMAN, 2006). The use of these terms, however, supposes the existence of a previous situation of normality that underwent transformations. It is essential to understand, however, what has been disordered, that is, which is the normality benchmark, assumed by most of the bibliography, making it possible to claim something is changing.

Weiss (2011), Eriksson, and Rhinard (2009) pointed out that even though many analysts have claimed something is changing in the relationship between internal and external security,

there is no general framework to guide empirical research. Seeking an unambiguous definition that could inform empirical inquiries, Weiss (2012) proposed to trace the line between military and police tasks through a twofold definition, which is based on territorial boundaries, on the one hand, and on the set of methods and instruments employed by each force, on the other. Under this token, the police is defined by its authority to employ coercion within the state's territorial borders, and for having instruments and tactics organized toward the minimal degree of force employment. While the armed forces are intended to act only in the international sphere and are trained for the extreme use of force, having instruments and doctrines designed for lethality.

This solution, however, is not new. Rather, it is largely disseminated in the literature on military missions and widely assumed as the normality benchmark (DAHLBERG; DALGAARD-NIELSEN, 2020; HUNTER, 1996; OJO, 2008; SAIN, 2018; SAINT-PIERRE, 2011). In contrast to what Weiss (2012) argued, the problem is not the absence of a framework guiding empirical research on the state's instruments of force, but how the framework grounding this research agenda has been acritically taken for granted, remaining mostly unquestioned. In fact, the rupture claimed by several authors refers more to the theoretical perspective conventionally employed to make sense of the state's instruments of force, than to the way in which these instruments have been historically deployed. Saint-Pierre (2011) evidences the normative character of the differentiation between defense and public security, grounded on the idea of a sharp division between a domestic pacified sphere and an anarchical international system when he states that the philosophical logic on which this division is based, whose starting point is the Hobbesian notion of the social pact, is not "a chronological or historical beginning, but a merely logical perspective" (SAINT-PIERRE, 2011, p. 422).

Adopting the inside/outside traditional division to address military missions generates more analytical difficulties than clarifications. From an empirical point of view, this sharp division posited by many has never been very clear. For instance, analyses grounded on this perspective have problems explaining both cases in which the armed forces' domestic deployment is incorporated into legal and social normality, and cases in which the acceptance or rejection of certain military tasks change, that is when a previously accepted action becomes rejected, or a previously inconceivable task becomes plausible.

Moreover, the urge to insert reality into an a priori theoretical conception hinders the development of the research agenda, as it led researchers to split into two poles when it comes to military missions. On the one side, a group condemns the domestic employment of the armed forces, characterizing it as a distortion of the normal organization of the state's violence

(LÓPEZ, 2016; SAINT-PIERRE, 2015). On the other side, are those who advocate for a supposedly pragmatic necessity for this type of military operation, based on the nature of certain threats, even though the domestic deployment of armed forces is a historical characteristic of several countries (NORDEN, 2016; PION-BERLIN, 2016).

The conflict between a normative theoretical framework and contradicting historical phenomena translates into conflicting statements in the literature. It is not difficult to find annalists sustaining, on the one hand, that the military operations within states' borders represent a rupture of the supposedly normal division of work between military and police forces, and, on the other hand, describing empirical cases in which the military domestic operations are so constant that it turns to be the normality, not an occasional distortion. This tension can be observed in the studies about the armed forces' deployment against organized crime, especially illicit drug trafficking, in Latin America.

In this context, many scholars have argued that the use of the military instrument in combating drug traffickers represents a distortion of the armed forces' primary missions, attributing to them tasks for which they have not been trained. It is argued that the military are prepared for the maximum use of violence, while a fellow citizen who commits a crime must be subjected to the judicial system, which is enforced through the minimum degree of force, not the state's lethality instrument (LÓPEZ, 2003, 2016; MATHIAS; SOARES, 2003; OLIVEIRA, 1994; RODRIGUES, 2016; SAIN, 2001; SAINT-PIERRE, 2007; WINAND; RODRIGUES; AGUILAR, 2016). At the same time, these works admit the fact that, although in the post-Cold War era and after the military dictatorships in this region, the armed forces' domestic operations have been mostly directed against crime, Latin American militaries performing countless domestic activities is a historical feature (ROUQUIÉ, 1984). In Brazil and Argentina, as discussed in previous work, even though the target of the armed forces' domestic missions changed according to historical conjunctures, the role of the military as responsible for maintaining internal order has been a constant (SUCCI JUNIOR, 2018a).

The Brazilian armed forces, for instance, were responsible for repressing the indigenous population in the colonial era, and for containing contesting movements against the Brazilian Empire, during the first half of the nineteenth century. In the First Republic (1889-1930), they assumed activities such as the command of police and firefighters, interventions in local politics at federal command, and the imposition of the legal order. In this period, the military assault on Canudos' community, between 1896 and 1897, stood out. It is also important to highlight that the armed forces played a central role in both the institution and dissolution of the Brazilian Empire, which resulted in the establishment of the First Republic. Moreover, the military

domestic deployment was particularly present in the *Estado Novo* dictatorial regime, instituted in 1937, and characterized the military dictatorship, initiated by the 1964 coup (McCANN, 2007; ROUQUIÉ, 1984). Similarly, in Argentina, according to Rouquié (1984, p. 123, translated by the author), the army “had no enemies other than the indigenous population repressed in the South and pacified in the North during the 1930s, the Buenos Aires metallurgists in 1919, the Patagonian agricultural workers in 1920, and the anarchists from Europe”. During the twentieth century, the country underwent a series of military coups and political mobilizations were constantly repressed by the armed forces (DELLASOPPA, 1998).

The tension between theoretical claims about disruption and the recurrence of domestic military operations, as well as between normative principles and historical events, is not exclusive to Latin American countries. In Canada, recent events have been regarded as sings of increasing involvement of the armed forces in domestic issues, such as: the establishment of Canada Command, focused on internal tasks, in 2006; the Civil Assistance Plan signed with the United States Northern Command, in 2008, which provides support for emergency operations, including terrorist attacks, natural disasters and criminal activities; and the first National Defense Strategy’s embracement of domestic missions in support of international events, response to terrorism, and support to civilian authorities during crises, also in 2008. The supposed novelty of these measures contrasts with the history of domestic military operations in this country (HEAD; SCOTT, 2009). Throughout the nineteenth century, the Canadian armed forces were regularly mobilized to deal with issues considered threats to public order (MORTON, 1970). Between 1900 and 1933, the military instrument was frequently used for suppressing strikes. In the 1970s, the Canadian Forces were mobilized against separatist groups in Quebec, and for the 1976 Olympic Games. From 1870 to 1990, the armed forces were deployed five times against autochthonous populations. In 1990, at the request of the Quebec government, a large military operation was undertaken to dismantle barricades erected in indigenous reserves (HEAD; SCOTT, 2009; SOKOLSKY, 1993).

In Italy, a similar dynamic can be identified. The employment of the military for urban patrol and migratory control is noteworthy in the country. The longest military operation on national territory – operation *Strade Sicure* – is underway since 2008. It is aimed at combating terrorism and crime and, more recently, was also involved in the containment of the Covid-19 pandemic (CAMERA DEI DEPUTATI, 2021). The armed forces deployment within the Italian territory is not novel, however. Other than the authoritarian experience in the early twentieth century, when the military were widely mobilized to enforce public order, after the second world war, the Italian armed forces fought domestic insurgencies, organized crime, and

irregular migratory flows. The nineties are particularly remembered for operations against criminal groups, such as *Forza Paris* and *Vespri Siciliani* (BATTILOSSI, 2000; CABIGIOSU, 2005; STRIULI, 2016). According to Lutterbeck (2010) the Italian army was deployed in ten domestic operations from 1900 to 2000.

Turkey is also illustrative. According to Yilmaz (2020), there has never been a clear distinction between armed forces and police. From 1929, when the country was founded, to 1987 it was governed under martial law, in the context of which the armed forces were regularly deployed domestically. In addition, the author claims that the process of autonomisation of the police forces from the military institutions concurred with their adoption of militarized equipment and training.

Even in African countries, marked by the artificial establishment of state borders, there are claims about a process of blurring between external military action and internal police operation (OJO, 2008). Abel Esterhuyse (2019) argues that the recent domestic involvement of South African armed forces in fighting crime, protecting the borders, and assisting actions against poaching, is preceded by different kinds of internal deployment in the country's history. From the nineteenth century to the decade of 1920, they were mobilized to quell uprisings of white industrial workers, while from 1921 to 1932 the South African Defense Forces suppressed violently various indigenous populations. After that, from 1979 to 1994, the military were domestically mobilized against anti-apartheid movements. If at the beginning of the twenty-one century an effort was made to drive the armed forces out of domestic operations, according to the author, it came back in the security of the 2010 Soccer World Cup.

In South America, the adoption of the traditional theoretical division as the parameter of normality is central to scholars normatively concerned with reintegrating the armed forces into the democratic political regime after the end of military dictatorships, in the late 1980s. The main concern of this part of the literature was the political control of the military by the elected civilian government, which entailed many issues such as removing the armed forces from the center of the political power, institutionalizing the civilian control over the armed forces, democratically defining the defense policy, overseeing the military compliance with the activities determined by the government, as well as the efficiency with which they perform these tasks (BRUNEAU; MATEI, 2008; PION-BERLIN; MARTÍNEZ, 2017).

In this context, some authors saw the great number of internal security operations performed by the armed forces as the outcome of a weak political control over the military (HUNTER, 1996; ZAVERUCCHA, 2008). However, this perspective is dismissive of the fact that the domestic mobilization of the military in recent years is part of the civilian government's

agenda and not necessarily an autonomous decision of the armed forces (DIAMINT, 2015; HARIG, 2021). As noted by Levy (2014, p. 79), politically controlling the military is different from controlling the militarization, which he regards as “the mechanisms for legitimizing the use of force”. Accordingly, Croissant *et al* (2010) defined civilian control as the primacy over the decision-making, that is, the situation in which the elected government decides and supervises all the armed forces’ activities, precluding any military autonomous decision. Under this perspective, the authors claim that military internal security operations per se do not undermine the political control when determined and monitored by the civilian authority.

Certainly, concerns might be raised about the effect this kind of operation has on the military social recognition and, consequently, the political influence and bargaining power this institution may gain. In this sense, other efforts have been made to understand the relations between domestic operations and political control over the military. Harig and Ruffa (2021) differentiate ‘operational pulling’ and ‘political pulling’, that is, broadening the range of military tasks and involving the military in politics, and argued that the former may create the conditions for the later.

Pion-Berlin (2012) sustained that the degree of military autonomy impacts the armed forces’ capability to negotiate their compliance with undesirable operations determined by the civilian government. By his turn, Desch (2008) associated changes in the security environment, and consequently in the array of military missions, with the weakening or strengthening of the civilian political control over the armed forces. Accordingly, Bove et al. (2020) contended that the increasing number of terrorist attacks and threats create a structure of opportunity for the armed forces to push their way into politics. The notion that removing the military from the political sphere would require keeping its activities directed to the outside, was also broadly present in South American literature.

Two other concerns were raised about the armed forces’ role in democracy. First, the use of violence against fellow citizens, given the systematic human rights violations perpetrated by the military during authoritarian governments. Second, the alert that the recurrence of the armed forces’ internal deployment against non-state actors could jeopardize their ability to respond to conventional military threats and, consequently, undermine the state’s political autonomy. (D’ARAUJO; CASTRO, 2000; MATHIAS; SOARES, 2003; SAINT-PIERRE, 2007)

The connection between political control of the armed forces and the nature of the operations assigned to them, as well as the tradeoff between recurrent domestic military operations and traditional defense capabilities, are very rich and important research agendas,

which are open to further developments. The focus here, however, is how a particular kind of use of force becomes acceptable, normalized, and, sometimes, desirable. In this sense, I engage with the literature by questioning the internal/external framework conceiving the organization of the state's instruments of violence. As suggested, it was well-received by South American literature on civil-military relations mainly because it served the goal of withdrawing the military from the political realm. In fact, Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas (2011) opposed this perspective claiming it is strictly normative. The authors maintained that in Latin America the claim for a sharp division between military and police functions arises from a civilian distrust in the military, after the authoritarian regimes. According to them, this differentiation leaves the states vulnerable to intermediate transnational threats, which lie at the intersection between military and police attributions.

From this perspective, in a later work, Pion-Berlin (2016) proposed what he called a pragmatic approach. The author wondered on what occasions it would make sense to allocate the armed forces to domestic tasks and sustained that the decision process should be based on three aspects: the urgency of the problem; the ability of the armed forces to respond effectively to it; and the lack of a feasible alternative. Pion-Berlin's claim for a pragmatic response to a supposedly objective reality is questionable. The argument he presents consists of a proposal of how countries should manage their armed forces' missions, rather than an explanation of the decisions already taken. It constitutes, therefore, another normative principle. Indeed, the urgency of the problem, the military's responsiveness, and the lack of other solutions are not self-evident issues. Rather, they depend on a process of definition and interpretation of reality. Although several actors observe the same situation, it will not necessarily be perceived in the same way, and even if it is, the action resulting from this perception is unlikely to be homogeneous, i.e. materiality has no ontological precedence in explaining social action.

My argument, therefore, is not about criticizing the normative nature of a theoretical perspective, contrasting it with what is considered to be the objective reality, but showing that every decision about the use of the force necessarily reflects a preceding cognitive and evaluative process that shapes the limits of what is acceptable, that is, a process of legitimation (JACKSON, 2006a). In this sense, the tension expressed in the bibliography with terms such as rupture or blurring between the domestic and international security is primarily a tension of the interpretative framework that gives meaning to a set of activities and modes of action considered proper to the armed forces. Therefore, what is at stake is a particular understanding of reality and a set of values and beliefs that underpin a particular organization of the states' instruments of force.

Moreover, some works on military missions focus on the legal regulation of the armed forces' functions. In those cases, the parameter of normality is the legal framework (CLARKE, 2006; GROSSO, 2012). Thus, the transformation of the type of task legally provided or its non-compliance would constitute an interruption of normality. Despite national legal specificities, the determination that the military is the state institution responsible for guaranteeing its sovereignty and that, on an emergency basis, can be deployed domestically to deal with specific situations that have exceeded the operational capacity of the regular security forces, is a common feature of liberal democratic jurisdictions (CLARKE, 2006; DONADIO, 2016). In this sense, the possibility of deviation from the established military functions is already incorporated into legal normality.

Even though it is provided by the law, as I will further address in the third chapter, defining a situation as an emergency is eminently a political move since it is not an objective or unquestionable claim. It is evident in the Brazilian regulations on GLO operations. The law provides that the armed forces may be employed in activities of this type when the regular public security instruments are insufficient to deal with a given situation (BRASIL, 1999). However, what determines that the security instruments are unavailable or insufficient is not an objective criterion, but the president's formal recognition. That is to say, the regular policing instruments will be insufficient, allowing the internal mobilization of the armed forces, when the president states their insufficiency (SUCCI JUNIOR, 2018b). The internal mobilization of military forces depends on a political process that constructs this action as necessary and, therefore, legitimate. As will be further discussed, legality can be as much a result of a political process of legitimation as an instrument used by the actors involved in this dynamic. In the legal quest as well, rupture is relative to the construction and reconstruction of the limits of the acceptable action.

In this sense, I argue that the question to be asked to understand the deployment of the armed forces within national borders refers less to the identification of an essential police and military activity, and more to how the process of proposing and accepting the use of force takes place. Thus, it is necessary to assume that any mobilization of the armed forces, regardless of their geographical location, reflects a political decision, which is inserted in a contingent social process of defining this action as legitimate. This shifting of focus can prevent analysts from taking a normative theoretical framework – the inside/outside division – as an objective historical reality. Instead, it implies that the theoretical division between a supposedly pacified domestic sphere and an anarchical international domain must be understood as a normative discourse constitutive of the legitimation process.

Converging approaches can be found in some works with different research concerns. Edmunds (2006), for instance, argues that the changing process of the main military missions, as well as of their organizational structures, does not represent a functional response based on the nature of the threats they are now facing. It is, rather, a reflection of what he called internal and international social-political influences, which shape the states' perception of their own armed forces. Under this token, he contends that the redefinition of the military's missions does not represent a pragmatic response to an objective material reality.

Forster (2006), on his turn, showed that the transformation or conservation of the tasks performed by the armed forces affects their relationship with the society to which they belong and must protect, impacting the legitimacy of the military institution, regarded by him as the society's belief in the importance of the military instrument. Although his concern is not about what makes a particular military activity acceptable, but how the nature of the tasks performed by them affects their own legitimacy, his work converges with the argument made here. This is because, Forster, on the one hand, makes no a priori assumption about what the military should or should not do and, on the other hand, claims that the armed forces are “shaped and reshaped in relation to not only functional demands but also social and political factors (FORSTER, 2006, p. 74).

I must also highlight Levy's work (2021, 2014, 2020), who has been exploring the legitimization of military deployment to deal with international problems. As mentioned before, he differentiates politically controlling the armed forces – i.e., restricting their freedom of action in matters with political implications – from the controlling of the militarization, which is defined as containing militarism – i.e., the conception that “war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity” (LEVY, 2014, p. 76). Levy, therefore, highlights the ideational and normative dimensions of the process of legitimization, which he associates with social beliefs about war, the nature of the threat, and the efficiency of the use of force. Although his central concern is the willingness to deal with international problems through the military, his argument converges with the idea that to understand the deployment of force it is necessary to analyze its construction as legitimate.

Before focusing more closely on the debate about legitimacy and legitimization, the next section analyzes in more detail the theoretical framework assumed by most of the literature as the normality benchmark to address the state's instruments of violence. It describes the internal logic of this theoretical conception, arguing that it is based on the coalescence of territorial borders, political authority, and community boundaries.

2.1 Domestic, international, and force employment

The theoretical framework that divides the world into internally pacified political units and an anarchic international system is based on the idea that the centralization of political power and the state constitution, characterized by a monopoly on the right to use violence, has eliminated war within its borders, relegating it to the external sphere (RODRIGUES, T., 2010). Under this perspective, the armed forces are an instrument of foreign policy, as they represent the state's instrument of maximum violence, trained for the elimination of the enemy, against which it protects the existence of the polity to which it belongs (ARON, 2002). Under this approach, the territorial boundaries represent the point of separation between a polemic and an agonistic situation, in Julien Freund's terms (1995). In the first, the absence of a centralized authority produces a self-help system whereby each state must calculate its risks and ensure its existence. In this situation, lethal violence, applied through the military, is considered to be a legitimate instrument for conflict resolution and, ultimately, to guarantee the very existence of actors (FREUND, 1995; MEARSHEIMER, 2001; WALTZ, 2002).

The international polemic condition is, as indicated, opposed to the internal sphere, characterized by the monopolistic centralization of the use of legitimate violence, which underpins a legal order designed to regulate and pacify the relationship between citizens. This situation is called agonistic and is characterized by the abandonment of lethal violence as a legitimate tool for conflict resolution. In the agonistic condition the idea of the enemy, that is, the one whose physical suppression is accepted and often desired in the face of the threat it may pose, is abolished and the predominant figure is the adversary. The relationship between adversaries in an agonistic state is characterized by a dispute, whose central feature is to be guided by predetermined rules, of which the founding norm is nonaggression. Compliance with this standard is guaranteed by a third party, in this case, the state. In this perspective, force employment is considered legitimate only to the minimum degree necessary to enforce the established rules (BOBBIO, 2003; FREUND, 1995; GIDDENS, 2008).

Under this token, those whose behavior does not conform to the domestic legal norms are not adversaries, since they are not under the previously agreed norms. They do not represent an enemy either, since they are national citizens, not to be physically eliminated. Rather, they are criminals, that is, "a 'deviant' who must be adjusted to the norms of acceptable behavior as defined by the obligations of citizenship" (GIDDENS, 2008, p. 205). There is, therefore, a sharp demarcation between the concept of defense, on the one hand, regarded to safeguard the state from external military enemies, and public security, on the other hand, characterized by the

minimum use of coercion, since both those breaking the legally established pattern of behavior and their victim are inserted in the social pact, by which their lives must be guaranteed by the state (LÓPEZ, 2016; SAINT-PIERRE, 2011).

This framework is the common starting point of International Relations' mainstream perspectives, despite their different take on international politics (RODRIGUES, T., 2010). Although most of the neorealism and its variations do not theorize about domestic issues by treating the state as a black box or a billiard ball, it characterizes the external as opposed to the internal. Waltz (2002) considers that the criterion that distinguishes domestic and international cannot be the kind of force employed, since, as he argues, no human order would be immune to violence. The author cites situations of civil war, as well as military dictatorships in South America, and argues that "if the absence of government is associated with violence, so is its existence" (WALTZ, 2002, p. 144). Waltz claims that the difference between domestic and international lies, instead, in the organization to respond to the use of force. While the international level is a self-help system, in the domestic realm, by contrast, public agents are organized to prevent the private use of force. In any case, even though the author may shirk some criticism by not neglecting the possibility of phenomena that challenge the idea of a pacified internal, as opposed to the anarchical international environment, he does not abandon the conventional inside/outside conception, since the situations that differ from this model will be considered exceptional, distorting the standard, normatively established as normal. Moreover, in assuming this division as its starting point, it ignores its constituting process.

Although the strict differentiation between the agonistic domestic sphere and the polemical international system is often attributed to realism and neorealism, it is a widespread assumption in the discipline. From the standpoint of liberal and neoliberal IR thinking, as Ferguson and Mansbach (1996) argue, even if some realistic and neorealistic assumptions are questioned, what is at stake is the extent to which international organizations, regimes, and norms have theoretical significance beyond the state. Although this approach considers cooperation to be possible in an anarchic environment, they accept the idea that the state is a unitary and preponderant actor in international affairs, characterized by the well-defined division between internal and external (KEOHANE, 1984).

This framework, in which the complete division between the domestic and the international guides all spheres of political life, grounds the organization of the force on the theoretical coalescence of physical boundaries, political authority, and community. The territorial border is considered to circumscribe a community that is supposed to be homogeneous and whose existence legitimates the political control over this territory, as well

as a specific form of violence management. Under this logic, it is considered that within the territory there is a homogeneous set of individuals who share the same values, principles of justice, and laws. Conversely, beyond territorial division, there are other communities similar in shape and in content, whose actions are unpredictable. In this way, the belonging to a community is supposed to be mediated by the physical space, which fundamentally delimits the included of the excluded.

As for the force employment, under this conventional framework, the mobilization of the state's instrument of lethality within the domestic borders would mean to direct it against a member of the community, therefore it would be deemed illegitimate (LÓPEZ, 2016; SAINT-PIERRE, 2011). On the other hand, given the unpredictability of what lies beyond borders, it would be seen as legitimate to use maximum force to ensure the existence of the political community, which is confused with the physical integrity of its borders. In this context, the focus is on interstate violence. Little attention is paid to the international performance of non-state violent actors. That is because, under this token, the state is deemed to monopolize violence also at the international level, by being responsible for controlling the private violence steaming from its territory. The state is, in this sense, responsible for repressing non-state violent groups that have their base in its territory, but whose performance is transnational (THOMPSON, 1994).

In sum, the strict division between armed forces and police relays on the inside/outside framework, according to which the world is divided into mutually exclusive political unities, whose borders draw a sharp line between a pacified domestic realm, characterized by the minimum degree of violence, and an international sphere that requires the maximum display of force. This framework, by its turn, is underpinned by the theoretical assumption that welds together the territorial, political, and community boundaries. The physical delimitation, the reach of the political power, the limits of a community's membership, and, consequently, the division between police and armed forces, are reified in a fixed and ahistorical category – the state. This reified coalescence is the deeper theoretical source of the analytical gaps previously identified – i.e. the difficulties in explaining the naturalization of the armed forces' domestic deployment, as well as the transformation in the acceptance or rejection of this kind of military mission.

Even though the literature on military missions resists in moving away from this framework, it has been widely challenged by IR and International Security theorists. The next sections analyze the overlapped elements, showing that they cannot be seen as an objective description of a static 'thing'. Rather, they are constituted by broadly unsettled principles and

normative discourses mobilized and reinterpreted to support or reject a wide, and sometimes contradictory, range of actions. This analysis stresses the need to move passed this essentialist and ahistorical approach to the organization of state violence.

2.2 Territory, community, political authority, and force employment

The inside/outside conception of the political world, underpinning the blurring argument, has already been widely challenged in the literature of International Relations Theory and International Security Studies, particularly in their critical branches. A common point among its critics regards historicity or ahistoricity. It is argued that the state should be treated as a historically unique kind of political and territorial organization. For these authors, the ahistorical way in which it is accounted by International Relations' traditional approaches makes it difficult to grasp transformations in the international system (AGNEW, 1994; RUGGIE, 1993a; WALKER, 1993; WENDT, 1987).

As for the historicization of the modern state, Charles Tilly's fundamental work (1985) reveals the historical specificity of the modern state as well as the current understanding of the internal and external division. Tilly discloses how the complex interplay between war-making, its consequent demand for extraction, and capital accumulation culminated in the early European states. He claims that the state's emergence was not an intended goal of the elites' pursuit of war but a consequence of a particular process it happened to trigger.

Moreover, Tilly argues that the extension of the European model to other parts of the world did not create identical states. For instance, according to Miguel Centeno (1997), the state in Latin America did not stem from war-making. Analyzing the wars of independence in the region in the nineteenth century, Centeno showed that the military conflicts did not produce considerable increase in taxation or institutional consolidation, as they did in the European experience. Instead, according to the author, Latin American states were grounded on the debt they undertook to finance the wars. Moreover, he claims that there were not national elites willing or capable to convert the opportunity provided by the wars into centralized political control. Centeno, then, concludes by alerting us that it is problematic to employ such idiosyncratic experience as the European states' construction to formulate universalistic models.

The critique of ahistoricity is a common point among different IR theorists. Wendt (1987) argues that Waltz reifies the state by understanding international structure not as a constitutive element of actors, but as constraining pre-existing actors, thus neglecting a theory

of state constitution and transformation of international politics. Accordingly, John Ruggie (1993), observing the European process of integration, argued IR has conceptual gaps that make it difficult to understand change in international systems, being the territorial state's fixity the main one. For Ruggie, the effort to understand transformation in the state's system involves analyzing the specific historical processes that produced the historically unique configuration of the political space observed in the modern international system. He converges with Wendt, regarding the need for a theory about the state in IR, concerned with the processes that produced this specific organization of the political space. Ferguson and Mansbach (1996) reiterated this argument and contended that no significant theoretical development could be made until the ahistorical analytical framework on the state and the static territorial separation between the pacified domestic realm and the anarchic external sphere are abandoned.

Rob Walker (1993), perhaps the most cited author in the inside/outside debate, presents International Relations theories as the expression of a historically specific way of understanding political life, which submits it to the state's territory, neglecting the historical character and socially constructed character of space. This perspective is responsible, according to Walker, for a characteristic ambivalence in IR: the oscillation between permanence and obsolescence of the state. He exemplifies this logic through John Herz's work, who first argued advances in military technology would reach a point where sovereign states' territorial borders would no longer be able to fulfill their purpose, that is, to provide physical protection to its members, and, subsequently, questioned his own conclusions by asserting the continuity of the states' sovereign power. On the other hand, Walker argues that the naturalization of the territorial state makes theorists who seek expressions of political life beyond these physical boundaries eventually incur in the reproduction of the state model in larger, supranational dimensions, which he calls the Gulliver theme, in reference to Jonathan Swift's novel.

For him the ahistorical territorial perspective has four major consequences in IR: a) any perception of threat to the integrity of the state's borders or territory are automatically converted into statements about its decline; b) possible alternatives to state political organization are limited to their larger reproduction; c) any innovation in the international system is received with theses foreseeing radical transformations in the immediate future; d) if universalistic assumptions about how international organizations should develop do not materialize exactly as it is expected to do, it is followed by assertions that everything remains as it has always been. For the author, this territorially fixed and historically inert conception of the state is a theoretical constraint that does not allow the elaboration of reasonable alternatives to the contemporary

reality in which “the limits of the state became the limits of theoretical reconstruction” (WALKER, 2013, p.206).

Ruggie (1993) undertook an effort of historical reconstruction in IR. He sustained three irreducible dimensions that produced the modern territorial conformation: a) the material environment; b) the strategic behavior; c) and the social episteme transformation. The first refers to intense economic growth between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, followed by a profound crisis, which, for the author, profoundly tightened social arrangements. The second refers to a utilitarian instrumentalization of material change, aiming at the political centralization. Finally, Ruggie argued that the transition from the Middle Ages to the modern territorial state reflected a broad transformation in what he called social episteme, extending far beyond the political realm, as exemplified by the one-point perspective in the field of visual arts. The author claimed that the way in which a society forges its identity, and its norms are not only the result of material determinations or instrumental rationality but of an intersubjective set of beliefs. The transformation in the social episteme, he evidenced, can be understood not only as a result or promoter of a change in the form of political organization but as a reproduction mechanism of this territorial political organization, a specific characteristic of modernity. By inserting the idea of social episteme in the analysis of the state’s construction, Ruggie showed that the significant social action is not, or not only, explained by materiality, in this case, the territorial division. Rather, it is also resultant of the meaning intersubjectively attributed to this material reality, which highlights the malleability of the territory’s meaning, to the detriment of the fixity inscribed in conventional approaches.

Under this token, we can distinguish space and territory from spatiality and territoriality. Agnew (1994) defines space as the physical place in which political and economic processes occur, while spatiality is understood as the way in which space is represented. The author also argues that the daily representation of space, although not receiving much attention, deeply symbolizes our identity and the way we value right and wrong. In a related way, Robert David Sack (1986) had previously defined territoriality as the relationship between society and territory, and the latter as the physical space in itself. Territoriality, for Sack, is socially constructed and thus susceptible to historical transformations, which allow us to understand the relationship between society, space, and time.

The challenges posed to the traditional fixed conception about the state and its territory call our attention to the transformations in the organization of political life, as well as the beliefs and ideas underpinning it. When it comes to the organization of violence, the conception about what can be done through force changed dramatically over time (FINNEMORE, 2004). The

explanatory difficulties found in the literature on military missions, as presented in the first section, are the byproduct of applying this broadly contested ahistorical approach to make sense of the domestic deployment of the armed forces. The framework conventionally mobilized to theorize military missions, and its difference from police activities, overlaps and reifies three main elements – political authority, community, and territory –, whose meaning varied widely, being often mobilized to support contradictory actions. In this sense, the internal and external division, guiding the distinction between armed forces and police and grounding the blurring argument, should be seen not as an objective description, but as a normative interpretation of how the state's violence is to be organized. To further develop this argument, in the following sections, each component of this theoretical model has been separately addressed.

2.2.1 Political Authority

Terms such as mutual exclusion, territorial differentiation (RUGGIE, 1993a), space homogeneity (WALKER, 2013), and cylindrical topography (BIGO, 2001) refer to the idea of an international system constituted of territorially delimited and mutually exclusive units, within which a structure of authority holds absolute political control. This idea fits into the concept of sovereignty, which, according to Krasner (1999), relates to four different issues: a) mutual recognition between territorial states of formal legal independence; b) exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures; c) the ability of the political authority to exercise effective control within borders; and d) the ability to control flows across borders. The author, however, classifies the concept of sovereignty as organized hypocrisy, since, from an empirical point of view, it has never been stable. Plus, it is routinely violated.

Accordingly, Ferguson and Mansbach (1996) sustained that the territorially delimited mutual exclusion is a legal fiction, since the same territory may contain different political units such as families, tribes, clans, and empires, with the state being just another historically specific type of political unity. Likewise, Agnew (1994) claims a system of authority is not necessarily territorial, it may be based on kinship or be nomadic. Political unity can also transcend states, as, according to Walby (2003), is the case of the European Union.

The treaties that followed the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648, known as the Peace of Westphalia, are traditionally regarded in the field of International Relations as the landmark of the sovereignty consolidation, in terms of political autonomy of territorial units. Murphy (1996) and Osiander (2001), however, sustain that in the seventeenth century, there was not a conception of a world or European order based on sovereignty, as it is currently understood.

States, even after 1648, were not the only form of polity territorial organization. In addition to the Church, which wielded power in many areas, the Holy Roman Empire was constituted of free cities, principalities, duchies, republics, confederations, and early forms of state, which coexisted within the same territory. Osiander (2001) points out that scholars tend to ignore that the Holy Roman Empire, whose operation contrasts with the idea of sovereignty – deemed to have been consolidated in 1648 – existed until 1806.

According to the author, the widespread narrative about the Thirty Years War in IR divides the conflict into two poles. On the one hand, the Habsburg dynasty, which sought the establishment of a supranational monarchy and, on the other, a group of actors defending their right to independence, i.e. to sovereignty. The author defends that the Habsburgs were not threatening the independence of these political units and the war. On the contrary, it was initiated by the expansionist aim of other actors. According to him, the Peace of Westphalia's treaties dealt with practical issues and did not refer to sovereignty, independence, and non-intervention.

Osiander (2001) regards the conventional reading of the Westphalian Peace as war propaganda, around which the French and Swedish crowns hinged their narratives to justify and make their military actions plausible. According to him, in the nineteenth century, historians enthusiastic about the concept of nation-state, acritically embraced this discourse. Accordingly, in the twentieth century International Relations scholars, also under the normative influence of this concept, perpetuated the propagandistic interpretation. This process, for the author, has produced a simplistic conception of what the international is, which is not capable of dealing with diverse patterns of political organization. Moreover, the sovereign state perspective is convenient from the point of view of the disciplinary differentiation, tracing the line, for instance, between International Relations and Political Science, as it creates two clearly delimited objects of study – international and domestic (BIGO, 2001; WALKER, 2013).

Even within the ideal territorial modern state, as Ruggie (1993) argued, the principle of mutual exclusion produces a paradoxical situation of absolute individualization, in which states need to create devices to tackle issues not confined to their territory. Examples of such artifices include the recognition of embassies as extraterritorial spaces that, according to the author, solved problems such as the practice of criminalized religious rites by foreign political representatives. For him, interstate spaces of interaction such as functional regimes, common markets, and military alliances are also illustrative.

Regarding interstate interactions, among the phenomena evidencing the artificiality of mutual exclusion based on territoriality is multilateral governance systems, which presuppose

states ceding a portion of their political authority over their territories, such as international regulations on human rights and environmental issues (BENHABIB, 2009; LINKLATER, 1998; WERRELL; FEMIA, 2015). Under this token, domestic regulation of criminal activities, conventionally understood as the sole responsibility of the sovereign state, is importantly influenced, and in some cases imposed, by external actors (EISSA, 2005; PEREIRA, 2015; RODRIGUES, 2012).

Perhaps the most significant challenge to the concept of sovereignty is foreign military interventions, often pointed out as its opposite, since it explicitly disrupts mutual exclusion, based on territorial inviolability. While the principle of nonintervention remains in force and central to the relations between states, interventionist practices have become routine, to the extent that sometimes countries have to justify their decision not to intervene in a domestic situation in another state, which gives the impression that intervention has become the norm (OLSSON, 2015). Although their recurrence, interventionist practices require legitimization practices, framing them as acceptable. This process of justification, as Cynthia Weber (1995) showed, reveals much about the malleability of the concept of sovereignty, constantly reinterpreted by both diplomatic professionals and scholars. Indeed, Murphy (1996) has shown that the historical variation in the way in which sovereignty was employed is associated with impulses to justify or reject military aggression.

In this sense, when an intervention is questioned for violating the principle of sovereignty, the concept is reinterpreted to make it coherent with interventionist actions. This movement is clear in the case of humanitarian interventions, which mobilize a set of ethical justifications on the basis of which the use of military force from one state within another is not considered a declaration of war, under international law (ÁVILA; ROCHA, 2018). For instance, the formulators of the Responsibility to Protect sought to establish criteria that would always legitimize the non-consensual force employment in a foreign territory. This endeavor took place through the reinterpretation of sovereignty not only as a right but also as a responsibility. However, the guidelines for outlining which interventions would be considered legitimate proposed by the International Commission on State Intervention and Sovereignty (ICISS) – the seriousness of harm, the motivation, the nonexistence of alternatives, the response proportionality, and the balance of consequences – were filtered through a process of political negotiation within the United Nations (UN) (BELLAMY, 2008; EVANS, 2009).

Other than humanitarian interventions, military actions in foreign territories are also supported by framing certain states as fragile or failed, as they do not contemplate the requirements to be considered sovereign, being, consequently, regarded as (potential) threats to

international security (PRINZ; SCHETTER, 2017). This discourse, which supports interventionist practices, can be contrasted with another sovereignty interpretation that underpinned the establishment of the former European colonies as sovereign states after World War II: self-determination. According to Jackson (1990), in this context, the right to political autonomy was attributed to countries that could not support it in practice and, therefore, could be easily interpreted as fragile or failed. Moreover, Chowdhury (2018) argues that not fulfilling the fundamental tasks of the modern state is not the exception. Rather, he claims that “the history of the modern state is one in which states that have been capable of fulfilling their fundamental tasks – monopolizing violence and delivering services – are the anomaly” (CHOWDHURRY, 2018, p. 3).

In this sense, the experience of those former European colonies is illustrative of the instrumentalization and reinterpretation of sovereignty. Clapham (1999) shows that the international sovereignty regime, which originated in Europe, served not only to regulate relations between European states but also to consolidate their colonial domination over other regions of the globe since all territories that did not satisfy the parameter of sovereignty could be freely appropriated. On the other hand, he points out that the same countries that underwent colonization came to strongly defend the European model of sovereignty after independence. He argues that even though these countries’ adherence to the very normative model that grounded foreign rule over their territories and populations may seem paradoxical, it is not contradictory. This is because, once the sovereignty presupposes legal equality between states, non-subordination of one polity to another, and non-intervention in internal affairs, the international sovereignty regime was embraced by the newly independent countries as a way to pursue some degree of autonomy from the most powerful states in the international system, including their former colonizers. Moreover, the sovereignty regime has also served as an international uphold for the local government to consolidate domestic control over the territory and the population.

In this realm, we can recall Finnemore’s argument (2009). Interested in the constraints on the powerful countries’ actions in the international system, she argues that while powerful states build international mechanisms seeking to legitimize their power, they impose restrictions on their own actions. The author defends, however, that when restrictions are not convenient for these countries, they assume hypocritical behavior. They defend certain principles, such as nonintervention, and disrespect them at the same time. An analogous behavior can be identified in the case of former European colonies. After the independence processes, they sought to uphold their autonomy and political authority through the principle of self-determination, while

denying this same right to domestic ethnic groups, to prevent loss of jurisdiction over part of their territory. It resulted in the perpetuation of the boundaries established by the process of colonization (JACKSON, 1990).

In this manner, sovereignty can be understood as a set of intersubjective practices and understandings that change over time, rather than the empirical description of an objective and static phenomenon (WEBER, 1992). Similarly, it is possible to understand the reinterpretation of the meaning of sovereignty as an instrument to legitimize or reject a particular course of action. The malleability of this concept reveals the impossibility of seeking through it an essentialist definition for the state's organization of violence. However, their importance should not be overlooked. Ideas are not only the result of circumstances, rather, they play an active role in shaping them.

Accordingly, Agnew (2008) and Murphy (1996) claim that the concept of sovereignty eclipsed alternative conceptions and became naturalized in political thought. By ruling the political imagination and becoming the only imaginable framework to organize political life, it limited the way we perceive and act in the world (AGNEW, 2008; MURPHY, 1996). Therefore, identifying sovereignty's importance and role in international and domestic relations implies recognizing it does not refer to the description of a fixed reality. Instead, it consists in a normative principle that is reinterpreted in time and space, by both diplomatic and academic practices (WEBER, 1995).

2.2.2 Community

The distinction between domestic and international, the right to political autonomy in a given territory, the right to declare war, exercise police power, and enforce a specific domestic order are all grounded on the idea that the borders of the state represent the boundaries of a community. Under the conventional framework, underlying most of the work on military missions, the territorial division is both the boundaries of the sovereign power and the delimitation of the community the state claims to represent and protect. This conception is particularly important since, from this perspective, the idea of a homogeneous community underpins what is considered legitimate or illegitimate in terms of violence employment (FREUND, 1995; SANTILLÁN, 1997). Notwithstanding, as Cynthia Weber (1995, p. 27) argued "while the belief that sovereign authority resides in 'the people' has become a less and less questioned foundation of state authority in the modern state system" the definition of "who the people are and who legitimately can speak for them is contested and constructed daily in

international practice”. Three main perspectives on the delimitation of the community’s boundaries can be highlighted – social contract, nation, and citizenship.

Accounts about community are surprisingly overlooked in works about military domestic deployments. Among the few exceptions, Saint-Pierre’s work (2011) is grounded on contractarianism, especially on Thomas Hobbes’ perspective, from which he considers that the community is constituted by those who voluntarily assign powers to a sovereign in order to preserve their own existence. Under this perspective, the community would be constituted through an instrumental decision taken by a group of individuals who choose to form a collectivity through a social contract. Its boundaries, therefore, would be confused with the physical space occupied by the individuals involved in this initial contract (ANDERSON, 1996).

On the other hand, as mentioned, the right of the state to declare war – *Jus ad Bellum* – and thus the legitimacy of employing its lethality, is traditionally grounded in the claim that it represents a national community (WALZER, 1977). Under this logic, the delimitation of the community is associated with the idea of nation and its link with territorial state. In this context, the community would be constituted by a group of individuals who identify themselves in an imagined community, based on a common sense of inheritance, symbols, and shared culture (ANDERSON, 2008).

Max Weber (2002) made a distinction between these two forms of collectivity. He called community the set of social actions based on a subjective and affective feeling of belonging to a whole, while social relations inspired by a logic of compensation, that is, based on a rational pact aiming at a certain end, constitute a society. Under this logic, we could associate the contractarian view with the latter, since the collectivity’s boundaries, under this approach, are traced by the formal bond to an agreement seeking a specific compensation. The nation, on the other hand, could be associated with the notion of subjective belonging, whose contours are less clear. Weber asserts, however, that most social relations have both community and society characteristics. Moreover, any social relationship, even the most strictly derived from the rational pursuit of some end, can give way to affective values that transcend the pursued ends.

In the contemporary analysis of the domestic military operations, the concept of nation is not mentioned. Rather, the rejection of the armed forces mobilization within the state’s borders, in activities that presuppose the use of the force, is often grounded on the idea that the state cannot mobilize its instrument of lethal force against its own citizens (LÓPEZ, 2016), which leads us to a third conception about what defines the domestic community – citizenship. Under this perspective, the right of an individual to be protected, which implies guaranteeing

his/her moral and physical integrity, even if s/he has committed a crime, derives from his/her formal membership to the collectivity circumscribed by the state's territorial borders, and not to his/her belonging to a nation. Therefore, it is the individual formal bond to a state, expressed through the concept of citizenship, the factor that traces the community boundaries and, consequently, assures the individual civil, political, and social rights, as well as a series of obligations, restricting the use of state force against him (BRUBAKER, 1992; MARSHALL, 1950).

Citizenship as formal belonging could be associated with the contractarian perspective of voluntary association. In this sense, we observe that the bibliography on military missions tends to conceive the collectivity to be protected under a logic of society and not of community, in Max Weber's terms. The notion of formal agreement is emphasized over the feeling of belonging, inclusion, and social exclusion of a certain group. I should point out, however, that the bibliography on citizenship is not dismissive of the dimensions of belonging, which is not restricted to the institutional bond between individual and state but encompass the identity dimension (JOPPKE, 2007). Therefore, it could be understood from the national community perspective as well, even though it is not the way it appears in the domestic military operations literature.

There is a common problem with all three approaches: the community's homogeneity. The organization of the state's instruments of violence is often analyzed on the assumption that the community to be regulated by the police and protected by the armed forces has some degree of internal homogeneity, regardless of the form in which it is constituted. When it comes down to the empirical assessment, however, the community boundaries, which theoretically and discursively legitimize both the state's sovereign and its lethal force employment, are more nuanced. Critics of the overlapping between territorial borders, sovereignty, and community agree that the formation of communities, as well as the previously discussed system of rules and authority, are not necessarily grounded on territorial geographical boundaries. They also claim that the same territory can be shared by more than one community, such as kinship systems, clans, nomadic, and indigenous populations (AGNEW, 1994; FERGUSON; MANSBACH, 1996; RUGGIE, 1993; SACK, 1986).

In this sense, opposing the concept of nation-state, Walby (2003) reiterates the mismatch between state borders and community boundaries. The author argues that there are more nations than states, since the nation, defined as a political and cultural project, based on a shared past feeling, does not necessarily constitute a political structure and is not correspondent with the state's territory. Examples are manifold such as Basque in Spain, Québécois in Canada, Middle

East Kurds, and Uighurs in China. She further argues that the historical experiences often associated with the nation-state, such as nineteenth-century Spain, Portugal, and France, were actually empires. It cannot be assumed that the population of the territories dominated by colonial and neocolonial experiences were part of the nation.

Another recurring question about the adequacy between state and community boundaries refers to the dynamics arising from the post-Cold War globalization process. Rosenau (1997) argues that this context has promoted two social dynamics that strain the conventional conception of nation-state, without being impeded by its territorial and legal limitations. On the one hand, cosmopolitan dynamics shaped communities that transcend the physical boundaries of states, and, on the other hand, local dynamics reaffirmed communities circumscribed to the state's territorial borders, without, however, identifying with it.

From the point of view of the formal belonging to a community, it can be highlighted that carrying documents, institutionally recognizing the membership to the society a state declares to represent, does not guarantee that an individual enjoys the rights he is entitled to. Pearce (2010), in this sense, highlights that the processes of re-democratization in Latin American countries, during the 1980s, which were formally marked by greater visibility of civil society rights, did not reflect the reduction of a number of violence suffered by these populations.

My point in presenting this brief appraisal of the complex community debate is that while there is little controversy about the idea that the organization of the state's instruments of violence, as well as the political authority, is grounded on the existence of a community to be protected and ruled, the delimitation of this community's boundaries is widely unclear; it depends on the criteria employed and the social process that gives meaning to it. The territorial circumscription, the formal citizen status, and the nationality do not enable us to explain the practical division between those who are and those who are not submitted to the state's lethal force – represented by the armed forces.

In this sense, beyond the examples of mismatch between state boundaries and a homogeneous community, what is essential to the analysis developed here is the initial movement that draws the line of the community. One cannot neglect the fact that, historically, the construction of what is understood as a pacified domestic environment, characterized by a homogeneous community, was a systematic movement of violent imposition of political authority and unity.

Heather Rae (2003) developed this argument by showing that periods of state-building and reconstruction, such as the end of the Middle Ages in Europe, the collapse of the Ottoman

Empire, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, are linked to phenomena such as large forced population displacements, genocide, ethnic cleansing, or forced conversions. She claims that to assert their legitimacy, the elites leading state-building carried out what Rae defined as a process of pathological homogenization, demarcating the borders of the state as the boundaries of a moral community. Based on six case studies, she argues that in this process of homogenization, the ruling elites mobilize pre-existing symbolic and cultural resources to reinvent collective identities. She shows that the instruments employed vary over time and space. While in the 15th century Spain's homogenization was grounded on religion, in the 19th century the nationalism produced more secular criteria. Rae also points out that, while in the Spanish case the homogenization took place through expulsions and forced conversions, in other cases, such as the Armenian genocide, in the context of the Turkish state construction, and in Serbian attempts to eliminate sectarian movements in the former Yugoslavia, the goal was to physically eliminate the targeted groups.

In Brazil, the process of pathological homogenization can be observed in the practices of pacification, which are operations historically performed by the army, with the aim of controlling the territory and the population (SOUZA et al., 2017). The pacification was first connected to the war of conquest undertaken by the Portuguese crown against the indigenous, during colonization (MOREIRA, 2017), but it has been perpetuated in this country's history. During the nineteenth century, the repression of contesting movements between 1831 and 1848, was called pacification. According to Souza (2017), it served not only to ensure governance but also to secure a national project. Correlating with the practices of pathological homogenization, described by Rae (2003), Souza states that in the Brazilian case the conservative political elite used the fear of popular movements and symbolic devices, negatively characterizing the rebels, to advance their project of establishing a centralized state.

Much of the Brazilian military identity is forged around these practices of pacification, as will be further discussed in chapter five. It is illustrative that the military responsible for many operations within the logic of pacification, Luiz Alves de Lima e Silva, later known as Duke of Caxias, became *Patrono* of the Brazilian Army (CASTRO, 2002). Moreover, during the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964-1985), the Pacificator Medal, a military award, used to be granted to those who had succeeded in the repression against political opponents (JOFFILY; CHIRIO, 2017).

Similarly, Bhabra (2015) argues that while accounts on the concept of citizenship often date back to the ancient Greek city-states and point to the French Revolution and the American War of Independence as milestones of its modern crystallization, this positive articulation of

citizenship simplifies its historical narrative and is dismissive of the, often racial, exclusions that characterized them. Violent practices of constructing an internal unity reveal that the debates on equality, rights, duties, and inclusion within the modern state were preceded by the elimination of those considered divergent. Citizenship is anteceded by a process of state-making, in which differences are forcibly eliminated in the name of domestic unity and pacification.

Therefore, addressing the organization of the state's instruments of force, as well as the delimitation of the spaces and the targets considered legitimate for its performance, involves understanding the unsettled process of delimitating the boundaries of the community. As the malleability of sovereignty's meaning, the boundaries of a community cannot be accounted as objective or rigidly fixed, they are constantly shaped and reshaped. The conventional theoretical framework, underpinning a great part of the military missions' literature, reifies community, equating it with the state's territory and formal recognition, which neglects that groups inside the state's borders are deemed to be aliens. In this way, the process of reshaping the boundaries of a community is interwoven with the construction of a particular use of force as acceptable. Accounts that reify the community's boundaries are constitutive of the explanatory difficulties tackled here. To completely grasp the military domestic deployment, it is necessary to acknowledge that the violent homogenization, embedded in the ideal of unity, is not a past phenomenon, but a feature of the modern state. As Mandelbaum (2016) argues, the congruency of the national body and the political unity is a fantasy, whose impossibility demands an excuse for its failure.

2.2.3 Border and Territory

The debates presented so far corroborate the conception, recurrent in the border studies literature, according to which borders should not be seen only as physical lines located in the limits of a state's territory. Instead, it is the result of a social, political, and cognitive process in which states, divergent social organizations, and actors mobilize ideas of division to produce and maintain certain dynamics of inclusion and exclusion (AGNEW, 2008; KOLOSSOV, 2005; NEWMAN, 2006; PAASI, 2009). From this perspective, borders are practices and discourses that influence social action, being manifested both ideationally and materially.

In contrast to the post-Cold War cosmopolitan optimism that saw globalization and the intensification of transnational flows as a movement toward the reduction of the state's importance and its capacity for exclusion and territorial control (ROSENAU, 1997), there is an

increased effort to control cross-border traffic, associated to the development of surveillance, and policing technologies (BOURNE; JOHNSON; LISLE, 2015). Andreas (2003) argues that if the commitment to border control and monitoring does not allow us to affirm that borders were simply eroded, this phenomenon, however, cannot be read from the perspective that nothing has changed in the relationship between the state and its borders, according to which boundaries are supposed to remain a matter of defense against foreign armed forces (WALT, 1991). For Andreas, borders have not become unimportant, but they are being recreated. He claims to be a shifting in the states' focus, which, while considering the access of certain individuals desirable, seeks to exclude transnational clandestine actors, as the author defined.

The state's concern for border control and policing through surveillance technologies does not mean either that there is a coincidence between border and territory. A border zone can be within, at the edge, or even outside the territorial delimitations of a state. In this sense, Basaran (2008) argues that there is a decoupling between the boundaries of policing, that is, the delimitation within which police power is legally exercised, and the boundaries of rights, i.e. the circumscription within which a set of warranties are provided. In this sense, the demarcation line between inside and outside, as well as police and military tasks is not demarcated by the territory.

The author develops her argument by analyzing the policing power in three border zones – maritime, offshore, and inland. Under maritime regulation, a state, in principle, has only the right to intercept vessels within its borders, while beyond its limits, the state's authority is restricted to vessels with its flag. However, Basaran shows that a series of legal adjustments, established through bilateral agreements, unilateral decisions, and particular reinterpretations of the law, opened the possibility for intercepting vessels with migrants in international waters or even in foreign territorial waters.

Regarding offshore border areas, the author shows that border practices and policies can be developed in a foreign territory, separating, in this way, the policy-making space from its enforcement space. It is illustrated, on the one hand, by the US military prison at Guantanamo Bay and, on the other, by the Pacific Solution, that is, the Australian Government's policy of transporting asylum seekers intercepted on unauthorized vessels to detention centers in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. Finally, Basaran also points out international frontiers within the state's territory. She claims that in the international zones of airports, seaports, or train stations a person may be physically present in a country and legally excluded at the same time. In this sense, the entry into the territory differs from the entry into law, that is, the inclusion of these individuals in the set of rights legally provided.

By analyzing each constitutive component of the theoretical framework that a major part of the literature on military missions took as the normality benchmark, grounding empirical and normative accounts, this chapter sought to unravel the roots of the explanatory gaps initially exposed, which are the inability to explain the normalization of domestic missions and the difficulties to explain the shifting from the acceptance to the rejection of this kind of military operation.

Those gaps stem from the fact that the theoretical framework guiding scholars assumes concepts such as sovereignty, community, and territory as objective descriptions with fixed meanings, that is an object well-defined and universally valid. Instead, as the present chapter showed, these elements are socially and historically changing normative principles, whose meaning is shaped and reshaped, articulated, and rearticulated, according to the set of practices and political organization they are mobilized to support, in a particular time and space. Therefore, fully apprehending the domestic deployment of the armed forces requires denaturalizing notions of sovereignty, community, and territory, as well as their assumed connection. Under this token, to overpass the explanatory difficulties tackled here, it is necessary to empirically investigate the process of legitimation, through which this kind of military task becomes contingently admitted or rejected by a specific collectivity in a particular moment. The following chapter further unfolds the notion of legitimacy and put forward a framework to operationalize research on the legitimation of the military domestic deployment, which moves away from essentialisms.

3 LEGITIMACY AND VIOLENCE LEGITIMATION

“We construct worlds we know in a world we do not” (ONUF, 1989, p. 38)

Thus far a threefold argument has been presented: a) the literature on the domestic deployment of the armed forces takes for granted the inside/outside framework, assuming it as the normality benchmark that not only explains the division between military and police forces but also consists in a desirable normative principle to be implemented; b) grounding inquiries on this framework has been precluding scholars to fully understand both cases in which this kind of military mission is naturalized and cases in which there is a shift in the acceptance or the rejection of the armed forces’ domestic operations; finally, c) we should move away from an essentialist perspective, aiming to identify the inherently military actions and undertake an approach that seeks to grasp how a particular form of employing this instrument of violence becomes acceptable, as well as how this acceptability is reproduced or reshaped over time. This ontological and epistemological turn entails shifting from concerns about the legitimacy of violence – as a static point – to inquiries about the legitimation of violence – as a social process. The present chapter aims to provide an analytical framework to address the legitimation of the military domestic deployment, which enables us to overcome the explanatory difficulties unfold in the last chapter. It might also provide a useful approach to inquire about the legitimation of other kinds of organized violence.

First, it is necessary to distinguish three approaches to legitimacy – normative, legal, and empirical. Although the debate on legitimacy and legitimation is absent in the literature on military domestic operations, this research agenda is grounded on a particular perspective about the legitimacy of violence. When scholars adopt the inside/outside theoretical framework as the parameter of normality through which the empirical phenomena are to be evaluated, they delimit essentialist principles about what are the properly military missions and assume, albeit not explicitly, a normative perspective. Under this approach, aprioristic universal maxims, separated from socially conjectural aspects, are assumed to guide what is acceptable, valid, and, therefore, legitimate. Thereby, the validity of a given action is grounded on the extent to which it complies with pre-established universalistic principles. This approach is explicitly embraced by Cresswell (2004), who seeks to establish moral principles for tracing the legitimacy of the use of force, grounded on John Locke's work. Even though only a few authors explicitly adopt this perspective this is not, as we have seen, peculiar to a particular author but it is the general

tone of analysis about armed forces missions, which set a strict conception about what are essentially military tasks and frame as atypical every operation that differs from it.

This perspective, thoroughly presented in the last chapter, has two fundamental problems. First, analysts grant themselves the position of defining the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a given action. Thus, instead of assessing the acceptance of a particular military operation by a collectivity in a specific time and space, they assume the role of the legitimating actor. In this sense, those analysts are political actors, participating in the dynamic that produces the acceptance or rejection of a certain form of organizing violence. Secondly, as has been pointed out, this perspective neglects the fact that, in many cases, the domestic employment of the armed forces is legitimized, legally provided, and socially consented, even though it is considered a deviation from a theoretical point of view.

A second very common understanding of legitimacy is the legal approach. It is well known that the dictionary definition ties together legitimacy and legality. Under this logic, something is legitimate because it is legally provided. The legal system, however, is the very result of a political and social process of legitimation that contingently crystallizes a specific choice about the proper, i.e. legitimate, forms of violence employment, delimiting the responsible institutions, instruments, intensity, objective, physical space, and time of its performance. On the other hand, legality is also an instrument mobilized by actors participating in a struggle for legitimation. In this sense, it is possible to argue that legitimacy, as the outcome of the legitimation, precedes legality, as well as underpins it. As Beetham (1991, p. 69) argues, “rules cannot justify themselves simply by being rules, but require justification by reference to considerations which lie beyond them”.

Since it results from legitimation, contingently crystalizing a specific way of action, legality serves as a stabilization mechanism, providing some extent of predictability to social life. By establishing behavioral norms, through a formal rite, it also establishes a certain understanding of the role of violence and the actors who perpetrate it. In this sense, certain types of force mobilization do not require constant justification. For instance, when a police officer uses coercion to prevent a robbery, the legitimacy of his action is hardly questioned, and no lengthy justification is required to support the police's right to act coercively. This is not because police action is inherently legitimate, but because the set of beliefs and meanings that grant it the legitimacy to act in this way and under these circumstances is institutionally stabilized by the legal norm and socially naturalized. For instance, when a law is socially regarded as flawed because it is too soft or too hard in dealing with criminality, i.e., it does not match the social expectation about what should be done, its lack of legitimacy may drive security forces to

secretly or explicitly disobeying it, as well as arises demands for its revision. Besides, as shown by Gordon (2020), legal and extrajudicial violence can be deemed legitimate simultaneously, which reinforces the mismatch between legality and legitimacy. In an ethnographical study in poor urban areas of Medellín, the author identified a high degree of residents' endorsement of extrajudicial violence. The naturalization of the extralegal violent activities carried out by a particular group was disclosed by residents providing material support to this group's activities, reporting crimes to the *vigilantes*, instead of the police, as well as a sense of social expectation about the violent punishment they would inflict on the assailants. This distinction is also pointed out by Leyv (2020), who recalls that NATO's intervention in Kosovo was regarded as legitimate by the International Commission on Kosovo, although it lacked legal authorization.

Moreover, it is relatively simple to legally define that the police must enforce the law, as in the robbery prevention example, employing the minimum degree of force needed in a particular situation. Drawing the line between the appropriate degree of coercion and the excessive use of violence, however, is not exactly clear in the daily police operations, especially in some particularly stigmatized areas. For instance, Lawrence (2000) argues that when a police operation is reported by the media, different actors attempt to control the way in which the news are framed. In her study case, she found that the public officials' first move was to advocate that the police disposed only of the amount of force needed to enforce the law. On the other hand, when it was not possible to deny police brutality, the discursive strategy was to individualize the problem and frame the event as the mistake of one police officer, instead of a systemic issue. Thereby, regardless of legality, there is a constant struggle to legitimize police violence, which often relies on formal and institutionalized rules, but cannot be fully understood through them.

The legitimacy of the armed forces' mobilization, on its turn, is even more sensitive, since they represent the state's instrument of lethal violence, in this sense, they are from the beginning directed to the physical elimination of their counterpart. Although the use of the military in certain situations is provided by the legal system, it always requires a political process of legitimation throughout which it is claimed that the situation being experienced fits the conditionalities legally required to deploy the armed forces. For instance, if it is taken for granted that the military instrument must be mobilized to counteract threats to sovereignty, it is not that simple to successfully frame something as a sovereignty threat, in the first place. In Argentina, for instance, certain political groups aimed to frame organized crime and terrorism as external threats, since its legislation provides that the armed forces are strictly limited to combat external menaces (SAIN, 2018). As the next chapters show, some political actors in

Brazil tried to present organized crime as a threat to sovereignty, while advocating the domestic mobilization of the military.

Even in the context of a conventional interstate conflict, which is traditionally deemed the specific space for the armed forces' action as guarantors of sovereignty, the appeal to the military response requires a process of justification, which presents it as the most suitable response for the specific situation. In this sense, we can also remind Raymond Aron's (2002) considerations on the definition of aggression, according to which even if the international law provides that a state has the right to self-defense, it is not clear what constitutes an aggression, since it might be something other than direct military action. In this sense, Aron claimed it is not possible to find a general criterion that defines what the legitimate or illegitimate employment of force is. The need to frame a military operation as legitimate, regardless of its legality, is particularly evident in the domestic deployment of the armed forces. This is because, as shown earlier, although this kind of military operation is not an exception from a historical point of view and is often incorporated into legal and social normality, it challenges the theoretical-normative foundations commonly used to sustain the legitimacy of the state's force in the liberal thought. Legal provisions, therefore, are not sufficient to explain the legitimacy of this action.

Legality, on the other hand, is a remarkable instrument for legitimating the use of force. It can be presented as a source of legitimacy for a specific course of action. Correspondingly to the dictionary definition, actors seeking to legitimize a specific action can claim that it is legitimate because it is legally provided. Indeed, Max Weber (2002) argued that this is a way in which validity can be attributed to a particular order, which may occur through a pact between the parties involved or be granted by a legitimate authority. In this sense, Hurrell (2005) argues that procedures are one important dimension of legitimacy. That is, the conception that an action or rule is legitimate because it has been properly submitted to legally established procedures. Similarly, the author considers that law plays an important role in legitimizing the use of force because it provides a common language. Thus, although the legal framework itself says little about the legitimacy of the force employment, it is essential to understand the political and social dynamics that, on the one hand, institutionalize certain forms of organizing and applying the force, and, on the other, tap into this institutionalization to reaffirm the legitimacy of the action undertaken.

In contrast to both the normative and the legal approaches, an empirical perspective on legitimacy is adopted here. For Max Weber (2002), legitimacy refers to the probability that a command will be obeyed. Therefore, it is essential that a given social order has a significant

degree of validity and thus presents itself as mandatory or as a model of action. In this sense, legitimacy is social and empirical, rather than transcendental and normative. Nothing is inherently legitimate or illegitimate but constructed as valid, which shapes social actions. Under this token, while approaching the military operations within the state's borders, we use the term legitimation – not legitimacy – to convey a sense of process, rather than a description of a static object. Accordingly, Jackson (2006a) defines legitimation as the construction and reconstruction of the boundaries of the acceptable action. In this sense, the analytical effort undertaken here is to examine empirically how a particular practice was legitimated, more specifically, how the limits of the military action acceptance were and are constantly shaped. Through this perspective, it is possible to tackle the two major explanatory difficulties found in the literature, i.e. the normalization of military deployment within the state's territorial borders and the shifting between acceptance and rejection of the domestic military operations. That is because, it does not suppose a static reality, encouraging scholars to inquire about how the acceptance of a particular organization of violence is constructed. Under this perspective, both the normative and the legal approaches are not dismissed. Instead of the ultimate ground for legitimacy, as they are often treated, they are reframed as a constitutive element of the discursive struggle for the legitimation of a particular use of force.

The main concern of the empirical legitimation literature, as well the legitimacy literature in general has traditionally been the power to rule. In this instance, the central questions are about who is entitled to rule, what responsibilities it entails, the most appropriate ways to exercise political power, and why authority is obeyed (BEETHAM, 1991; HABERMAS, 1992; SCHMITT, 2004; WEBER, 2002). In the field of International Relations, some accounts have been made about legitimacy as a central component of the international society dynamics (CLARK, 2005), how international organizations are legitimized (HURRELMANN, 2017; STEFFEK, 2013), compliance with international rules (HURD, 1999), and the influence of legitimacy struggles on foreign policies (GODDARD e KREBS, 2015; JACKSON, 2006b; KREBS, 2015). Moreover, among the literature approaching the state's violence through an empirical perspective of legitimacy, there are accounts about the perception of police violence in specific countries (GERBER; JACKSON, 2017; HIRSCHFIELD; SIMON, 2010; JACKSON *et al.*, 2013), military interventions in foreign territories (AOI, 2011; FINNEMORE, 2004; MOTTA, 2018), traditional interstate warfare (GRAHAM; KEENAN; DOWD, 2004; ODDO, 2011), as well as legitimacy disputes between state's actors and non-state armed groups (DUYVESTYEN, 2017; MOTTA; SUCCI JUNIOR, 2021; OLSSON, 2013; PODDER, 2017). My purpose here, instead, is to understand the

legitimation of a particular use of the state's violence, which, to my knowledge, has not been addressed through this perspective yet – the armed forces' deployment within the state's borders in operations involving the possibility or the actual employment of violence.

Political power and the use of force are certainly intertwined, the very existence of the state and its instruments of violence – police and armed forces – resulted from an earlier process of legitimation, which draws a line between those who have the right – legitimate authority – to use violence and those who do not, whose use of force is therefore rejected. This is exposed in Tilly's (1985) argument about the state as organized crime. The author claims that the state initially operated in many ways like a racketeer, charging its population for protection from a threat that had been created by this very state in the first place. Tilly considers that "there is, of course, a difference: racketeers, by the conventional definition, operate without the sanctity of governments" (TILLY, 1985, p. 171). In this sense, the difference between the violence performed by the criminal and the one perpetrated by the state is precisely its legitimacy or lack of it. Therefore, the state's construction implied a process through which this new political organization was granted the entitlement of the legitimate holder of the violence management. However, as argued before, when the one entitled to use the force actually employs it, the line dividing the legitimate and the illegitimate needs to be reaffirmed.

Every kind of organized violence deployment is implicated in legitimation politics, through which it justifies its rightfulness. If we remember the classical notion of power as an interplay between coercion and consent, it is not possible to endure a political order without an ideational element that justifies its existence as well as the violence employed to uphold it. As argued, the state is continuously implicated in the struggle to legitimate the way in which its instruments of violence are deployed, but it is certainly not a dynamic specific to the state. Non-state armed groups such as insurgents, criminals, terrorists, and guerrilla groups perform legitimation practices, addressing domestic and international audiences with the claim that their cause is fair, their means are proper, and their organization is reliable (DUYVESTEYN, 2017). Some kinds of violence can be deemed excessive, causing negative effects on a group's legitimacy (SCHOON, 2017). In this sense, non-state violent groups often settle their own rules of engagement to constrain the range of violence employed. In this way, these groups try to avoid a negative image by drawing the line between the legitimate and illegitimate ways of using coercive means (SCHLICHTE; SCHNECKENER, 2015). On the other hand, counterinsurgency operations engage in legitimation practices as well. By claiming its difference in relation to the insurgent, the counterinsurgent seeks to convince the local audience of its higher moral ground and, consequently, the only source of legitimate violence (OLSSON,

2013). Similarly, the Brazilian military, during an intervention in a Rio de Janeiro *favela* against criminal groups, in 2010, tried to present its actions through humanitarian rhetoric, caring out civic-social actions, as it was called, and using blue hats in reference to the blue helmets of the United Nations peacekeeping operations (SAVELL, 2016).

From the point of view of operationalizing a research grounded on the empirical approach to legitimacy, Schneider, Nullmeier, and Hurrelmann (2007) claim the two major methods adopted by the literature are: opinion surveys and the analyzes of behaviors deemed dissenting, such as protests. The authors argue, however, that, on the one hand, the first method does not clarify how meanings, valuations, and beliefs are produced and reproduced, generating the acceptance or rejection of a particular political order or action. On the other hand, observing behaviors that express disagreement does not, by itself, make it possible to infer any conclusions about the legitimacy or illegitimacy. That is because, as Hurrelmann (2017) argues, the initial condition for a process of legitimation or delegitimation is the politicization of a particular object, i.e., its insertion in a controversial dynamic of decision making, which implies dynamics of agreement and contestation.

In line with those authors, I adopt a perspective that addresses the dynamics of legitimation through the analysis of political communication and discursive practices that construct an appearance of consensus. This approach, unlike the previous ones, allows us to capture the specific dynamics and mechanisms of legitimation, understood as a process of normative meaning production, in which socially shared ideas are articulated to underpin a specific course of action. It is noteworthy that this approach is very close to other widely analyzed discursive dynamics, such as the securitization process. In this sense, this research also relies on debates about securitization (BALZACQ, 2005; BUZAN; WÆVER; WILDE, 1998; COTÉ, 2016; SALTER, 2008; WILLIAMS, 2003). Legitimacy is a central concern in the securitization agenda, since this process, on the one hand, requires a given actor to be recognized as legitimate, so that his interpretation of reality gains relevance in the political debate, and on the other, the success of securitization leads to the legitimation of a given action (OLESKER, 2018).

As aforementioned, the current chapter aims to provide an instrument of analysis to operationalize empirical inquiries on how processes of legitimation take place. It is focused on the domestic use of military forces, however, the analytical framework proposed here might provide a useful analytical path and tool to address other kinds of violence deployment as well. It is unfolded in three sections. At first, it is essential to explore the role played by ideational elements, since legitimation is regarded fundamentally as a process of meaning constriction.

The perspective adopted here conceives ideas as social and intersubjective factors, instead of the individual subjective account related to beliefs. Then, I delve into the constitution of legitimization discourses and how they operate. Finally, the last section further develops the idea of legitimacy as an apparent consensus forged through the process of legitimization.

3.1 Beliefs, ideas, and interests

The process of legitimization takes place in the interpretation of the social reality. Despite passing through subjectivity, it constitutes a social process. To further unravel the legitimization mechanisms, it is essential to address the role ideas play in it. Indeed, the debate on legitimization gained space in International Relations within the emergence of perspectives that put ideas in the limelight when explaining states' behavior, notably constructivist approaches (CLARK, 2005). This set of approaches is broadly grounded on the assumption that meaningful social action is informed by socially constructed meanings of the material reality, instead of the materiality itself (GUZZINI, 2013; WELDES, 1996; WENDT, 1999). Under this token, a broad range of ideational elements, such as ideas, beliefs, values, and shared beliefs are articulated in several ways to explain different social actions (GOFAS; HAY, 2018).

Among the terms employed to refer to ideational elements in the legitimacy literature, the notion of belief and its role in the process of legitimization is particularly pervasive. For instance, Schneckener (2017), claiming to ground his argument on a Weberian empirical approach, argues that legitimacy depends on the belief in the rightfulness or moral validity of an organization or a particular action. In contrast, Beetham (1991), endorsing an empirical perspective to analyze the legitimacy of political power, criticizes the reading of Weber according to which the legitimacy stems from the belief in its legitimacy. The author claims that this understanding leads social scientists to inquire about the social processes through which ideas are disseminated and internalized. According to Beetham, power is not legitimized because it is believed to be legitimate, rather its legitimacy is grounded on the ability to justify it accordingly to previous social beliefs. Consequently, he claims that appraising a political regime's legitimacy means evaluating the extent to which it satisfies previous normative expectations.

Beetham's argument will be addressed further on, when discussing how ideas operate in the legitimization process. At this point, the essential step to be taken is to explore what kind of phenomenon is referred to by terms such as belief and idea, even though scholars often do not define it explicitly. As Laffey and Weldes (1997, p. 206) argue, beliefs "are more

straightforwardly and commonsensibly understood to be ‘internal’ to the individual”, that is to say, it refers to what is in a person’s mind. To account for shared beliefs, therefore, would mean assessing the state of mind or a mind event common to a considerable number of individuals. The search for evidence of mind events may lead to the aforementioned research methods such as surveys, seeking to assess the beliefs of a large group, or examining personal notes and correspondence, when the inquiry’s object is a small elite group or an individual decision-maker. However, based on such evidence, it is not possible to conclusively infer what is in someone’s mind. While responding to a survey form or writing a report, a person may easily be lying to persuade the audience or because he or she feels that a specific answer is what his or her interlocutor wants to hear. Jackson (2006a, p.23) claims that Weber’s approach, contrary to Beetham’s interpretation, does not imply that “anyone necessarily ‘believes’ the kind of legitimating rhetoric that they are deploying as a way of justifying a course of action”, even though some translations to English would suggest otherwise. According to Jackson, what Weber does is emphasizing how a pattern of public claims is referred to and articulated to sustain a specific course of action.

This argument has remarkably intertwined implications for another central issue in the ideas debate – the relation between ideational elements and interest. Actors involved in a process of legitimation are unquestionably seeking to persuade an audience. However, it says little about whether this attempt derives from a sincere personal belief, from an instrumental calculation to achieve an unspoken interest, or from a more mixed kind of ideas-interest relationship.

According to Laffey and Weldes (1997), the rationalist approach that considers ideas as a variable to explain social action accounts it as an instrument purposely mobilized by an actor to persuade the audience and achieve its pre-existent interest. In this sense, it assumes that interest is something given, apart from ideas, and that determines how ideational elements relate to social action. This approach, on the one hand, generates another unanswered quest about where interests come from. On the other hand, by assuming that the idea is external to the actor who mobilizes it, this perspective is dismissive of the fact that the actor itself is embedded in a social context. As Norbert Elias (1994) claimed, the very notion of individuality emerges from social interaction.

In this sense, it is not possible to sharply isolate interest from ideas, since the first is informed and constituted by the second. Similarly, when Max Weber distinguishes society, rationality guided, from community, grounded on the feeling of belonging, i.e. the subjective belief, he also argues that in social relations this division is not sharply clear. Moreover, as

argued before, it is not possible to fully acknowledge what is in someone's mind. This does not mean that there is no motivation, but that "we have no systematic way of talking about – and, hence, analyzing – them" (JACKSON, 2006a, p. 24).

Therefore, if we approach ideational phenomena as essentially social and intersubjective, instead of subjective and shared (LAFHEY; WELDES, 1997), the most feasible way to empirically grasp the vicissitudes of a legitimation process is by identifying patterns in the public discourses, through which the boundaries of acceptable action are reshaped and reproduced. The empirical legitimation, in this sense, is about drawing the acceptability limits, pushing them forward or backward through discursive practices.

The question of how ideas work throughout the process of legitimation remains to be addressed. For that, we could return to Beetham (1991), who claims that power is legitimized when it is justified in accordance with pre-existent social beliefs. A twofold consideration must be done about this argument. First, the correlation between a contingent empirical phenomenon and previous socially shared ideas is not self-evident. It requires both a process of interpretation to make sense of a specific event or practice in terms of broad social shared ideas and the dissemination of this particular understanding. In this sense, throughout the process of interpretation the legitimizing actor articulates broadly vague pre-existent ideas to make sense of a particular phenomenon, seeking to render his preferred course of action not just acceptable, but to frame it as the most suitable response to the situation at stake. This process appears to be more important for the success of legitimation than the *a priori* ideational elements themselves. That is because, the same idea can be articulated to sustain contradictory actions. In this sense, analyzing a process of legitimation essentially requires focusing on the process of production and diffusion of these interpretations through which the acceptance of a specific course of action is normatively articulated, rather than just identifying major social ideas.

Second, ideas are not static. Rather, as argued in the second chapter, they are very ambiguous. Even though some ideas can have a certain resistance to changes, they undergo transformations in this process of making sense of reality along the legitimation process. More precisely, they only have a significant meaning after it is contingently fixed. Previous general ideas – also referred to as commonplaces (JACKSON, 2006b), cultural resources (RAE, 2003; SWIDLER, 1986; WELDES, 1996), or cultural beliefs (JOHNSON, DOWD; RIDGEWAY, 2006) – cannot be reified, since they are constantly shaped and reshaped to legitimize certain actions and preclude others.

Therefore, legitimation is a process of articulation (WELDES, 1996) that entails discursive and communicative acts, through which actors, drawing upon ideational resources,

contingently fix the meaning of general ideas, such as sovereignty, community, and legitimate violence, to make sense of a preferred course of action. On the other side, the reception of a discourse is a moment in which the meaning fixated by the speaker through his or her discourse can be unfixed and reinterpreted by the audience (THOMPSON, 1995). For instance, the target audience of a politician's speech could agree with its content and, at the same time, use it to underpin a course of action that was not intended by the speaker. The audience could also be suspicious about the speaker's honesty and, consequently, respond negatively to his or her discourse, even though it fits those general conceptions.

At this point, it is quite clear that agency is central to the role played by ideas in the process of legitimation since it is put into motion by the performance of a set of actors. In this sense, it must be more clearly addressed. Agency is commonly defined as the actor's capability to carry out a specific action when he or she could choose to do otherwise (GIDDENS, 1984). The action, however, cannot be regarded by itself, rather, it is always embedded in a particular social context, by which it may be constrained or fostered. The uneasy balancing between an individual autonomy to act and the limitations imposed by the social arrangement – often called structure – is a longstanding issue in social sciences, which permeates the International Relations field as well (WENDT, 1987). On the one hand, perspectives focused on the pressures structure imposes on actors may excessively downplay the role of agency in the social world, tending to depict certain courses of action as necessary or inevitable (MEARSHEIMER, 2001; WALTZ, 2002). On the other hand, by concentrating exclusively on the action itself, analysts may neglect that there is no individual isolated from social context and overstate the range of possible actions. In this sense, this kind of analysis may be dismissive of the fact that not only an action's internal features are implicated in its likelihood to succeed, but it also depends on the social context within which it unfolds (MAFFETTONE; ULAS, 2019)

In the scope of communicative processes, as is the case of legitimation struggles, the agent-structure issue is often expressed through the contention between an internalist and an externalist perspective. The first one tends to concentrate on the transformative power of the discourse, focusing on how the social context is modified and built through the performance of a specific utterance. In the Copenhagen School's securitization theory (BUZAN, WÆVER; WILDE, 1998), for instance, "the concept of security permits the activation of a new context, or converts the existing one into something different" (BALZACQ, 2005, p. 180). To the externalist approach, in turn, a discourse's capacity to impact social relations is grounded on something external to the utterance itself, which does not mean a material reality, but a social context. The success of a particular discourse, in this sense, depends on a social arrangement

that makes a set of actors and normative discourses significant in the first place (BALZACQ, 2005; STRITZEL, 2007).

The externalist perspective, which can be framed as constructivist, is embraced here. That is because, it does not focus exclusively on the social arrangement to explain social action, as the structural approach, rather, it preserves agency as the central element. This approach acknowledges that every significant social action involves social and individual forces, which are essentially intertwined and mutually constituted. The social arrangement not only affects a set of social actions, but it is also hung together by it. Action, in its turn, is at the same time producing and being produced by the social arrangement in which it is circumscribed. As has been said, it must be stressed that the notion that the discourse is grounded on external elements must not give the misleading impression that this approach aims to confront discourse with a material or supposedly objective reality. The exogenous element at stake here is ideational and socially constituted, which will be called here ideational topography (JACKSON, 2006a), upon which the discursive struggle to legitimate a particular course of action takes place.

This consideration, however, raises a question about the degree of freedom narratives have in relation to the material reality. It is undeniable that materiality imposes some constraints on the narrative construction. If, for example, a bomb has been dropped it would be difficult to deny it never happened. However, the way in which a particular actor and group of actors react to this material fact depends on a process of interpretation and social construction of its meaning, which has a huge range of variation. In this sense, explaining social action requires understanding how the phenomenon at stake is discursively articulated.

This perspective on the agent-structure issue has important implications for how the role played by ideas in the legitimation process is understood in the present work. On the one hand, legitimizing actors are embedded in a social arrangement that both underpins their position as reliable and credible speakers and provides them with ideational resources, i.e. broad intersubjective ideas that can be deployed to persuade an audience about a preferred course of action. Therefore, restrictions on the agent's range of action are twofold. First, he or she must comply with social expectations about which kind of characteristics a credible speaker has. Second, they are restricted to the ideational sources available in the social arrangement within which they are acting. On the other hand, the content of the ideational sources contingently accessible in a particular time and space is always vague and malleable. As Jackson (2006a, p. 44) argues, "it is merely a potential resource until it is deployed in the course of some specific policy debate". In this sense, it only becomes significant through agency, i.e. the choice to articulate it in a particular way and not otherwise. This way of conceiving the role of ideas in

the legitimation process, allows us to avoid incurring in a recurrent problem of constructivist works, which while theoretically defending the mutual constitution of agency and structure, end up emphasizing one or another during empirical inquiries.

In this sense, I endorse Jackson's perspective (2006a; 2006b), according to which the process of legitimation involves the mobilization of commonplaces, that is, ideas that are widely disseminated in a community's imaginary, whose meaning's extension allows them to be articulated in various forms, being used to justify different and contrasting actions. The term democracy is illustrative, since it is often mobilized to support quite diverse, sometimes contradictory, actions. Under this perspective, the very process of portraying and framing the social world and a particular issue, i.e. stating what the observed object is, inherently entails an interpretation about whether it is a problem to be concerned with or not, what is causing it, and what an acceptable response would be (LAFHEY, WELDES, 1997; SCHNEIDER; INGRAM, 1993). The next section focuses on the legitimation discourse, further unfolding its constitutive elements and operation.


3.2 Legitimation discourse

Legitimation is a communicative process in which a set of actors, through discursive practices, mobilize and articulate ideational resources within a particular social arrangement, reinterpreting and articulating them to make sense of a particular situation and justify a particular course of action or social order, producing an apparent consensus (see Figure 1). Communication can be performed in several ways, through a diversity of mediums such as speech, writing, and image, and in different levels, such as informal daily conversations, formally framed parliamentary debates, presidential speeches addressing domestic and international audiences, or communication through media companies.

In this sense, developing empirical research on legitimation as a communicational process requires some methodological choices, among which is the identification of the space in which the dynamics of legitimation occurs. According to Hurrelmann (2017), the dynamics of struggle for (and, consequently, construction of) legitimacy are commonly deemed to take place in the public sphere. However, as the author points out, the notion of a public sphere is too vague to support empirical research. Addressing this difficulty, Hurrelmann proposes to section the public sphere into three distinct public arenas: a) institutional, that is, state structure occupied by politicians; b) intermediate, a broader sphere linked to the decision-making process, including political parties, interest groups, and the media; c) civil arena, which,

according to the author, covers the communication of lay people about politics, such as in informal workplaces and debate among friends.

Figure 1 – Legitimation Process



Source: Elaborated by the author

Although examining the civil arena can make relevant contributions to the study of violence and force employment, I will focus on the first two arenas. This analytical frame has two main motivations. First, the actors who set the process of legitimation in motion occupy specific spaces of power, from which they have the ability to circulate certain discourses, thereby, advancing their agendas and interpretations of reality. In a related way, this analytical delimitation grounds, secondly, on the fact that, as will be further addressed, the process of legitimation does not depend on the conformation of an absolute consensus, i.e. the explicit consent of a whole collectivity. Rather, it requires only the construction of an apparent consensus, which makes it possible to suppress the civil arena from this particular analysis. Moreover, in some cases, the legitimation discourses have a narrow target audience, such as security professionals or the parliament, within which this apparent consensus is sought, regardless of a broad collectivity.

Defining the legitimation spaces to be considered, has direct implications for the selection of the actors, whose discourses will be examined. In this sense, during the empirical analysis, I focus on the discourses produced by the Executive and Legislative powers, the armed forces, and the media. The latter will be accounted in three ways: as an agent, both when

expressing an opinion in editorials and when choosing a particular way to frame the military operation; as a space for debate, where other social actors publish opinion articles; and as a source of other actors' discourses, when it reports a politician's statement, for instance. From the volume of communicative acts about the use of the armed forces within the physical borders of the state, only those linked to legitimation were analyzed.

Moreover, further developing a framework able to grasp this process requires delineating what the legitimation discourse looks like and how it unfolds. According to Schneider, Nullmeier, and Hurrelmann (2007) it consists of three elements: a) the referred object; b) the positive or negative valuation attributed to it; c) the parameter of legitimation, that is, the criterion used to produce the acceptance or rejection of a given action. I add two other elements: d) ideational source and e) rhetorical strategy.

The first two serve mainly to select the discourses to be analyzed and organize them based on the positive or negative valuation of the object at stake. In this sense, during the empirical account, developed in the following chapters, I identified and took into consideration only the legitimation discourses whose object is the military action within the state's borders. The parameter of legitimation, in its turn, is the central element. It is the explicit answer to the question about why this particular action should or should not be carried out, constituting the axis around which arguments are structured. It allows us to identify the ideational sources drawn upon by actors, as well as how they are presented, i.e. rhetorical strategies. Addressing the legitimating discourses in these terms reveals a deep layer of the relation between society and violence, by disclosing what makes a particular kind of force deployment acceptable or rejected.

The statement of the former Brazilian Minister of Justice, Torquato Jardim, about the military operation that took place in Rio de Janeiro in 2018, shows these elements at play. During an interview, Jardim claimed that "we are living an asymmetric warfare", in which "anyone can be the enemy, [they] are not uninformed (...). You must be prepared for everything and everyone all the time". He also stated that "unfortunately (...) there is no war that is not lethal" (DUBEUX; ROTHENBURG; CAVALCANTI, 2018, translated by the author). In this illustration, the parameter of legitimation for deploying the state's instrument of lethality is the criticality of the situation, while the ideational source that the Minister hinged upon was the notion of warfare, a quite overused commonplace, but a very powerful one. Even though the concept of asymmetric war may not be a widely held commonplace, the notion of warfare as an exceptional moment that requires a particular effort and to which some regular norms of violence regulation do not apply, is pervasive. On the other hand, this statement also evokes another parameter of legitimation, i.e. technical knowledge. By framing the issue at stake

through a specific concept – asymmetric war – not present in the everyday vocabulary and presetting specific features of the situation in a way that seems it had been thoroughly appraised, the speaker recalls the notion of the specialist who has a superior knowledge not available to everyone and, therefore, an authoritative perspective that must be followed. Moreover, the notion of asymmetric warfare, in which the line between combatant and noncombatant is blurred, provides more room for justifying errors, i.e. civil casualties.

Regarding the same object, another metaphor often mobilized to sustain criticality as a parameter of legitimation of the military domestic deployment is the notion of a health emergency. During a Senate special meeting, the Defense Minister at the time, Joaquim Silva e Luna, when referring to the armed forces deployed in the city of Rio de Janeiro in 2018, compared the public security situation to a patient in an Intensive Care Unit (BRASIL, 2018a). In the same meeting, Senator José Medeiros compared the security problem at stake to an obstructed vein, which requires medical intervention and not a healthy diet or exercise. The medical metaphor also recalls to some extent the idea of technicity, in the sense that, in this kind of situation there is an undeniable objective reality that demands an inevitable action, which is technically informed and, therefore, is not subject to political debate.

The particularity of the legitimation discourses used to advocate for or against the armed forces' domestic deployment will be further examined and detailed in the following chapters. As these two examples show, the same parameter of legitimation can be sustained throughout different ideational sources, and the same discourse can embrace different parameters of legitimation. Although, for the sake of explanatory clarity, I divide parameter of legitimation from ideational sources, they are closely intertwined, since the very existence of a legitimation parameter is tied to socially constituted ideas. In this sense, in the actual social process analyzed here, they are never completely isolated. Moreover, both the parameters of legitimation and the ideational sources are expressed through particular rhetorical strategies, which will be further addressed. In the aforementioned illustrations, for instance, the main rhetorical instrument was the metaphor.

3.2.1 Parameters of legitimation

During the empirical research, five main parameters mobilized to legitimate coercive actions performed by the military within its states' territorial borders, were identified: technicity, criticality, normality, community boundaries, and political authority. I do not intend to elaborate a universally comprehensive record of all the possible parameters of legitimation,

since, as the ideational sources, they are essentially contingent and context-dependent. Exploring these parameters is aimed at assessing how the process of violence legitimization unfolds.

The first one is grounded on the positivistic assumption about the possibility of a neutral assessment of a supposedly objective and self-evident reality. Under this perspective, the capability to adequately identify the features and functioning dynamics of the subject observed requires technical knowledge, restricted to a particular set of experts. In this technocratic framework, the decision, inherently political, is subsumed under the idea of a scientific evaluation or technical planning (HABERMAS, 2011). In this sense, the legitimacy of the political decision of deploying the state's lethality instrument is underpinned by an external and allegedly unquestionable parameter, framing itself as non-political.

Arguments according to which the deployment of armed forces in public security is imperative due to the warlike weapons owned by criminal groups can only be neutralized through a military action are illustrative of the technicity as parameter of legitimization. On the other hand, those contrary to this policy claim that the armed forces are not technically adapted for domestic operations, which do not produce effective outcomes. This parameter of legitimization also brings to the fore the logic of inevitability (BECK, 2008). In this sense, the preferred course of action is presented as the only suitable and rational response to the ongoing problem, consequently, casualties are presented as a calculated and unavoidable risk, as it appears in Jardim's speech, aforementioned. Moreover, it also impacts the decision maker's legitimacy, since it supposes that the professionals with specialized knowledge, in our case the military, are those who should be entitled to decide.

When it comes to employing violence, another pervasive legitimization parameter is the notion of emergency. The way in which a particular situation is framed as an urgent matter, through the idea of security, and the range of previously unthinkable actions that, consequently, became acceptable, is pretty much the kind of legitimization process the securitization theory is concerned with (BUZAN, WÆVER; WILDE, 1998). When this source of legitimacy is at play, the preferred course of action, advocated by the legitimizing actor, is presented as a conspicuous demand in face of the unbearable reality in course. In this unsustainable situation, the existence of a fundamental referential object – e.g. the state, a community, the humankind, or the national identity – is perceived to be under threat. It could be an ongoing situation, as an armed conflict, or be presented in terms of risk, i.e. the anticipation of a future catastrophe (BECK, 2008). Such as technicity, this parameter of legitimization appeals to a sense of inevitability, which is grounded not on the claim that the action to be carried out is the only rational or technically

effective option, but on the image of criticality. In this sense, the course of action advocated might not be presented as the ideal and most desirable one, but as an urgent effort that might eventually be unpleasant but is pressing, since if the existential threat is actually materialized, nothing else matters. Given its characteristics, this parameter of legitimation tends to be mobilized to overcome restraining elements and concerns.

It is important to stress that the notion of crises, which sustains claims for a particular action, is not a matter of merely describing an existing situation, in this particular case, an objective collapse of the public security system. A failure must be politically mediated, it depends on agency, a successful narrative, to be perceived as a crisis that requires and allows actions deemed atypical (HAY, 1999). For instance, in 2018, the Brazilian federal government was seeking the parliament's approval for intervening in the management of public security in the state of Rio de Janeiro, carrying out a narrative that framed the situation as an unbearable crisis. It was opposed by the argument that other Brazilian states had a much higher rate of urban violence, and that the increase in this rate in Rio de Janeiro was not significant enough to constitute a crisis (BRASIL, 2018b; c). In this sense, the dispute is not over the objective failure, but over the discourses drawing upon it, which “enables a variety of strategic responses that may, at least temporarily, resecure state legitimacy without directly addressing, far less resolving, the underlying contradictions themselves (HAY, 1999, p. 328).

On the other hand, legitimating actors may advocate a particular kind of force deployment by claiming it constitutes the normal course of action, the behavior expected from the instrument of violence at stake. In this sense, it could be argued that a police officer used coercion to arrest a criminal because it is what he is supposed to do, or the armed forces were called to perform a particular operation because this is part of the normal set of tasks entitled to them. The normality as a parameter of legitimation can operate under two logics – legality and tradition. Both, each in its own way, produce a sense of ordinariness, a perception that the way in which a particular action unfolds is precisely the how it is supposed to. Thereby, there is nothing to be debated or concerned about. While the legal system grounds the sense of normality on the compliance with stabled rules and proper procedures, tradition mobilizes a social commonsense according to which things have always worked in this way.

Legality, as discussed previously, is a powerful instrument of legitimation. It is inherently meant, through a system of formal norms and enforcement instruments, to produce a considerable degree of predictability in social relations, underpinning and allowing the functioning of a particular social order. A very practical and prosaic illustration is that one can drive safely through an intersection when the traffic light is green, knowing that, almost all the

time, the other drivers will stop. When it comes to the matter of force employment, every country has its own set of rules that grant specific institutions the right to use violence and, at the same time, restrict how it can be used. In this way, it would be supposedly possible to ensure a high degree of predictability about the way in which violence will be used. When tapping into legality as a parameter of legitimacy, the legitimating actor advocates that a particular military operation is in accordance with the law and its procedures, and, therefore, it is the normal course of action. For instance, five out of seven Brazilian constitutions provided that assuring the order and the law is one of the armed forces' functions (MATHIAS; GUZZI, 2010) and, as we will see, its constitutionality is always reminded whenever any question is raised about domestically deploying the military.

The second logic through which normality, as a parameter of legitimation, operates is tradition, which can, on the one hand, be grounded on claims about historical recurrence and, on the other, on a tradition of thought. In the first, legitimating actors point out that the kind of action at stake has been historically taking place and, therefore, constitutes the normal situation, not a disruption that should be explained. In Brazil, the military operations against domestic groups are not just legally provided by the constitution but have actually taken place during the country's whole history (McCANN, 2007; ROUQUIÉ, 1984), which is also often reminded as a normal and traditional mission of the armed forces. However, even if it is not very common, it is also possible to find discourses that frame combating national citizens as a rupture of the Brazilian military's historical tradition (BRASIL, 2010a, p. 85).

On the other hand, in some cases, even though a particular organization of the state's violence is absolutely not a historical continuity, it is traditionally framed as the normal arrangement by a tradition of thought. In this sense, claims about normality are not grounded on the recurrence or uncommonness of a particular action throughout history, but on the reproduction of a particular way of understanding it. For instance, even though the complete coalescence between community and state is not accurate, from a historical point of view, as previously discussed, the concept of nation-state is a pervasive tradition of thought about the organization of political life, which underpins a broad range of political and social actions. This is precisely the argument made in the first chapter: the traditional theoretical framework grounded on a sharp inside/outside division is not historically accurate, however, it is the normality benchmark literature draws upon to argue about a blurring process.

Through this category, the critique of the inside/outside framework previously developed is taken seriously. The conventional theoretical framework is treated as part of a discursive struggle to legitimize a particular way of organizing violence and, consequently, the

political life. This parameter of legitimation reinforces the idea that adopting an empirical approach to legitimacy does not require dismissing the role played by the normative debates around the object of analysis. Instead, it means acknowledging that normative principles are not external to society and “are integrally interwoven with and so directly articulate and consolidate the factual and historical conditions of power and legitimacy” (THORNHILL, 2008, p. 168). The Argentine case is illustrative of this matter. Its armed forces have systematically performed domestic operations throughout the country’s history, which is highlighted by six military coups in the twentieth century (DELLASOPPA, 1998; ROMERO, 2006; ROUQUIÉ, 1984). However, after the redemocratization, a basic consensus in defense matters, informed by the inside/outside framework, was forged, restricting the military activities to the external-related activities, because it was considered its main, i.e. normal, function (SAIN, 2000).

Moreover, the legitimation of violence is always, to some extent, grounded on the process of shaping and reshaping the boundaries of a community, that is to say, the moral exclusion and inclusion. This parameter is characterized by the perception that an individual or a social group is not inscribed in the same moral values and justice consideration of a certain community. Since they are deemed not to comply with the community’s moral norms, those individuals are not granted the same rights and protections than the members of this particular collectivity. In this sense, the perpetrators of moral exclusion “perceive others as psychologically distant, lack constructive moral obligations toward others, view others as expendable and undeserving, and deny others’ rights, dignity, and autonomy” (OPOTOW, 1990, p. 2). Under this perspective, the differentiation between acceptable and not acceptable violence is grounded on a moral relation between those who are approving and employing the force and its target group (WILMER, 2002; WILMER; MANSBACH, 2001). Moral exclusion can be identified through a large range of expressions, such as a sense of moral superiority, regarding groups as inferiors, dehumanization, double standards evaluations, explicit approval and normalization of violence, emphasizing technical efficiency over outcomes, framing harmful behaviors as isolated events, among others (OPOTOW, 1990).

As discussed in the previous chapter, the very homogeneity the state draws upon to sustain that a particular form of violence employment is legitimate is the outcome of a process of systematic violent exclusion (RAE, 2003). Besides this important acknowledgment, what concerns me in accounting moral exclusion as a parameter to legitimize violence is how in the discursive struggle for legitimation the community’s moral boundaries are contingently fixed, stressing that it is context-dependent and not territorially bounded. For instance, as it will be

elaborated, in the Brazilian case those who advocate the domestic deployment of armed forces frequently characterize the target of the military operations as vicious, immoral, and irrecoverable.

On the other hand, those warning about possible rights violations, argue that the areas where the military operations take place are dwelled by non-criminals and honest workers, whose rights and physical integrity could be jeopardized. In this sense, critics of the armed forces deployment detail the target population, aiming to morally include some groups, but not everyone. Therefore, when mobilizing this parameter, both the actors defending the domestic military operation and those opposing it, rely their discourses on the dichotomy between morally included and excluded groups.

Finally, even though the notion of centralized authority is often intimately related to the notion of a homogeneous community, sovereign authority as a parameter of legitimation differs from the moral exclusion, in the sense that in this case the justification to deploy force is grounded on the very power to rule. When mobilizing sovereignty as a parameter to legitimize the military operation within the state's territory, the legitimating actors claim not only that particular areas or groups are not submitted to the state's central authority, but that there is a parallel authority, competing with the state. Under this logic, the armed forces should be deployed to ensure the ultimate power to rule.

3.2.2 Rhetorical strategies

Another constitutive element of the legitimation discourse is the rhetorical strategy. Studies on rhetoric, whose key thinker is Aristotle, date back to Ancient Greece's democracy and are mainly concerned with the methods of persuasion (CHARTEIS-BLACK, 2011). While the parameter of legitimation is the criteria the speaker draws upon to argue why a particular action is or is not acceptable and the ideational source consists of the ideas made available to the actor by the social arrangement within which the legitimation process takes place, rhetorical strategy refers to the form in which both are expressed in the discourse. There are three main instruments of rhetoric commonly present in the literature: a) the features of the speaker; b) the style of the argument; and c) the mobilization of emotions.

The first is traditionally referred to as *ethos*, which consists in grounding the discourse's reliability on the orator's authority, presenting him or her as someone with outstanding knowledge about the issue at stake, such as a doctor talking about a medicine, or a priest about religion. The first example asserts, through the orator's *ethos*, the technicity as the parameter of

legitimation, while the second mobilizes tradition as the parameter to underpin the discourse in its struggle for legitimacy. *Ethos*, as a rhetorical strategy, is not only employed by the speaker while trying to present its own discourse as authoritative. Rather, personal features of a third part can be brought by the speaker to sustain its argument. It is illustrative how Brazilian politicians against the domestic deployment of the armed forces repeatedly resorted to the critiques of those operations made by the former Army Commander, Eduardo Villas Bôas, employing, in this way, his position as a military expert to sustain their discourse against the contested course of action.

Both the parameter of legitimation and the *ethos*, as a rhetorical strategy through which it is expressed, are grounded on the ideational sources contextually available. In this sense, the reliability and legitimacy of the physician's discourse are only possible because there is a previous set of social ideas about science and formal education. Correspondingly, the priest's moral authority is only possible because of ideational sources about his religion and religious institution, which are provided by the social arrangement. Accordingly, previous negative reputation of the specific individuals or institutions to which they belong may be mobilized to undermine the reliability and legitimacy of their discourse. Moreover, the *ethos* may overlap and outweigh the parameter of legitimation. For instance, Senator Jorge Viana, who advocated the military deployment in Rio de Janeiro, arguing that the situation was critical (BRASIL, 2017a), was also skeptical about it because he did not trust the president's intention (BRASIL, 2018c).

The second rhetorical instrument refers to the way in which arguments are shaped to make the discourse sound reasonable and persuasive (CHARTEIS-BLACK, 2011). According to Leith (2012, p. 56), it is "the way one point proceeds to another as if to show that the conclusion to which you are aiming is not only the right one, but so necessary and reasonable as to be more or less the only one". It has also an intertwined relationship with the parameters of legitimation and ideational sources mobilized since a discourse that draws upon technicity tends to play out in a serious tone, presenting data, thoroughly describing a situation, and establishing logical correlations and conclusions.

While formal logic can be the way one seeks to convince its audience, it is not about absolute proof. In this sense, the use of generalizations, metaphors, and analogies is pervasive. Metaphor consists in constructing the understanding of a target domain through terms specific to another one – the source domain. Apart from this abstract definition, it is a very familiar practice, pervasive in everyday communication, such as "talk and think about life in terms of journeys, about arguments in terms of war, about love also in terms of journeys, about theories

in terms of buildings, about ideas in terms of food (...)” (KOVECSES, 2002, p.04). Kovecses (2002) differentiates conceptual metaphors from metaphorical linguistic expressions. The first refers to claims according to which the source domain is the target domain, which can also be understood as an analogy (GENTNER *et al.*, 2001). For instance, when a public security issue is said to be a war or when a domestic military operation is framed as a peacekeeping operation. It is illustrative when the Brazilian Senator Magno Malta congratulating a military operation in Rio de Janeiro stated that “(...) this is how one acts in a war. The current urban violence is war” (BRASIL, 2010l, p. 52956, translated by the author). Another example is when the congressman Antônio Pannunzio, addressing the same operation, claimed “this kind of operation is not new for the armed forces, since they have been doing it for a long time in Haiti” (BRASIL, 2010a, p. 49263), referring to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Metaphorical linguistic expressions, on the other hand, refer to a speech that uses terms commonly circumscribed to the source domain to make sense of the target domain. Also about the military deployment in Rio de Janeiro, an illustration of a metaphorical linguistic expression is when different congressional representatives called a favela’s specific area as the crime’s *quartel general*, which means a military headquarters (BRASIL, 2010c; d).

The metaphor’s remarkable power of persuasion lays in its defining feature, that is, the capability to articulate a previous widespread understanding of a particular object to make sense of a new one (CHARTEIS-BLACK, 2011). As well as ideational resources, the same metaphor can be mobilized to advocate competing positions on a particular matter. For instance, at the same time that the metaphorical mobilization of warfare is pervasive in supporting a military deployment, it is also employed to advocate against it, as when the armed forces domestic missions are framed as a “war against the poor” (BRASIL, 2018c). That is because, this process of transferring previous ideas or knowledge about something to explain and structure the understanding of a target domain is not a matter of merely describing or revealing existing similarities between two realms, but to create them. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) claim, it is possible to metaphorically frame an argumentation both as war or dance, which would reveal not a previous similarity, but a particular way of conceiving the act of arguing, which leads, consequently, to one particular way of action, instead of another. To understand the act of arguing as war suppose a confrontation between enemies, which necessarily ends up with a defeated and a victorious one. On the other hand, when it is framed as a dance, “the participants are seen as performers, and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way” (LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 1980, p. 6).

Moreover, rhetorical strategies can be combined. It is possible, for instance, to mobilize a speaker's authoritative position, i.e. *ethos*, through a metaphorical discourse. A good illustration is when Senator Mozarildo Cavalcanti metaphorically referred to a domestic military operation as a medicine and then stated: "as a doctor, I say it doesn't matter if the person did not start taking the medicine at the right time and is taking it a little bit late" (BRASIL, 2010f, p. 54500, translated by the author). In this discourse, his claim to be a reliable orator is grounded on the fact that he is a physician, however, it only makes sense because he had previously mobilized two metaphors: a) the public security issue is a disease and b) the military operation is a medicine.

The third rhetorical instrument consists in expressing the agreement or disapproval of a particular course of action through the mobilization of emotions, *pathos*. Pointing out emotions, especially fear, as an important element in politics is not uncommon, it is mentioned even by the IR neorealist scholars, who are committed to a materialist approach. However, it is often overlooked when it comes to theorization, even by those perspectives that emphasize the ideational aspect of the social world (ROSS, 2006). Emotions tend to be understood as an individual and private matter, which entails a broad debate about whether it is a bodily state or a relational phenomenon, as well as its consciousness or unconsciousness (RYTHOVEN, 2015). The concern here, however, is how the legitimating actor seeks to be persuasive about a particular course of action, mobilizing parameters of legitimacy and ideational resources through emotions.

In this sense, the focus is not on how a discourse lures a particular individual or group subjectively, but on how it frames and aims to induce a judgment about the object at stake by attributing a particular feeling to it. For instance, criticality, as a parameter of legitimation, is often expressed by framing a situation as frightening, terrifying, or outrageous. In contrast, the response to this situation, deemed as unacceptable, is recurrently framed as a relief, hope, something to be proud of or happy about. The speech of a Brazilian congressional representative in 1994, after a domestic military intervention, is illustrative. He stated: "today Rio de Janeiro is experiencing an atmosphere of tranquility. People are no longer frightened" (BRASIL, 1994k, p. 15071, translated by the author). Similarly, in 2010, referring to the same kind of operation, a senator stated that "last week, I spoke with the Minister of Defense, Nelson Jobim, showing my anguish about what was happening in Rio de Janeiro (...). This is a time of relief for the Brazilian society (BRASIL, 2010h, p. 54343, translated by the author).

3.2.3 Ideational Sources

As has been stressed, parameter and rhetorical strategies of legitimation are strongly dependent on the ideational sources. The correlation between the ideational sources available in a particular social arrangement and the parameters and rhetorical strategies deployed by actors attempting to legitimate a particular course of action is built upon Anthony Giddens' (1984) argument on the duality of the social structure. In his theory of structuration, Giddens argues that every social action relies on rules and resources provided by the pre-existing social structure within which it takes place. At the same time, the endurance of this social arrangement – and consequently the very rules and recourses actors draw upon – depends on its reproduction through social actions – i.e. agency and structure are mutually constituted.

In the legitimation framework developed here, while choosing the parameters to be mobilized, as well as how they are to be conveyed, refers to the agency side of the equation, since actors could have done otherwise. Ideational sources, on the other hand, locate the process of legitimation in a broad social arrangement. Composed of intersubjectively shared ideas, they provide the raw material to the actors to forge their claims. Taken together, ideational sources compose an ideational topography (JACKSON, 2006a) upon which the struggle for legitimation takes place. Some ideational sources can be identified in different social arrangements, such as the aforementioned notion of war and health emergency. Others, however, are idiosyncratic of a particular social environment, such as the conception that the Brazilian army is an agent of pacification, as will be unfolded in chapter five.

3.3 Legitimacy as apparent consensus

After specifying the dynamic of legitimation, the question about when a particular action can be considered legitimated arises. That is, how to argue that this process is completed. It is not possible to precisely define the exact starting and ending point of a legitimation process. It could be thought of in terms of the implementation of the action submitted to the legitimation struggle, in this way, one could suppose that if a course of action took place it is because the discourse advocating its acceptability was successful. However, the performance of a particular action, by itself, does not entail its acceptance, since it can be carried out despite the uncertainty about its legitimacy, which is tackled afterward. On the other hand, the end of this very action does not entail the end of the legitimation struggle, even though it tends to gradually fade away in the public debate.

Legitimacy, as the outcome of the legitimation, is not a static point; it is contingently sustained and requires to be continually reaffirmed. The legitimacy is not in the action itself but in the constitution of a dominant discourse about its acceptability. It is within the struggle for legitimacy that we can identify how a particular discourse becomes predominant, constituting an apparent consensus, and contingently stabilizing the boundaries of the acceptable, i.e. legitimate, action. This relative stabilization can be identified in elements such as the institution of new legislation, as discussed before, and in rearrangements of the instruments of force. The relative stabilization can be embodied in more subtle and subjective levels as well, through what Weldes (1996) calls *interpellation*. It refers to the process in which individuals identify themselves with the description of the social world provided by a dominant discourse, naturalizing and inserting it into the common sense.

Every legitimation struggle needs to tackle discourses previously stabilized, seeking to reaffirm or refute them. In this sense, every new debate about a particular domestic military operation requires addressing previous conceptions about the organization of the state's instruments of force. For instance, since 1990 several laws have been created to regulate the domestic deployment of the armed forces in Brazil, it is also illustrative that in 2005 the Brazilian army established a unity specifically aimed to provide training and elaborate doctrines for domestic engagement. In this sense, a specific conception about the armed forces' suitability to perform this kind of operations has been relatively stabilized through these movements of institutionalization. As we will see in the following chapters, the institutionalization of this conception is constantly mobilized to sustain the legitimacy of particular operations.

While a relative stabilization might be expressed both in the legal institutionalization and in the process of *interpellation*, we should remind here two central points, previously made. First, legitimacy is not defined by legality. Consequently, even though a law indicates the stabilization of a particular perspective on the organization of force, it is not to be treated as the legitimacy itself. Second, attempting to grasp the completion of legitimation through *interpellation* would mean to assess subjectivities – i.e. what is in someone's mind –, which entails several methodological hindrances already presented. The current work, in contrast, addresses the social and intersubjective ideas underpinning certain forms of organizing violence. Considering the changeable nature of legitimacy, particularly the violence legitimacy, instead of looking for a static point, identifying the result of a legitimation process means grasping the conformation of a contingent appearance of consensus, within the discursive struggle for legitimacy.

In the scope of legitimacy, consensus is frequently accounted in terms of individual agreement with a political order. In this realm, Greene (2016) presents two main perspectives, which she calls contractarian and voluntarist. The first supposes that a political regime is legitimate because it is justified through a principle that would be accepted by every citizen. That is, it is grounded on a hypothetical acceptability as well as on universal criteria – normative legitimacy. Under the second perspective, legitimacy depends on the actual consent of every individual, which leads to the impossibility of legitimacy, since reaching unanimity among all individuals in a political community is highly implausible. Moreover, if one could suppose that everyone has some opinion about the government, it is not the same when it comes to a specific action, as is the case of military missions. Not everyone is engaged or has a clear opinion on a specific policy. In this sense, Goddard and Krebs (2015) claim that a policy with a low degree of public attention requires less effort to be legitimized than an issue broadly present in the public debate. Accordingly, while the military operations performed in Rio de Janeiro are widely publicized and questioned, debates about the mobilization of the armed forces in other parts of Brazil are diminished and often non-existent.

It is argued here that legitimation requires the conformation of a contingent apparent, not actual, consensus, so that even if an individual disagrees or is not sure about his agreement with a particular practice, he or she understands it as collectively accepted (HAUNSS, 2007; JOHNSON, DOWD; RIDGEWAY, 2006). As discussed, this process is cognitive and normative, involving the attribution of meaning and valuation of a given practice. “This appearance of consensus makes the association between the characteristic and cultural markers of status and competence seem like an objective social reality in the encounter that is accepted by others as a valid social fact” (JOHNSON, DOWD; RIDGEWAY, 2006, p. 62). When a particular conception about how and why to employ violence becomes a dominant discourse, it creates a sense of obviousness. For instance, when analyzing foreign military interventions, Finnemore (2004) argued that even though currently it seems obvious that foreign interventions to collect debts are not acceptable or that non-western populations are entitled to be protected by humanitarian interventions, it was preceded by alternative dominant conceptions, which underwent changes and reinterpretations.

Moreover, regarding legitimation as the process that discursively creates an appearance of consensus highlights that it is not a matter of transforming individual beliefs, pursuing genuine persuasion as the sign of legitimacy (PAYNE, 2001). Reversely, the apparent consensus focus on how actors through discursive practices shape the line of the acceptable

action, rendering a particular course of action untenable, while making another seem the obvious, or even the only, option (KREBS; JACKSON, 2007).

By analyzing discourses of legitimation on a particular matter, mapping and tracing patterns of the parameters, ideational sources, and the rhetorical strategies mobilized, it is possible to identify the constitution of a dominant discourse and, consequently, of an apparent consensus. It is not merely a matter of quantitatively tracing the frequency of a word, even though the content analysis is an useful instrument to provide evidence of the qualitative account, as we will see in the next chapter. The prevalence, constitutive of an apparent consensus, entails that a particular discourse or set of discourses advocating the same action are endorsed and propagated by an important number of actors at different levels of the public debate and that it is not possible to engage in this debate without addressing those discourses.

4 NATURALIZING MILITARY DOMESTIC OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL: LEGITIMATING DISCOURSES

“If they must fight, they insist, they will do so only for the most righteous of reasons, as a last resort, and in the most civilized manner”. (FREEDMAN, 2019).

Applying the framework previously unfolded, this chapter aims to tackle the explanatory difficulties arising from the traditional essentialist perspective that, as extensively presented in the first chapter, underpins most of the literature on military missions. That is, accounting the situation in which the domestic deployment of the armed forces – deemed an anomaly by the theoretical division between a pacified domestic realm and an anarchical international system – is socially naturalized.

To understand the continuity of the domestic deployment acceptance, the public debate about three main operations was analyzed – Operation Rio (1994-1995), Operation Arcanjo (2010-2012), and Operation Rio de Janeiro (2017-2018). The three selected operations were very significant in terms of the number of soldiers deployed, the great budgetary resources assigned, and the vast public attention they attracted. Moreover, these are the three major operations of this kind undertaken since the end of the military dictatorship in Brazil. They were performed during governments with distinct political stands, suggesting that the parameters mobilized to legitimize and reaffirm the legitimization of domestic military operations are constant in time and are not particular to a political stance.

Following the framework proposed in chapter four, the discourses sustaining and opposing the domestic mobilization of the armed forces in the three selected operations were identified and systematized. The study proceeded through the content analysis of: the transcriptions of the debates at the House of Representatives and the Federal Senate, which included ordinary and extraordinary meetings, special sessions, public hearings, and meetings of the Congress’ Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defense; the articles of opinion and news reports published in three major newspapers – *Folha de S. Paulo*, *O Estado de S. Paulo*, and *O Globo* –; the public statements made by the presidents, ministers, as well as the military, as displayed in Table 1¹.

¹ A complete list of the primary sources is provided as supplemental material, available at <https://figshare.com/s/35bcc135b4bbf71b2361>

Even though the research design adopted here requires gathering and analyzing a considerable amount of primary data, from different sources, it is not a quantitative matter, but mainly qualitative, relying, therefore, on the depth of information data can provide, not the amount. Accordingly, the process of data gathering was guided by the principle of saturation, that is, the point in which considering more data does not result in new qualitative information. Under this token, data saturation was reached when the scrutiny of primary sources did not provide new parameters of legitimation and, consequently, new coding was unfeasible (FUSCH; NESS, 2015).

Table 1 – Primary Sources

Operation Rio (1994-1995)	Number
Articles of Opinion	70
Parliamentary records	16
Executive statements	9
Military statements	39
Newspaper reports	56
Operation Arcanjo (2010-2012)	
Articles of Opinion	73
Parliamentary records	18
Executive statements	4
Military statements	10
Newspaper reports	41
Operation Rio de Janeiro (2017-2018)	
Articles of Opinion	114
Parliamentary records	25
Executive statements	8
Military statements	21
Newspaper reports	72
TOTAL	576

Source: elaborated by the author

Through the analysis of the primary sources, five parameters of legitimation were identified², which, in the terms proposed in the last chapter, worked as axes around which the public debate was structured and, therefore, mapped out. The parameters respond to the questions of whether and why the military instrument should or should not be used for the mission in question and permeate the three moments studied. They were mobilized to both build

² The parameters of legitimation were inductively traced in a preliminary reading of the primary sources and were later used to code the segments of the discourses of legitimation.

the acceptability of this kind of force employment and to sustain alternative perspectives opposed to the domestic operations.

The five parameters are: criticality, normality, technicality, community boundaries, and sovereignty. The first refers to discourses that associate the military operations with a situation of crisis. The second consists of depicting the military operation as normal and expected. The third, by its turn, refers to claims that advocate or oppose the military domestic deployment based on operational or technical issues. Community boundaries, as a parameter of legitimation, captures the unsettled dispute around who is and who is not part of the community to be protected. Finally, the fourth consists of concerns about political control over a territory and political autonomy. The general meaning of these parameters has been more extensively discussed in the last chapter, while here I specify the vicissitudes of how they were mobilized in Brazil. The chapter follows by briefly presenting the three studied operations and, subsequently, thoroughly unfolding how different actors articulated the five parameters, shaping the public debate and forging a dominant discourse to legitimate the domestic deployment of the Brazilian armed forces, which endured and consolidated over time.

4.1 Operations

Operation Rio was a set of public security actions in the city of Rio de Janeiro that took place between November 1994 and March 1995. It was commanded by the armed forces and carried out in cooperation with federal and state police. Its focus was the containment of crime-related violence. It was the first episode in which the Brazilian armed forces were deployed on a large scale in urban security activities and domestic confrontation after the military dictatorship ended, in 1985³. Even though the Federal Constitution of 1988, as well as its predecessor, provided that assuring law and order is among the armed forces' functions, the procedures for setting it in motion were not fully regulated at this time. The only rule available was the complementary law number 69, from 1991, which rendered mandatory GLO operations to be ordered by the president. It was established after the armed forces were deployed under a judicial to repress a strike order, in 1988. In 1994, other constitutional mechanisms such as federal intervention and state of defense were brought up in the public debate, Operation Rio,

³ The Brazilian armed forces had been previously deployed in smaller and more restricted public security operations, in 1988, against workers on strike at the National Steel Company (Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional), after a judicial decision, and in 1992, to security the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, known in Portuguese as Eco-92.

however, took place through an *ad hoc* formal agreement between the federal and state governments. Initially, it would have been in force until December 31, 1994, but it was later extended to March 3, 1995. A few years later, several laws and official documents further regulated and institutionalized the military deployment in the so-called operations of Law and Order Assurance.

Under the *ad hoc* agreement, the military patrolled urban areas, roads, ports, airports, and bus terminals, took part in the security of local elections, and performed many operations in the *favelas* – very poor areas composed mostly of irregular and precarious housing. In the first weeks following the agreement’s signing, the armed forces did not engage in direct actions, carrying out what they called a psychological operation, which consisted of demonstrations of force. The military had to wait for the electoral process that was underway to end before they could engage in direct actions. Operations involving the extensive use of force took place between mid-November 1994 and January 1995. From this point on, there was a moment of transition in which the armed forces began to transfer the command of the operations to Rio de Janeiro’s Public Security Department and ceased its participation in direct action in the *favelas*. However, they patrolled the city again throughout the carnival, in February 1995. The operation attracted great attention in the public debate, as it was marked by confrontations with criminal groups. There have also been accusations of human rights violations, such as searching homes without a judicial mandate and even torture.

Between Operation Rio and Operation Arcanjo, the armed forces were deployed domestically in 88 other occasions, of which seven were in Rio de Janeiro (MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA, 2020a). Those operations were not restricted to fighting organized crime, but also to safeguarding electoral processes and protecting authorities during international meetings. In this period, military domestic missions were broadly institutionalized, especially those aimed to tackle crime-related violence. In 1999, the Complementary Law 69 of 1991, was replaced by the Complementary Law 97, which paved the way to further regulations such as the Decree 3897, in 2001, the Complementary Law 117, in 2004, and 136, in 2010. Beyond the regulations, in 2005 the army created the Center of Instruction for Operations of Law and Order Assurance (CIOpGLO, in Portuguese), in Campinas, which was replaced by another center with the same name, place, and purpose, in 2006. As the name suggests, its main purpose is to produce military doctrine and prepare the army to perform domestic operations. According to the official website, the Center trains approximately one hundred soldiers each year. Moreover, in 2021, CIOpGLO was rebranded as Urban Operations Instruction Center (CIOU, in Portuguese), following the terminology used by the US military, Military Operations in Urban Terrain

(MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA, 2021c), which, however, is aimed at foreign conflict, no domestic operations.

In November 2010, after an outbreak of criminal violence in the state of Rio de Janeiro, including bus burning and gunfire attacks, the governor requested assistance from the federal government, which allowed, through a decree of Law and Order Assurance, the deployment of the armed forces. The set of public security activities carried out by the military in Rio de Janeiro from November 2010 to July 2012 was called Operation Arcanjo, which was the longest domestic deployment of the armed forces – approximately twenty-one months – since democratization. It costed around thirty-three million dollars⁴. The first operation under the aegis of Arcanjo was in a *favela* named Vila Cruzeiro, on November 25, 2010. The joint incursion of police and military and the confrontation with armed groups was followed by a massive fled of criminals to the neighboring *favela* – Alemão –, controlled by the same criminal faction, which was also engaged by the police-military task force on November 28. The escape caused a public stir, especially because it was broadcasted live and repeatedly reproduced on the news.

The military presence in this first action consisted of the navy's soldiers and armored vehicles; the army joined in the successive operations, greatly increasing the number of troops. In this context, after an agreement with the state's government (MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA; GOVERNO DO ESTADO DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2010), the Ministry of Defense, Nelson Jobim, determined the creation of an unprecedented Pacification Force, commanded by the army, to which has been granted the prerogative of patrolling, searching and arresting suspects (MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA, 2010). This Force carried out the subsequent military operations that occupied several *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro, settling police unities in the targeted areas. A great number of the soldiers composing this Force had previously served in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. During Operation Arcanjo, the military occupation of Alemão and Penha *favela*'s complex, in the North of the city, was the action that drew the most public attention since it was the longest. The military permanence in these areas was extended under the justification that more time was needed to train the large police contingent that would take over the security in the region.

Between Operation Arcanjo and Rio de Janeiro, nine other military deployments took place in the city, many of which were related to securing international events, such as the United

⁴ According to the Defense Ministry the operation's budget was 135.458.800,00 reais (MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA, 2021c)

Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), in 2012, the FIFA Confederations Cup, and World Youth Day, in 2013, FIFA World Cup, in 2014, and the Olympic Games, in 2016. There were also operations aimed to tackle organized crime in Rio de Janeiro, such as Operation São Francisco, between April 2014 and June 2015, and Operation Carioca, in February 2017. The latter occurred during Michael Temer's government and preceded Operation Rio de Janeiro.

The domestic deployment of armed forces was a notable feature in Temer's short administration, which started after Dilma Rousseff's impeachment, in 2016. The armed forces performed nineteen operations of Law and Order Assurance during his government, from August 2016 to December 2018. Besides the urban public security activities, these operations entailed different tasks such as securing international events, assisting the electoral processes, prison inspections, and unblocking federal highways during a trucker's strike (MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA, 2021a). Two military operations in domestic security stood out in this period: Operation Capixaba and Operation Rio de Janeiro. The first took place in the context of a police strike in the state of Espírito Santo, which constrained the use of the military in urban patrolling.

I focused on Operation Rio de Janeiro, from July 2017 to December 2018, for three reasons. First, it represents a geographical continuity in relation to the other selected events. Second, this operation stands out for its dimensions. It was the second longest operation of this kind since the democratization, lasting eighteen months, and had a budget of approximately fifty-eight million dollars⁵ – twenty-five million dollars more than Operation Arcanjo, which had a longer duration (DEFESA, 2020). Third, it was overlapped by a federal intervention in the state of Rio de Janeiro, through which the federal government took control of the public security administration, normally entitled to the state governor. Temer nominated the army general, Braga Neto, as the federal intervenor, who assumed the governor's attributions in public security, who, by his turn, nominated the colonel, Richard Fernandez Nunes, as the state's secretary for public security. Michael Temer's administration and its allies insisted that it was not a military intervention, as the opposition had characterized it, but a constitutional federal intervention that happened to have a general in charge. The fact is that, at this point, the armed forces were not only an instrument but also part of the public security political administration in the state of Rio de Janeiro. While the Law and Order Assurance – Operation Rio de Janeiro – took place from July 24, 2017, to December 31, 2018, the federal intervention


⁵ According to the Defense Ministry, the operation's budget was 234.485.755,13 reais (MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA, 2021c)

was established on February 16, 2018, and ended on December 31, 2018. Moreover, it is worth noting that during this operation, there has been a legal change, under a strong military lobby, which transferred to the Military Justice the prerogative of judging soldiers that perpetrate crimes against a civilian during domestic operations (PRESIDÊNCIA DA REÚBLICA, 2017).

4.2 Legitimizing discourses

To identify and map the presence and pervasiveness of certain parameters of legitimization in the public debate about the three operations examined here, the research proceeded through the content analysis of the aforementioned primary sources. While going through the primary documents, 1617 speech segments⁶ were coded according to the parameter they were mobilizing to sustain or oppose the domestic operation of the armed forces. The prevalence of each parameter can be seen in Figure 2, which depicts how the public debate about the domestic deployment of the armed forces was structured. Technicity and criticality were the most recurrent, constituting, respectively, 45,9% and 24,7% of the coded segments. The third most prevalent was community boundaries, with 15,9%, while sovereignty and normality represented 8,6% and 4,9% of the segments considered, respectively.

Figure 2 – Parameters general frequency




Source: Elaborated by the author

A similar pattern can be observed if we consider each case separately, which indicates a relative stabilization of how the domestic deployment of the armed forces was addressed in

⁶ A compendium of all coded segments, containing their transcriptions and the information about their authors and the document in which they were identified can be found as supplemental material, available at <https://figshare.com/s/35bcc135b4bbf71b2361>.

the public debate from 1994 to 2018. As can be seen in Figure 3, technicity had a small variation, from 44% to 48,3% of the segments coded, as well as criticality, which varied from 19% to 30,6%. It is also possible to see that the dispute around the community boundaries represented an important parameter, slightly surpassing criticality in Operation Rio and occupying an intermediate position in the public debate about operations Arcanjo and Rio de Janeiro. It is worth noting that, although technicity is the most frequent parameter in absolute terms, it is constituted by several narratives focused on different and, sometimes, contradictory aspects, as will be further unfolded, while criticality refers to one question only, that is, the notion of urgency posed by a situation of severe crisis. In this sense, the construction of a sense of criticality, as will be argued, is the most pervasive and unquestioned foundation of the effort to legitimate the military domestic operations.

Figure 3 – Parameters frequency per case



Source: Elaborated by the author

Although there is a continuity in the way the public debate around the armed forces' domestic missions was structured, if we look closer at each parameter it is also possible to identify certain variations that reveal the vicissitudes of each historical moment, as well as the particularities of each operation. For instance, sovereignty had an increased emphasis during


Operation Arcanjo, reaching 16,9% of the coded segments, which speaks to the fact that the actions undertaken at this moment were much more centered on the occupation of particular areas than the other two operations analyzed. Moreover, even though the mobilization of normality, as a parameter of legitimation, had a small range of variation throughout the cases, it was more frequent in 1994 and 2018. That is because, as we will see, normality is mostly constituted by legal narratives and in these two specific moments juridical controversies came to the fore. That is because, during Operation Rio the regulation of domestic military operations was incipient, and in 2018, as mentioned, the government used an unprecedented constitutional mechanism by ordering a federal intervention. Beyond the expected particularities of each moment, there is a pattern of discursive practices, permeating and shaping the public debate about domestically deploying the military instrument. The dominant discourse endeavored to legitimate this course of action by constructing a sense of obviousness. The following sections detail how the five parameters were mobilized and articulated, and expressed through certain rhetorical strategies, in the attempt to legitimate or oppose the domestic military operations.

4.2.1 Criticality

While, as we will see, there was a considerable debate about whether the armed forces are an adequate instrument to deal with public security issues in Brazil, the notion that there was an ongoing emergency in this domain is a rare common ground in the discourses comprised within the three moments studied. There was a small attempt to question the degree of criticality before the federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro's public security administration in 2018, even though the armed forces had already been performing operations of law and order enforcement in the city since 2017. However, it was a minor and very specific perspective when we look at the whole body of discourses. In this sense, during the timeframe in question, it was not possible to engage in the Brazilian public debate about the domestic deployment of the armed forces without addressing criticality. It was not feasible to utter an authoritative and compelling speech without acknowledging the public security situation as critical. In effect, critics of the military domestic missions do not contest the existence of a critical situation. These actors acknowledge criticality and focus on stressing the adequacy, effectiveness, or potential negative outcomes of the militarized response. The centrality of the claims drawing upon criticality to shape the public debate and legitimate this particular use of the armed forces is noticed in its intersection with other parameters of legitimation at play. As displayed in Figure 4, all the narratives, hinged

around the other four parameters, have some, if not a strong, intersection with the notion of criticality⁷.

Figure 4 – Codes Intersection



Source: Elaborated by the author

It does not mean to say that there has been a perpetual emergency from the nineties to 2018 since crisis is usually understood as a specific moment of particular criticality, i.e., substantial and systematic failure. Rather, it indicates that the notion of a pressing and unbearable situation reemerges from time to time when the military deployment is under debate. As argued before, perceiving something as an emergency or a crisis does not depend on the actual failure or, in this case, the genuine breakdown of the regular instruments of public security, but on its political mediation, i.e. the discursive representation of something as a crisis. It explains why the public security in Rio de Janeiro is often presented as an emergency, while other Brazilian states that have higher rates of violence are not⁸. It is “constituted in and through

⁷ An intersection consists of the occurrence of two or more codes in the same segment. The complete matrix of intersections that informed figure 4 is provided as supplemental material.

⁸ According to the Atlas of Violence, produced by the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea) (2017), while in 1994 Rio de Janeiro was the Brazilian state with the higher rate of homicide per 100,000 inhabitants (48,7), it was not far from its neighboring state, Esp rito Santo (42,5). In 2010, on the other hand, while the rate in Rio de Janeiro was 35,44, it was much higher in Esp rito Santo, 50,98. Finally,

narrative” (HAY, 1999, p. 340). Every time the military was internally mobilized, the emergency discourse was renewed and replicated, constantly reproducing the idea of a situation beyond normality.

Under this token, the three moments analyzed here were pervasively depicted as a calamity, catastrophe, war, exception, or a dramatic situation, which carved out the sense of criticality as self-evident reality. The recurrent use of these terms is displayed in table 2, which also reveals the cases in which they are followed or preceded by “security”, “armed forces”, and “military”, indicating the context in which the notion of crisis was mobilized. Criticality is also expressed through other assertions such as “the question is whether Rio became a tropical Beirut or a transplanted Bosnia” (CAMPOS, 1994, translated by the author), “it is only missing someone to turn off the lights and close the door” (SOUZA, 1994, translated by the author), “the time may come when helmets and bulletproof vests will be needed in the cariocas’ everyday wear” (LACERDA, 2018, translated by the author). It is also worth noting how this sense of urgency is transmitted through the titles of the special sections created by the newspaper *O Globo* to report on the military domestic operations in Rio de Janeiro – “war in Rio”, in 2010, “force against crime”, in 2017, and “full force”, in 2018.

Table 2 – Criticality: terms frequency and context

Word	Frequency	"security" in context	"Armed Forces" in context	"military" in context
crise (crisis)	1618	186	15	24
tensão (tension)	472	4	10	6
medo (fear)	457	34	9	11
insegurança (insecurity)	295	-	3	9
exceção (exception)	270	8	2	13
excepcional (exceptional)	223	16	7	4
caos (chaos)	219	20	3	8
emergência (emergency)	176	7	6	4
falência (failure)	150	12	4	3
inaceitável (unacceptable)	103	2	3	2
colapso (collapse)	91	13	3	1
calamidade (calamity)	80	8	4	0
catástrofe (catastrophe)	43	1	1	2
aumento da violência (increase in violence)	21	7	0	1
escalada da violência (escalation of violence)	20	2	1	2
Total	4238	320	71	90

Source: Elaborated by the author

in 2017, Rio de Janeiro and Espírito Santo had again very similar rates, 38,8 and 37,87, respectively. While, in the same year, a northern state, Rio Grande do Norte, experienced a homicide rate of 62,82.

The constitution of a sense of obviousness about criticality was present not only in the moments preceding the military deployment when actors were pushing for it. After the armed forces' operations were ongoing or had ended it was often presented in articles of opinion or media reports as the description of a fact, creating a notion that the military response was inevitable, given the critical situation. An illustration is the *O Globo*'s editorials that, one year after the beginning of Operation Arcanjo, repeatedly asserted that the military deployment "was due to the urgent need to promptly respond to the attacks, resembling terrorism, carried out (...) by drug traffickers' gangs" (ESTADO DE S. PAULO, 2011, translated by the author). When the editorial states that "the operation had to be launched because local gangs decided to confront the state and the society through acts inspired by terrorism" (ESTADO DE S. PAULO, 2011a), not in the form of an argument, but as a reported fact, it conveys criticality as self-evident and the military domestic deployment as a consequent, almost natural, result.

The mobilization of criticality as a parameter of legitimation is also followed by claims about the uniqueness of the circumstance at stake, which is alleged to represent an emergency with no precedents, requiring, therefore, exceptional responses. In the same way that domestic military operations are not historically exceptional, allegations about an unprecedented crisis are also not occasional but continually renewed. In 1994, Senator Hydekell Freitas averred that "(...) we have never witnessed, in the entire history of our country, a situation of violence as intense as the one currently taking place in Rio de Janeiro and in several other Brazilian metropolises" (BRASIL, 1994b, p. 6171). Similarly, in 2010, Deputy Arolde de Oliveira sustained that it was "an absurd confrontation, as it had never happened in that city or in any other big city in Brazil" (BRASIL, 2010g, p. 60). The same argument was repeated in 2018, by Senator Laseir Martins according to whom what was going on in Rio de Janeiro, in terms of violence and criminal activities, had never been seen before, depicting it as "the most delicate of our contemporary history" (BRASIL, 2018d, p. 17).

Moreover, criticality is mobilized through different metaphors and analogies. Besides the strenuous recurrent use of the term "war" and its correlated expressions such as civil war, (BRASIL, 1994c; LEVY, 1994), domestic war (CANTANHÊDE, 2010a), or postmodern war (FERNANDES, 2018b), some actors communicate this parameter of legitimation through analogies with actual civil conflicts. Claimants highlighted, for instance, that the number of homicides in Brazil between 1985 and 1991 exceeded the American casualties in the Vietnam War (BRASIL, 1994b, p. 6171; CAMPOS, 1994). In 2018, on the other hand, more contextually adapted claims were made arguing that the number of murders in Brazil between 2001 and 2015

was higher than the number of deaths in the Syrian Civil War and during the United States Occupation of Iraq (BRASIL, 2018b, p. 90, 2018c, p. 83).

In terms of metaphors and analogies, it is also significant the extensive employment of expressions related to medical and health emergencies such as “multiple organ failure”, “public security epidemic” (BRASIL, 2017a, p. 23), “obstructed vein” (BRASIL, 2018a, p. 55), “Intensive Care Unit patient” (PEREIRA, 2018), “cancer” (BRASIL, 2010h, p. 54345), “chronic disease” (BRASIL, 1994c, p. 13632). It frames the situation as a matter of life or death, accessing a widely available commonplace with which everyone can relate, and that entails a pressing urge to do whatever it takes. Another significant rhetorical instrument for constructing the sense of criticality is to frame the situation in terms of emotions, such as fear, sorrow, embarrassment, concernment, or distress. It permeates all areas of the public debate, being expressed in discourses of members of the parliament presidential, and ministerial statements, as well as in the media. As Arendt (1970, p. 75) had already warned us, when these metaphors make debates about using violent or nonviolent instruments to enforce law and order resemble a medical decision between surgery and drug therapy, the more ill the patient seems to be the more surgery will appear reasonable.

Therefore, depicting the situation in these terms upholds the notion that “it is obvious the need for the army’s cooperation” (BRASIL, 2010d, p. 48350), “it could not be different” (O GLOBO, 2010b), and that it is unacceptable that resorting to the military has been under discussion for so long (BRASIL, 2010h, p. 54337). In this dominant discourse, the image of criticality and, consequently, the claimed urge to act, grounds the authorization to deploy the armed forces, despite possible legal constraints, incompatible training, and doctrines, as well as risks to the civilians and the military. According to Senator Josaphat Marinho, “there are times when legal forms have to be interpreted with the due flexibility (...) the fact in Rio de Janeiro was extremely serious – we could not be discussing only legal forms” (BRASIL, 1994e, p. 6288). Under the same perspective, Senator Magno Malta questioned, in face of the critical situation, “are we going to stay here evoking the Constitution, constitutional details, [and] errors in the President's text (...)?” (BRASIL, 2018a, p. 22, translated by the author). Accordingly, General Heleno, an important figure in the army, the situation in 2010 “did not let room for any analysis about the legal provision, about whether that was the best way to act (...) the important thing was not to deny the highly necessary assistance that could not be postponed”. (MOREIRA, 2010, translated by the author). He and Coronel Barroso Magno, both former commanders of the Brazilian troops in Haiti, averred there was no legal or moral reason to deny the military deployment in Rio de Janeiro.

As well as legal constraints, uncertainties about the compatibility of military training with domestic operations are overcome by criticality arguments. Claimants retained that, in face of the crisis experienced, technicalities should not halt the military deployment. Deputy Alberto Fraga (BRASIL, 2017b, p. 99), for instance, recognized that the “army’s training is not quite focused on public security, but the situation in Rio de Janeiro is so serious that it has to be treated as a war issue”. In Figure 4, this logic is revealed by the intersection between criticality and pragmatism, which, as I will further elaborate, is a narrative reliant on technicity.

The most crucial point of this intersection is how depicting a situation as critical provides the bases to construct the acceptability and naturalization of particular uses of the armed forces. In this context, lethal violence is framed as an unfortunate but expected feature inherent to the pressing situation. For instance, during a seminar organized to debate public security, in 2017, General Sérgio Etchegoyen, head of the Institutional Security Office at the time, referring to the military operation in course in Rio de Janeiro, explicitly stated, “there will be failures and incidents. We are at war. It will happen. Undesirable things, including injustices, are likely to happen. The society either wants it or does not” (OLIVEIRA, 2017, translated by the author). The argument had been made on several occasions before Etchegoyen’s speech and has been widely reiterated after it. For instance, in 2010, Senator Leomar Quintanilha admitted that “the consequences are sad, innocent people are falling, but there must be a reaction, it has to be done” (BRASIL, 2010i, p. 54209). In 2018, as well, Senator Eduardo Lopes claimed, “we can face difficult moments, because there may be a reaction from the criminals, [and] there may be (...) moments of war”, however, “every change requires sacrifice” (BRASIL, 2017c, p. 77, translated by the author).


4.2.2 Normality

It might be expected that normality, as a parameter of legitimation, is the exact opposite of criticality, since the latter is defined by claims about exceptionality, which often seek to enable the overlook of standard procedures. In contrast, normality is not necessarily the opposite side of criticality, in fact, arguments suggesting that deploying the armed forces is the expected, i.e. normal, course of action to be taken under a critical situation are very common. As argued in chapter three, normality can be mobilized through two logics – legality and tradition. When it is prompted through the logic of legality, the legitimization struggle takes place in two fronts. First, there is a quest about the kind of situation in which the armed forces’ deployment is authorized and the procedure through which it must be done. This debate usually

happens at the beginning of the military operation but is not restricted to it. Second, during and after the military action there is a legally framed legitimization dispute about the armed forces' compliance or not with the law during the operations. Therefore, there is, on the one hand, a contend about the right to deploy the military instrument and, on the other, a legal quest about the prerogatives it is entitled to while performing the domestic operation.

Although few claimants sustain that the military deployment against criminal groups is unconstitutional (BRASIL, 1994f, p. 14043, 2017d, p. 59), it is not a resonant perspective. As can be seen in Figure 5, it represents 22% of the segments relying on the parameter of normality, against 71,4% of the claims sustaining military domestic operations are legally supported. It is not deemed a plausible argument since the Brazilian Constitution entitles to the armed forces the function of assuring law and order. There is, as well, a large number of infra-constitutional legislation regulating this military function, which reinforces its legality (SUCCI JUNIOR, 2018c). We should consider that military domestic missions were more formally institutionalized in 2018 than it was in 1994, however, the legally provided possibility to deploy the armed forces domestically is a common ground for the three operations examined here. In fact, even politicians opposed to this kind of military operation recognize that “it is a political matter (...) in legal and formal terms, there is nothing to contest” (BRASIL, 1994f, p. 14300, translated by the author). Actors supporting the domestic operations, by their turn, constantly stress that it is provided by the Constitution (BRASIL, 2010a, p. 49267, 2017c, p. 88) and that, consequently, “we cannot, under any pretext, criticize the role of the Armed Forces” since they are operating “exactly in terms of the law” (BRASIL, 2010a, p. 49263).

Figure 5 – Normality: coded segments



Source: Elaborated by the author

The disagreement resides on the form, that is, the legal procedure through with the domestic operation was to be triggered and not on whether the armed forces could be

domestically mobilized. In 1994, some voices argued that instead of an *ad hoc* agreement that kept the governor in charge, there should have been a federal intervention, as provided by the Federal Constitution, in which the public security management, which normally falls under the state's government, is taken over by the federal administration (RAMOS, 1994). Others sustained that the most suitable legal procedure was declaring state of defense (SAINT-PIERRE, 1995), which was opposed by claimants concerned it would mean suspending civil rights (FOLHA DE S. PAULO, 1994a; c).

In contrast, during Operation Arcanjo, there was not a significant debate about the legal procedure through which the armed forces were called. That is because, as mentioned before, since the late 1900s numerous infra-constitutional norms were established to regulate this process, in the legal figure of the Law and Order Assurance, which did not imply restrictions on civil rights, as in the state of defense, or on the governor's authority, as in the federal intervention. It was true for the 106 domestic military operations carried out in the twenty-first century, including Operation Rio de Janeiro, in 2017. This debate came back more loudly in 2018, when Michel Temer's administration decided to undertake a federal intervention in the state of Rio de Janeiro. The discussions, however, were mainly centered on the actual need for such policy (BRASIL, 2018e, p. 45), as well as on the federal government's decision to assign active militaries to political positions, such as the aforementioned federal intervenor position, which assumed the governor's attributions in public security, and the position of public security secretary (BRASIL, 2018c, p. 14). Therefore, the idea that it is legally normal to deploy the armed forces for internal operations in particular circumstances, prevailed in the Brazilian public debate along with the increasing number of laws and regulations in this respect since the nineties. These quests are captured in Figure 3, which shows that the proportion of segments under the code of normality, in relation to the total, is higher in the debates about Operation Rio and Operation Rio de Janeiro – 6,2% and 5%, respectively, against only 3% during Operation Arcanjo.

There are also claims about the military violating the law while carrying out domestic operations, which confront the sense of normality conveyed by the legal argument. In this perspective, which is centered mostly on another parameter of legitimation – moral exclusion – claimants report and condemn abuses of power perpetrated by the armed forces, such as restricting the population's right to come and go (BRASIL, 1994h, p. 14545) and even cases of torture (BRASIL, 1994i, p. 14703). In contrast, a group of politicians and military sustained the operations were carried out strictly “under the law, politely, respecting the citizens, dialoguing, [and] trying to change the situation of insecurity” (BRASIL, 1994e, p. 14304, translated by the

author). According to General Camara Senna, who commanded the troops during Operação Rio, their main concern was to “avoid, in any case, a violent action that could result in the death of drug dealers or criminals and also in the death of innocent people” (BRASIL, 1994j, p. 15251, translated by the author). Moreover, in the three studied operations, the military replied to this kind of concern by reiterating they are a professional institution, and every misconduct would be investigated.


The Brazilian armed forces, as argued before, have recurrently performed operations within its territory throughout the country's history, which is framed in different ways when it comes to legitimizing or refusing domestic missions. In fact, there is a narrative dispute over what is the military tradition in Brazil, depending on whether this parameter of legitimation is mobilized to underpin or oppose the armed forces' deployment. Under the logic of tradition, Deputy Fernando Chiarelli, for instance, argued military domestic operations stain the armed forces' heritage. He stated that “those who have already faced the Nazis, those who have already faced Solano, must respect themselves, protect the national borders, defend [the country] against aggressions that may occur, and do not wage war against their own brothers” (BRASIL, 2010e, p. 49265, translated by the author). It is interesting how Chiarelli constructed a narrative where domestic military actions are deemed abnormal, despite their historical recurrence.

Also critic of internal military missions, Deputy Eduardo Suplicy (BRASIL, 1994k, p. 7226), in 1994, remembered the War of Canudos, when the Brazilian army overran a village, in a bloody conflict, in 1896, and claimed he hoped it would not be repeated in Rio de Janeiro. Similarly, Deputy João Daniel argued that the military deployment in 2018 is part of the Brazilian tradition of repression (BRASIL, 2018f, p. 107). The armed forces' historical involvement in internal operations, on the other hand, is reframed by Deputy Jair Bolsonaro, who praised it by claiming that Operação Arcajo was part of their tradition of always supporting the Brazilian population in difficult times. These are very specific perspectives, which did not have considerable resonance in the political debate, being a secondary question within the whole body of discourses. As displayed in Figure 5, it represents only 6,5% of the arguments circumscribed within the parameter of normality. Notwithstanding, for the analytical perspective proposed here, it is worth noting the flexibility with which tradition can be evoked in the effort to create alternative discourses.

4.2.3 Technicity

Discourses drawing upon technicity as the parameter to legitimate the domestic deployment of the Brazilian armed forces can be divided into four major groups: armed forces' preparedness; effectiveness of the military operation; pragmatism; and political neutrality. As displayed in Figure 6, the quests about preparedness and effectiveness represent a major part of the segments relying on technicity, approximately 25% and 50%, respectively. Claims about political neutrality or political bias represent 8,5% of the coded speeches' segments, while pragmatism tilts the balance towards the acceptance of the domestic use of the military forces, with 16,8% of the coded segments. The common feature to all these narratives is the effort to frame the political decision on what kind of violence is acceptable through technical and procedural terms. In this way, the chosen course of action is depicted as an objective imposition of reality, instead of a political decision, which could unfold otherwise. This movement of pushing forward a particular stance by withdrawing it from the realm of the political debate is observed in both advocates and opposers of the military's domestic missions.

Figure 6 – Technicity: codes frequency



Source: Elaborated by the author

As for preparedness, even though accounting it would be expected to rely on the description of specialized abilities, a large part of the discourses is vague, with claimants merely averring the armed forces are or are not prepared to perform domestic operations, without further developing the argument. Many of these vague statements sustain the military aptness tapping into the common idea that the armed forces are a reliable institution. For instance, Deputy Paulo Magalhães, referring to Operação Arcanjo, argued “we watched, in Rio de Janeiro, the Armed Forces giving a show of strength, competence and willingness to serve the country and the Brazilians. They do their job boldly and firmly, as we all expected (BRASIL,

2010c, p. 95, translated by the author). Magalhães, in this way, mobilizes the social confidence in the military institution through a rhetorical strategy focused on the military features, as well as on emotions, such as pride.

The debate about military preparedness also develops in less vague terms. During a special senate meeting about public security, General Joaquim Silva e Luna, minister of Defense at the time, asserted that, since it is a constitutional function, the armed forces are prepared to perform GLO operations. Silva e Luna argued that the army maintains three brigades exclusively devoted to this kind of operation and has the appropriate equipment, such as non-lethal weapons (BRASIL, 2018a, p. 5). It is interesting to note that even though the army has units specifically designed for domestic operations training, as stressed by Silva and Luna, it is not usually mentioned in the public debate – not even by the militaries. On the other hand, analogies with the Brazilian military experience in the United Nations' peace operation are constantly mobilized to advocate the armed forces' aptness to carry out domestic missions. It is propelled regardless of the fact that the armed forces were involved in internal security operations long before its participation in peace operations – in fact, one could suppose this previous experience helped in UN operations and not the other way around – the Haiti experience was a compelling ideational resource available at this moment, which was not present, in 1994, during Operation Rio.

For instance, according to Senator Eduardo Azeredo, “it is important to remember that part of these forces [deployed in Rio de Janeiro] were trained in Haiti. By sending troops to Haiti, Brazil (...) trains its soldiers. There, in Haiti, there is something similar to Rio's gangs” (BRASIL, 2010e, p. 54473, translated by the author). Accordingly, Deputy Antônio Pannunzio deems internal security operations are not new to the Brazilian military, “since it is what they have been doing for a long time in Haiti” (BRASIL, 2010a, p. 49263, translated by the author). Under the same token, General Villas Bôas, when he was the army's commander, asserted that the success of the military operations in Rio de Janeiro was, to a large extent, due to what they had learned in Haiti (BRASIL, 2017e).

The argument of technical preparedness based on the experience in MINUSTAH is also broadly disseminated in news stories and media opinion articles. In some cases, it appears as part of an argument favorable to the military deployment, as when a columnist claims that even though the “Army does not train to investigate or to do systemic policing (...) maintaining peace and order is a competency of part of the troops” since they “spent 13 years doing just that in Haiti” (FREITAS, 2018). In other moments, affirmations such as “the military drew upon technics learned during the peace mission in Haiti” (FOLHA DE S. PAULO, 2017a) and

“operations of this kind are useful, moreover, for the military to gain experience in pacifying urban areas – knowledge used, for example, in Rio de Janeiro” (FOLHA DE S. PAULO, 2017b), frame this relation as a reported fact.

It is not difficult, in this sense, to find speeches sustaining that “the Army has the necessary apparatus to reinforce the security of Rio de Janeiro” (BRASIL, 2018b, p. 62). However, while Silva e Luna sustains this argument asserting the military has less lethal equipment, the major part of the actors advocating the armed forces’ preparedness ground their argument precisely on its greater firepower, revealing a mismatch of expectations about what kind of violence the armed forces are intended to employ in domestic operations. For instance, general Tomás Ribeiro Paiva, who commanded troops both in Haiti and Rio de Janeiro, argued, ten months before Silva e Luna’s statement, that the armed forces are prepared to engage in domestic operations against criminal groups, however, they are not forces of security, but defense, and they will act accordingly, which means applying a higher degree of force (PAIVA, 2017). These claims often stress the kind of weaponry criminal groups use and sustain that facing it requires the military’s expertise. Under this token, Deputy Marcelo Itagiba asserted that “there is legitimacy to act”, because “the weapons in the hands of these criminals are of restricted caliber, weapons that are under the control of the armed forces, often subtracted from the barracks” (BRASIL, 2010j, p. 422).

The quest about the kind of violence the military are supposed to deploy when acting within its borders is also a major concern in discourses contesting the military’s preparedness to act domestically. Many claimants, challenging the sense of obviousness about the military aptness for internal operations, hold that the armed forces’ training to fight wars renders it unsuitable for public security operations since it poses human rights at risk, which also affects military credibility (BRASIL, 1994f, 2010e, 2017d). Under this perspective, Deputy Edson Moreira, former police chief, asserted that when a rifle is fired in a favela, “it will go through several walls and hit innocent people. Innocent people will die” (BRASIL, 2017b, p. 99). Besides the weapon’s characteristics, according to Moreira, while the police are trained to respect the legal process, “the soldier does not have this kind of concern”, since he is under a doctrine and training aimed at the enemy’s physical elimination. Therefore, “employing a soldier on the streets requires a redirection of all this doctrine” (BRASIL, 2018g, p. 64).

This argument is represented by the code ‘preparedness contested’ and constitutes a significant part of the debate, as displayed in Figure 6, being sustained in several political speeches (BRASIL, 1994d; p. 6284, 2010e; p. 49261; 2017d, p. 59) and articles of opinion (BARROS, 2010; FRANCO, 2018; OLIVEIRA, E. R. de, 1994). However, besides the

aforementioned actors directly contesting this argument by claiming the armed forces do have specialized training to hold public security operations, in the broad debate, assertions on the mismatch between the military training for war and domestic tasks are eclipsed by discourses tapping into criticality as a parameter of legitimation, as well as other narratives grounded on technicity, such as pragmatism and effectivity. It is illustrative the *Folha de S. Paulo*'s editorial stance during the three moments analyzed, which although presenting a certain degree of skepticism, by pointing out risks associated with the particularities of the military training, it frequently praised the results, stressing that due to the critical situation, the involvement of the armed forces was fundamental (FOLHA DE S. PAULO, 1994b; d, 2010, 2011a; b, 2017a; c).

What is actually at stake in the quests about the armed forces' preparedness is not the technical capabilities but contrasting understandings of what kind of violence is acceptable. However, the debate about whether the armed forces are prepared or not to carry out these missions unfolds in a way that relegates to the background the main political question to be answered: prepared for what? Both stances – favorable and contrary to the military domestic mobilization –, beyond a technical concern, are in fact defending a particular form of organizing and deploying violence. On the one hand, there are advocates trying to broaden the circumstances in which the instrument of lethal violence is acceptable domestically, extensively mobilizing the ideational source provided by the MINUSTAH experience. These actors argue the military is prepared because their assumed goal is to escalate the degree of violence employed and the military are trained to use the maximum force. While, on the other hand, there are claimants aiming to preclude the broadening the threshold of the violence acceptability, by averring the armed forces are not designed for this kind of mission. Under this perspective, the armed forces would not be prepared, because the assumed goal is another one, i.e. to downsize the violence employed. In this sense, by mobilizing technicity as a parameter to legitimate or delegitimize a particular way of using the armed forces, both stances seek to push through a fundamentally political decision – how a particular polity is to organize its own means of violence – framing it as a technical and operational matter.

Intimately related to the debate about preparedness, the second group of arguments, mobilizing the notion of technicity, refers to the effectiveness of the actions performed by the military within the state's borders. Claims that the armed forces' domestic operations are an effective way to tackle internal violence are centered on individual actions, instead of on the historical outcomes of these operations. In the three operations studied, right after the beginning of the military actions, these discourses endeavored to construct a sense that the armed forces

reduced the violence, stabilized, or pacified the previously unbearably critical situation. For instance, shortly after the beginning of Operation Rio, during a public hearing in the National Congress, General Câmara Senna, the operation's commander, asserted that

“In a very short term (...) we managed to practically eliminate the shootings in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro (...). We eliminate gang fights. The number of car thefts has been reduced, which, honestly, was not a major concern for Operation Rio (...). The results evaluation is starting to arrive. The sense of security given by the operation to the population is noted”. (BRASIL, 1994i, p. 15254, translated by the author).

Accordingly, in 2010, Deputy Acir Gurgacz, claimed the joint operation performed by the police and the armed forces was exemplary. He argued that “we saw a group of security forces working together to retaliate a series of terrorist attacks carried out by the narcotraffic (...). Weapons, ammunition, and drugs were found. Arrests were made (...)” (BRASIL, 2010h, p. 54339, translated by the author). Senator Eduardo Lopes, by its turn, days after Operation Rio de Janeiro, asserted it brought results and that a reduction of crime had been registered (BRASIL, 2017c, p. 79). In terms of rhetorical strategies, these discourses tapped into the parameter of technicity by articulating its content as an objective fact, a thorough description of the results that reveals its supposedly clear functional nature, albeit the results announced are often not accurately presented by the speaker.

The repeated affirmation of individual actions' success carves out a sense that the effectiveness of the armed forces' deployment is evident, as well as that the success would not have been possible without the military. It is particularly the case of the media coverage and opinion article in 2010, after the armed forces' first incursion in Vila Cruzeiro and the consequent escape of criminal groups. The military action was pervasively referred to as the “successful operation” (O GLOBO, 2010a), “successful occupation” (O GLOBO, 2010d), “successful strategy” (O GLOBO, 2010c), not as something being advocated in a debate but as an acknowledged fact, which favorable outcome is deemed to only have been possible due to the military presence (CANTANHÊDE, 2010b; CASTRO, 2010). Accordingly, it was largely argued that this operation, given its success, proved once for all the efficiency of mobilizing armed forces to public security tasks (O GLOBO, 2010a; c).

While some actors advanced the argument about the military's effectiveness by presenting data such as drugs and arms seizures or crime reduction, a major part of the actors draw their claims about effectiveness on the mobilization of emotions. While criticality is

expressed by framing the situation as frightening or outrageousness, effectiveness is communicated through a sense of relief (MENDES, 2010; O Estado de S. Paulo, 2010), hope (BATOCHIO, 1994; BLANC, 2010), happiness (BRASIL, 2010f, p. 54340, 2017c, p. 77), enthusiasm (BRASIL, 2010k, p. 16), transmitting the idea that the critical situation has been overcome thanks to the “brave” (BRASIL, 2010l, p. 56035) decision of mobilizing the armed forces. For instance, Deputy Aldir Cabral, in December 1994, argued “Rio de Janeiro already experiences airs of tranquility; the people are no longer frightened” (BRASIL, 1994j, p. 15072, translated by the author) and that “we are proud of it” (BRASIL, 2010e, p. 49263). Deputy José Lourenço, by his turn, claimed an eighty years old lady told him that after twenty-three years of uneasiness, of nights awake hiding under the bed, she was finally sleeping and she did not hear shootings anymore, because “the army restored order, calm and peace” (BRASIL, 1994g, p. 14304).

The clout of this sense of obviousness around the effectiveness of a particular operation restricts what can be authoritatively said. Even those arguing that the military intervention is not a definitive solution and demanding more structural reforms had to stress not to be dismissive about the operation’s positive outcomes. For instance, a *Folha de S. Paulo*’s columnist, Fernando Rodrigues, expressed concerns about how naturally people were taking the deployment of war tanks in urban areas (RODRIGUES, F, 2010). Two days later, he wrote a disclaimer, arguing he was not ignoring the necessity of the military involvement and stating “it would be suicide to stand against the armed forces’ presence in Rio at the present moment” (RODRIGUES, F., 2010b, translated by the author). The former president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a political opponent of the president at the time, wrote an opinion article entitled “carioca’s great goal” – a soccer metaphor –, which was published in both *O Estado de S. Paulo* and *O Globo*, praising the operation and reaffirming the essential role played by the armed forces (CARDOSO, 2010a; b).

Differently, assertions sustaining the inefficiency of the military mobilization against internal violence are centered on the operations’ historical and recurrent outcomes, instead of particular moments. It is argued that militarized responses are merely palliative since it does not address structural problems and the real crime bosses, who are not living in the poor areas targeted by the military intervention. In this sense, according to Deputy Benedita da Silva (BRASIL, 1994h, p. 14541, translated by the author)

“(...) the incursion of the armed forces converts into a palliative; the easiest solution is not the proper and necessary one. To pretend to solve the issue of

organized crime overnight, by magic, is to ignore that it is a consequence of the disorganization and scrapping of the Brazilian police, which acts without a minimum of coordination and structure.

Another common argument is that the military response to crime is not effective because it combats “the small crime (...), being dismissive of the big issues of violence” (BRASIL, 1994l, p. 14791), while the real “generals of crime are (...) in luxury condominiums, in companies that launder money” (BRASIL, 1994h, p. 14545, translated by the author). Instead of contingent results and emotional narratives, the actors upholding this line of argument request data and proof of effectiveness. Deputy Assis do Couto, for instance, holds that “numerous studies and researches carried out by civil society and universities, as well as the outcomes of previous operations, show that this kind of intervention does not bring effective results” (BRASIL, 2018h, p. 79).

From this perspective, actors opposing military internal operations rhetorically draw upon the army’s commander’s authoritative figure, in terms of technical expertise, and untiringly reproduced his statement, according to which the domestic mobilization of the armed forces should be reconsidered because it is a “dangerous, consuming and innocuous”. He declared that after a military operation of fourteen months, everything returned to how it was before (BRASIL, 2017e). In the parliamentary debate, however, this narrative remained, with rare exceptions, restricted to the left-wing parties, whose critique had been less vocal during Operation Arcajo, which took place during the Work Party’s administration.


It is important to stress that, just as failure requires a political mediation to be deemed a crisis (HAY, 1999), a substantial policy failure does not lead necessarily to the revision of the dominant discourse (KREBS, 2015). The process of legitimation, through the construction of an apparent consensus, does not depend on the actual effectiveness of the course of action at stake, rather, it is about persuasively presenting it as the most desirable option. It is illustrated by the fact that the narrative about the military domestic missions’ inefficiency was still little expressive even after many operations of this kind were repeatedly followed by other waves of violence.

As well as the quest about preparedness, claims about effectiveness must rely on a previous notion of what is to be accomplished and what kind of violence the armed forces are supposed to deploy. In this sense, the inconsistency about whether the armed forces are mobilized to perform a downsized version of its violence capability or to deploy its full lethality power reveals that technicity, as a parameter of legitimation, stumbles on a prior unsolved and

inherently political question: what kind of violence is acceptable? Actors seek to naturalize their own answer to this question by presenting it as a technical requirement or an operational matter. Under this token, the question of how to implement a policy – operational matter – defines what should be done – the political decision. This logic can be also identified in two other narratives drawing upon technicity: pragmatism and political neutrality.

In the first, the military operations are framed as an objective necessity, arising from a self-evident reality in which the mobilization of the armed forces, as a technical decision, imposes itself. There is a clear and strong intersection between the narrative of pragmatism and criticality, as can be seen in Figure 4, since the allegedly objective reality urging the militarized response is precisely the one depicted as critical. Under this perspective, the armed forces would be needed since criminals have heavy weaponry and employ war or guerrilla tactics that excel the police capabilities, creating an intolerable situation of rampant violence (JAGUARIBE, 1994a; MARGOLIS, 2010; SIRKIS, 2010). However, it is not only a matter of criticality, but to frame the crime-related violence as political violence – such as war, terrorism, and guerrilla – creating, thereby, the sense that the nature of the issue at stake is not merely criminal anymore, but qualify as warfare, which responds to different juridical and moral criteria in terms of violence deployment. Advocates mobilize the metaphor “crime is war” and conclude the militarized response is a technically pragmatic choice.

Figure 7 – Terrorism in articles of opinion



Source: Elaborated by the author

The pervasive recurrence of these terms can be seen in Table 3, while Figure 7 illustrates the articulations made in articles of opinion between crime-driven violence and political-driven conflict, through the term “terrorism”. As displayed, claimants sustain that “it [the militarized response] could not be different, due to the terrorism”, “it resembles terrorism”, “terrorism promoted by criminal groups” or “it is necessary to put an end to this terrorism”.

This sense of urgency arising from a critical situation can also be observed in the intersection between pragmatism and contested preparedness, as displayed in Figure 4. Even though both narratives mobilize technicality as the parameter of legitimation, they would seem, at first, opposed to one another, since pragmatism is used to advocate the military mobilization, while contesting the armed forces’ preparedness to carry out the operation is mostly part of opposing speeches. The intersection of these two narratives, however, unravels the argument that albeit the military is not primarily destined for public security, it is the only, and therefore pragmatic, choice possible in the faced situation.

Under this narrative, preparedness contestation is outpaced by pragmatism in the struggle to legitimate domestic deployment. The statement of the Navy’s Commander, Ivan Serpa, in 1994, is illustrative. He declared that although the military was not trained for fighting criminals, they would comply with their missions. Serpa said “I have to be happy with the agreement [to mobilize the armed forces]. It is a solution (...). Evidently it could not stay as it was” (MINISTRO PÕE ..., 1994, translated by the author). The same argument was sustained by the Defense Minister, Raul Jungmann, in 2017, who on many occasions had publicly expressed concerns about domestically deploying the armed forces, which, according to him, had been trivialized. During a lecture at the Brazilian War College (*Escola Superior de Guerra*), Jungmann stated “is this [fighting criminals] a role for the armed forces? I don’t think so”, however, “how could a President, facing a crisis like this, escape the trap that GLO represents? (...) It is not acceptable for those who have sworn to defend a population to leave it exposed, in the hands of criminality” (BRASIL, 2017, translated by the author). Therefore, as well as criticality is mobilized to overcome potential technical and legal issues, pragmatism relativizes training incompatibilities and underpins the dominant discourse favorable to the military’s domestic operations.

Moreover, pragmatism also entails claims that since Brazil has no external threat it would not be reasonable not to use the military instrument to tackle the issue the country is undergoing. Under this perspective, an article of opinion questioned: “Admiral, are we going to fire missiles at shirtless Liberian pirates? Go to war with China? And, I promise not to spread, who is threatening the *Pré-Sal* [oil reserve]? (BLANC, 2010). This argument, however, has

been seen with skepticism by part of the military. Almirante Mário Cesar Flores, for instance, published several articles of opinion arguing that even though the critical situation urged the domestic deployment of the armed forces, it should not be emphasized over the national defense, since “one cannot mistake a peaceful country for an unarmed country” (FLORES, 2018, translated by the author).

The argument according to which the chosen course of action results from an objective comprehension of reality is also related to the narrative of political neutrality. The idea of a sharp dichotomy between a neutral technical account and an interest-guided political position is used to both defend and oppose the domestic military operation. For instance, according to Deputy Marcelo Itagiba, “joint operations with the army in 2005 were indisputable proof that the Armed Forces could and should help state police (...) in urban combat against drug trafficker” (BRASIL, 2010c, p. 47998, translated by the author), however, “partisan hindrances precluded again the creation of a permanent task force”. Itagiba claimed that during Operation Arcanjo the political biases were overcome, allowing “the State, now with all its available forces, to return to the Complexo do Alemão and dominate that territory under the control of the drug traffickers” (BRASIL, 2010k, p. 47999, translated by the author).

The idea of technicity as politically neutral is also mobilized to oppose domestic military missions. In this perspective, since this kind of operation is not effective, its repetition is explained through political interest. Senator Joao Capiberibe, for instance, argued that the military deployment against criminals in Rio de Janeiro is not technically appropriate, and accused the president of relying on the army to compensate for his government’s lack of popularity. This line of argumentation increased during Michael Temer’s government since he assumed the presidency after a controversial process of impeachment.

4.2.4 Community Boundaries

As discussed in the second chapter, the traditional conception of the state assumes a homogenous community as the state’s founding element, which legitimates its very existence. In this sense, the conventional division between armed forces and police, on the one hand, is embedded in a particular understanding about who is to be protected by the state – its domestic homogeneous community – and from who it must be protected – foreign states also constituted of a different unitary community. On the other hand, it entails a historic process of violent elimination of diversity, underpinned by the urge to construct this unity (RAE, 2003; WIMMER, 2004). Accordingly, a central part of the debates about the domestic deployment of

the Brazilian armed forces, i.e. the struggle to legitimate this kind of force employment, was structured around the boundaries of the community, shaping the lines between the excluded and the included groups.


To identify the dispute over the limits of the community, I borrowed the concept of moral exclusion, which refers to a situation in which a particular group is deemed not to comply with the principles of justice of a community. According to Optow's (1990) definition, deeming a group as not compliant with the moral values and justice considerations of a particular community entails the perception that these individuals are not to be granted the same rights and protections as the members of this collectivity. This concept allows us to address the boundaries of membership and belonging as malleable and sustained by a moral account, contrasting the fixed inside/outside line of the conventional territorial or juridical conception. Consequently, it allows us to grasp lines of inclusions and exclusions that do not equate with the state's territorial borders or citizenship legal status, which is the case when we are analyzing the acceptance of domestically deploying the instrument of lethal force.

As mentioned in the third chapter, Optow (1990) provides a list of moral exclusion symptoms, through which it is possible to identify the occurrence of this process. Four main signs of moral exclusion permeated the public debate about the three operations analyzed here: derogation, i.e. regarding groups as inferiors, which is identified through claims establishing divisions between good and evil or "we" and "them"; dehumanization, characterized by framing someone as devoid of humanity, incapable to feel and having no moral compass; technical orientation, which consists of emphasizing technical efficiency over its outcomes; and normalization of violence, which is often the result of the first three symptoms and is constituted by claims presenting actions of force as normal, expected and acceptable. Conversely, two narratives opposing moral inclusion were identified. They were classified as exclusion condemnation and partial inclusion. The first refers to claims directly associating the military deployment with socioeconomic or racial discrimination. The second consists of the attempt to include part of the targeted areas' population, by differentiating them from criminals. It is considered a partial inclusion because in these discourses the employment of lethal force against criminal groups is implicitly or explicitly endorsed. Figure 8 displays the percentage of the speeches' segments drawing upon one of these six narratives to defend or oppose the military domestic mobilization. It is possible to observe that the greatest part of the discourses tapping into the community's boundaries, as a parameter of legitimation, is concentrated on derogation and exclusion condemnation, 30% of the coded segments each. The sum of the other signs of moral exclusion – dehumanization, technical orientation, and normalization of violence –

represents approximately 30% of the segments reliant on community boundaries, while 10,1% consists of partial inclusion narratives.

Although actors supporting the domestic deployment of the military and those opposing it mobilize these two categories very differently, both rely their discourses on the included/excluded logic. The excluded refers to the targets of the armed forces' domestic actions. It is mainly used by actors advocating the military mobilization and unfolds through two main narratives. The first frames criminals through collective characteristics, depicting them as well-organized armed combatants, while the second depicts the target group through personal features, such as irrational, unscrupulous, ruthless, and morally inferior individuals. Both narratives are certainly interwoven, however, the distinction highlights two different logics through which criminal groups are presented in the exclusion discourses. The included category, reversibly, depicts part of the people living in the targeted area as the honorable, hardworking, and honest citizens, who happened to be in an unbearable situation of violence, being victimized by both the criminals and the law enforcement agencies.

Figure 8 – Community's Boundaries: coded segments



Source: Elaborated by the author

As for the first, advocates of the armed forces' mobilization against organized crime frame criminals as external to the community, by characterizing them as an enemy army. Under this logic, moral exclusion is expressed through metaphors related to warfare or other kinds of political organized violence, such as guerilla, terrorism, narcoterrorism, civil conflict, asymmetric warfare, non-declared war, and urban warfare. Criminals are also depicted as "generals (...) sergeants, corporal, soldiers" (General: Comando do ..., 1994). As aforementioned, this metaphor is also part of the pragmatic narrative, however, instead of using

terms such as civil war and terrorism to sustain a technical urge to employ a certain instrument of violence, here the central matter is to mobilize these images to present the targeted group as alien to the community, usually equated to the limits of the state. Under this logic, supporting Operation Rio, Senator Aureo Mello claimed that part of the population had been transformed “in guerrilla members, in criminals, in combatant, in undeclared and unofficial warfighter” (BRASIL, 1994m, p. 6010, translated by the author), placing this part of the Brazilians outside the community boundaries, since they allegedly became something else. In this sense, discourses about winning a war against crime to save society from violence are pervasive (BRASIL, 2018b). Table 3 displays the recurrence of terms linking crime to war, which served both pragmatism and moral exclusion narratives.

Table 3 – “Crime as war” metaphor terms frequency

Word	Frequency
guerra (war)	2058
inimigo (enemy)	189
terrorismo (terrorism)	132
terrorista (terrorist)	100
guerra civil (civil war)	85
guerrilha (guerrilla)	62
guerrilheiro (guerrilla fighter)	21
guerra urbana (urban guerrilla)	11
narcoterrorismo (narcoterrorism)	3
narcoterrorista (narcoterrorist)	3
quartel general (military headquarter)	3
guerra não declarada (undeclared war)	2

Source: Elaborated by the author

On the other hand, discourses advocating the military intervention in Rio de Janeiro’s public security rely on depicting criminals not as a well-organized group, but through negative individual features. Under this narrative, Senator Mello dehumanizes criminals, by regarding them as morally inferiors, when he claims that:

“Worse than this is the insensitivity, [and] the lack of compassion manifested by criminals of all kinds who are exercising their cruelty, without feeling the slightest remorse or realizing that they are entering the field of teratology and placing, therefore, (...) Brazil, this great country, in the list of those with a greater number of inferior and primitive beings, who can be leveled with

animals, panthers, jaguars, crocodiles”. (BRASIL, 1994m, p. 6010, translated by the author).

The analogy with animals is a common characteristic of moral exclusion discourses, which can be observed, for instance, in Fanon’s (1963, p; 42) description of the colonial situation, in which colonizers depicted natives in “zoological terms”. By the same token, Senator Jaques Silva framed criminals as deprived of moral values as well as rationality, sustaining that out of despair, they wage an “intuitive war”, abandoning “the principals of consciousness, the notion of good judgment, mercy and the very human solidarity” (BRASIL, 1994m, p. 6010).

The characterization of criminals as deprived of moral compass is explicit in a military document produced in 1994, which was intended to inform the development of a doctrine of domestic operation. This document, entitled “Security Urban Operations in *Favelas*”, depicts the drug dealer as someone who “does not have ethical and moral values and impose his leadership through weapons” (Leia a íntegra ..., 1994). Similarly, in 2010, Senator Magno Malta, referring to criminals as rats, another recurrent analogy, based his support for a domestic military operation on allegedly flawed individual features, stating “they feel no constraints to attack the physical integrity of a child, a worker, a businessperson or an unemployed. They kill and that is it!” (BRASIL, 2010l, p. 52957, translated by the author). The continuity of this narrative in time is clear during the debate about the federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro, in 2018. On this occasion, Deputy Simão Sessim claimed the violence was carried out by “wicked criminals, sponsors of barbarism, fear, terror, staining with blood, pain, and despair the hope of a people who still believe in moral values and social justice” (BRASIL, 2018c, p. 91, translated by the author).

Both, the group, and the individual narrative aim to justify the military force mobilized within the state’s borders. In effect, the conclusion claimants recurrently reach through these lines of argumentation is the allegedly pressing need and, sometimes, the inevitability of using force, particularly military force, against the targeted group. The narrative framing criminals as a well-organized armed group grounds its claims for the military response on the argument that this is how we are supposed to fight an alien enemy, naturalizing the mobilization of armed forces. There are several actors averring “criminals must be treated with bullets” (BRASIL, 2010k, p. 44, translated by the author), “one does not combat criminals with flowers” (BRASIL, 2018b, p. 51, translated by the author), or that “it is only possible to combat war with war” (BRASIL, 2018c, p. 96, translated by the author). Deputy Rodrigo Maia even quoted Churchill

to sustain that in war “we must do whatever is necessary” (BRASIL, 2018c, p. 128, translated by the author).

Moreover, this logic is embedded in a notion of technicity, that is, the idea according to which the militarized response to the organized crime is grounded on a technical decision related to the kind of weaponry (BRASIL, 2010k) employed by criminals and to particularities of this kind of combat, described as civil war (BRASIL, 1994m), urban warfare (BRASIL, 2017d) or urban guerilla (BRASIL, 2010c). As Opatow (1990) argues, focusing on the technical effectiveness over the result of the action – the deployment of the state’s instrument of lethality within densely populated areas – is another sign of moral exclusion. In this sense, politicians frame possible casualties as an unfortunate inevitable side effect, as well as a calculated risk. In this narrative of technical orientation, community boundaries, as a parameter of legitimation, intersect with technicity, particularly with the pragmatism narrative – but also with effectiveness and political neutrality, as can be seen in Figure 4.

It is particularly illustrated by the case in which army soldiers, patrolling a favela in 1994, put a group of children, who were going to school, against the wall and searched their backpacks. After the media published a photograph of this moment, causing a stir, the operation’s commander, general Camara Senna, replied: “I recognize that freedoms are being curtailed. We are not a battalion of social workers. It is impossible to avoid one or other excess. Sometimes you have to be tough, harsh, on the ground” (BRASIL, 1994i, p. 14523). It can also be seen in the appeal for more intense use of force, frequently sustained by discourses comparing military operations in Rio de Janeiro to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, whose military component was led by the Brazilian army. For instance, General Heleno, who had commanded Brazilian troops in Haiti, made several public statements defending adjusting the engagement rules for internal military missions to allow the soldier to eliminate anyone carrying a rifle. Heleno’s argument was based on the claim that this policy had worked in Haiti (PEREIRA, 2018). Accordingly, the army’s commander at the time, General Eduardo Villas Bôas, in a senate public hearing, claimed the restriction in the domestic operations’ engagement rules put the military in a vulnerable position (SENADO FEDERAL, 2017). Consonantly, in a survey conducted by Harig (2019), soldiers who were deployed in domestic operations in Rio de Janeiro after having served in Haiti expressed frustration about the greater restrictions on the use of force, which they deem to be prejudicial to the operation’s effectiveness.

Authorizing the force employment through the subjective morality narrative, by its turn, is based on claims for a sort of society purification, identifying the bad and unreasonable

elements. For instance, in 1994, Deputy Alceste Almeida referred to Operation Rio as a “necessary purge”, while Deputy Benedito Sá stated that the society urged for a moralizing measure (BRASIL, 1994n, p. 13629). Accordingly, opinion articles averred that Operation Rio had to happen “for us to have any chance of continuing to live as human beings” (LEVY, 1994, translated by the author) or for Rio de Janeiro to survive “as a civilized state” (JAGUARIBE, 1994b), translated by the author). In this sense, as argued by Deputy Valter Pereira, violence against criminals was expected, since “homeopathy will not calm down the nerves of criminals who assaulted the public peace and the citizens’ fundamental rights” (BRASIL, 1994m, p. 13632, translated by the author).

Moreover, while the target group is negatively characterized, other groups are hailed as holders or representatives of the community’s moral values, which in the Brazilian case are often the armed forces. It is illustrative for this matter, parliamentarians advocating the expansion of the mandatory conscription as an instrument to combat criminality since they consider the armed forces to have a moralizing effect, preventing those who served in the armed forces to engage in criminal activities (SENADO FEDERAL, 2017). In this sense, the military is often characterized as brave or heroes, the “greatest guardians of this great nation and the spine (...) that keeps this body upright and civilized” (BRASIL, 1994l, p. 6012, translated by the author).

Conversely, actors opposing the domestic mobilization of armed forces focused their discourses on the second category, i.e., the included. In this sense, they denounced these previous discourses as prejudiced and racist. Deputy Haroldo Lima, for instance, argued that reducing the drug trafficking issue to the image of a favela’s criminal “reveals a discriminatory, racist vision, which is, consequently, conniving with the real leaders of the drug trade” (BRASIL, 1994e, p. 14043, translated by the author). Accordingly, the military domestic operations are frequently characterized as a war against the poor and the criminalization of poverty (BRASIL, 2017d, p. 54). In this sense, Deputy Jandira Feghali stated that “it is the favela’s poor and black people who are within the weapons’ crosshair” (BRASIL, 2018b, p. 113). Senator Joaquim Beato, mentioning a professor’s article of opinion, contested the idea of inevitable casualties sustaining that

“people who justify the killing of innocents (...), accepting this as a natural consequence of the repression and who then say that ‘you cannot make an omelet without breaking the eggs’ (...) have a stupid brutality, a racist

brutality. (...) It is necessary to distinguish who is a favela's resident and who is a criminal" (BRASIL, 1994n, p. 6843, translated by the author).


In Beato's speech, we can note that the discourses contrary to the deployment of armed forces do not move completely away from the moral exclusion logic. That is because, even though these discourses stress the community's boundaries seeking to increase the included groups, they do so by relying on an excluded one. In this sense, those concerned with human rights violations and power abuse, during the military operations, often claim that the good citizens, living in poor areas, cannot be treated violently as if they were criminals. Therefore, this line of argumentation entails that there is a group against which the use of military force is acceptable. The effort is "to distinguish the favela's residents from the criminals" (Brasil, 1994e, p. 6843, translated by the author). Accordingly, Senator Cid Saboia sustained "we must be careful to find the Brazilian citizen", in order not to treat him as a criminal (Brasil, 1994e, 6843, translated by the author). In this sense, the struggle between the opposition to the military domestic deployment and those advocating it is a matter of where to draw the line between the included and the excluded, rather than a quest about what kind of violence – minimum police coercion or maximum military lethality – can be deployed within the state's territory. It was about who can undergo the state's lethal violence and who cannot, i.e. who is part of the community.

4.2.5 Sovereignty

In the three studied events, the dominant discourse advocating the domestic deployment of the armed forces, which was permeated by arguments about criticality, technicity, moral exclusion, and legal normality, is also accompanied by sovereignty as a parameter legitimization. As discussed in the first chapter, sovereignty can be granted different meanings (WEBER; BIERSTEKER, 1996) and refer to more than one dynamic (KRASNER, 1999). When mobilized to sustain the domestic deployment of the Brazilian armed forces, sovereignty was primarily used as the ability to exercise effective control over the territories within borders, by enforcing the national legal system and assuring the state's power as monopolistic in its territory. This narrative, called here territorial control, was the majoritarian use of sovereignty in the public debate about military missions in Brazil, corresponding to 93,5% of the coded segments drawing upon this parameter, as displayed in Figure 9. There was a minor alternative understanding of sovereignty that tapped into the notion of eliminating external influences over

the domestic authority structures, which was mobilized by claimants against the military deployment. I called this alternative perspective conventional defense. However, as can also be seen in Figure 9, it did not thrive, representing only 6,5% of the claims about sovereignty.

Figure 9 –Sovereignty: coded segments



Source: Elaborated by the author


Discourses according to which the state's authority must be recovered in a particular area of the national territory were pervasive. The concern under this logic is not the urgency to protect a certain group or eliminate an unbearable situation of violence, but to guarantee the monopoly of political authority over a particular area. In this sense, claims that in the Rio de Janeiro's favelas there is a parallel power (BRASIL, 2010f, p. 65, 2018f, p. 65), two legalities (BRASIL, 1994p, p. 13583), a threatened authority (PAIVA, 2010), a state of anarchy (LEVY, 1994), or the absence of state within the state (ROSENFELD, 2018) is constantly repeated and reinforced in the public debate. According to Senator Alvaro Dias, "the criminals consider themselves more powerful than constituted authorities. They became the kings, the emperors (...)" (BRASIL, 2010h, p. 54337, translated by the author). Claimants point out that, despite the state's legislation, criminals determine curfews, interdiction of areas and buildings, and restrictions on the right to come and go (BRASIL, 1994n, p. 13632; FERNANDES, 2018a; JAGUARIBE, 1994b).

This perspective is fostered by metaphorically framing the situation at stake through terms related to foreign aggressions and territorial warfare, widely mobilized by advocates of the militarized response through diverse metaphors and analogies. General Heleno, for instance, firmly stated: "we are being invaded by the organized crime", in this sense, "it became a matter of national security" (PEREIRA, 2018) or "national interest" (BRASIL, 2010i, p. 54208). A particular element through which this narrative was constructed and pushed forward is the use

of numerous expressions alluding to a territorial dispute, proper of conventional warfare, such as controlled territories (FOLHA DE S. PAULO, 2010; PAGNAN, 2017), occupied territories (AMORIN, 1994; PEREIRA, 2010), and liberated territory (ALVES, 1994; CARDOSO, 2010b).

Moreover, in 1994 and 2010 the military forces performed a very symbolic act, placing a Brazilian flag in the areas the operation took place, resembling an occupation army. During Operation Rio, the national flag replaced a cross, allegedly placed by criminals, in the favela of *Borel*, while in Operation Arcanjo it was positioned at the top of *Alemão's favelas* complex, which became the symbol of the military occupation. By the same token, the former president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, made a striking analogy, in his article published both in *O Globo* and *O Estado de S. Paulo*, where he stated that “in Rio de Janeiro, the constraints imposed by the organized crime (...) is equal if not greater than, what I saw in Palestine” (CARDOSO, 2010a; b).

Figure 10 – Newspapers word-three: territorial



Source: Elaborated by the author

The word-tree displayed in Figure 10 shows that sovereignty is constantly mobilized as a parameter of legitimation in the newspaper – in both articles of opinion and news reports – through claims that “gangs carry out the territorial control”, “the Brazilian peculiarity is the territorial control”, or that “Rio must face the challenge of ending the territorial control”, which is undertaken by criminals “heavily armed”, “with war weaponry”. By framing criminal groups

as an issue of sovereignty, legitimating actors conceal their economically driven nature, assigning them a quasi-political motivation. They are depicted as something similar to an insurgent group, even though they do not aim to overthrow the government or change the political regime. The attribution of a political character to economically motivated violence impacts the acceptance of a particular kind of response since it suggests “organized crime is much more than a police issue” (MARGOLIS, 2010).

Discourses opposing the armed forces’ domestic involvement do not address this parameter directly and, therefore do not contest the state’s lack of authority in certain areas. Rather, as well as criticality, it is acknowledged by the opposition. In fact, even though these claimants do not agree with the militarized solution, a major part of actors opposed to the military deployment, asserts that the main problem in the areas at stake is the state’s absence as a provider of basic services, such as education and health assistance. It is worth noting that it could represent another understanding of sovereignty, not only as the entitlement of controlling an area but the responsibility to provide services, however, it has not been put in terms of sovereignty. In this sense, even though we can infer a different approach to sovereignty here, it is not converted into an alternative discourse to confront the dominant understanding. Thereby, the uncontested claims about the authority at risk crystalize as commonsensical.

Another alternative understanding of sovereignty, propelled by critics of the armed forces’ domestic deployment, focuses not on the lack of authority in certain areas but on the characterization of the armed forces as the instrument to assure the state’s autonomy in relation to foreign powers and alien interests – conventional defense. This narrative sustains that there is a foreign interest, particularly from the United States, in directing the Brazilian military forces’ attention away from foreign policy, channeling it to domestic issues. In fact, in 1994, Deputy Aldo Rebelo, who several years later served as Minister of Defense (2015-2016), highlighted that there had been a meeting at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, attended by the President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, where the United States Secretary of Defense, William Perry, “advised the Brazilian authorities on the role and usefulness of its armed forces”. Rebelo claimed the former State Secretary, Robert McNamara, proposed “the dissolution of the armed forces of third world countries and its transformation into a national guard, aimed at combating drug trafficking and environmental crimes”, and asserted that “the North Americans, currently, believe sovereignty and self-determination have no value” (BRASIL, 1994e, p. 14043, translated by the author).

This perspective had almost no resonance in the public debate about the military domestic deployment. It was mentioned only in two opinion articles about Operation Rio (O

ESTADO DE S. PAULO, 1994; PEDREIRA, 1994) and was not identified in the debate about the other two operations analyzed, except by a speech in the parliament in 2018, when Senator Lindbergh Farias remembered this episode. He quoted Celso Amorim, who was the Foreign Affairs Minister in 1994, recounting his concern about William Perry's proposal to direct the Brazilian military forces to domestic issues, while the United States would guarantee the region's external defense.

4.3 Conclusion

As we have seen, even though, the conventional theoretical understanding of the state and the state's instruments of violence, assumed by most of the scholars addressing military missions, regard the domestic deployment of the armed forces, especially with the purpose of performing coercive actions, to be a rupture with the essentially military activities, it has been normalized in Brazil. In this sense, analysis grounded on this conventional framework tend to focus on condemning the rupture of what is normatively deemed to be the way in which the armed forces should be mobilized. Instead of assuming an a priori conception through which the object of analysis is to be inquired, this chapter attempted to empirically grasp the ideational framework underpinning the military domestic operations in Brazil. Five parameters of legitimation structured the public debate – criticality, normality, technicity, community boundaries, and sovereignty.

Discourses advocating the domestic mobilization of the armed forces drew upon these five parameters to make sense of the domestic military missions, forging a sense of obviousness, which did not imply the absence of contestation and alternative perspectives, as has been shown. The constant reproduction and adaptation of this dominant discourse relatively stabilized the struggle for shifting the line of the acceptable military action – i.e. the process of legitimating and delegitimizing a particular kind of violence – in Brazil throughout the three moments studied. Its main components, sustaining that calling the military is the obvious response, are: (1) there is a crisis of violence; (2) the armed forces have the training, the necessary equipment, and are an efficient instrument; (3) even if it is not the ideal unproblematic solution, there is no other option given the pressing circumstances, i.e. it is a pragmatic response; (4) the mobilization of the armed forces to this kind of situation is legally provided, therefore, normal; (5) we are dealing with unreasonable and well-armed criminals who did not comply with our principals of morality.

The construction of this dominant discourse, however, is not only grounded on the agency and discursive ability of its advocates, as presented in this chapter. Legitimizing actors articulate general notions that are made available to them by the social arrangement, that is, the set of social ideas historically constructed and intersubjectively shared by a collectivity. In this sense, the following chapter argues that what made it possible for these five parameters of legitimation to be mobilized into a dominant discourse is a particular image of the meaning and the role of the armed forces in Brazil, which set the topography upon which the discursive struggle took place. This image is built upon the image of the military as the agents of pacification.

5 NATURALIZING MILITARY DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: THE IDEATIONAL TOPOGRAPHY

Oh senhor cidadão,
 Eu quero saber, eu quero saber
 Com quantos quilos de medo,
 Com quantos quilos de medo
 Se faz uma tradição?
 Oh senhor cidadão,
 Eu quero saber, eu quero saber
 Com quantas mortes no peito,
 Com quantas mortes no peito
 Se faz a seriedade?

Tom Zé, Senhor Cidadão

Following the analytical framework proposed in the third chapter, we have thus far focused on the way in which a set of parameters and rhetorical strategies were mobilized by actors seeking to legitimate or preclude the domestic deployment of the armed forces in Brazil, and how it forged an apparent consensus about this particular kind of military operation. The present chapter, conversely, aims at highlighting the social arrangement within which this process took place. It is argued that the dominant discourse previously detailed depended on a particular ideational topography to unfold in the way it did. It comprises a set of ideational sources, i.e., historically constituted and intersubjectively shared ideas about the role of the armed forces in its relationship with the Brazilian state and society.

The concept of role used here is based on Berger and Luckmann's (2009) sociological approach. The authors define it as a set of intersubjectively shared ideas about a kind of action, and a way of performing it, which is perpetuated over time, generating the expectation that all those who assume this particular role, regardless of their individual characteristics, will perform it in the same way. It is also related to the actor's identity, in the sense that when one assumes a particular social position, he or she understands him/herself as having the duty and the right to adopt the behavior entailed by this role. For instance, being a father, a mother, or, in our case, a military implies a set of socially codified behaviors, in which one's identity turns to be embedded. In this sense, the ideational sources, unraveled in this chapter, reveal a set of social

expectations about what the armed forces' normal behavior is, as well as an identity structure to which the military, individually, are expected to conform.

These ideational sources made it possible for legitimating actors to craft their discourses in the way they did, as well as for their claims to resonate as credible and reasonable statements. As argued before, if the analysis of the parameters of legitimation and the rhetorical strategies highlights the weight of agency in the legitimating process, the scrutiny of the ideational sources locates this process in a particular social arrangement, which limits or stimulates specific courses of action and that, at the same time, need to be reproduced and reaffirmed through agency.

The ideational sources that made it possible for the apparent consensus, described in chapter four, to be articulated in that particular way relied on the military self-indulgent image of the armed forces as agents of pacification. This image entails two broad ideas about the meaning of the military and its place in the Brazilian society. The first, called here 'the ideal citizen', is based on individual and moral characteristics. It frames the armed forces as the benchmark for citizenship, that is, the ideal model of behavior to be disseminated and inculcated in the Brazilian society, which leads to a self-endowed educative role, as well as to a, also self-granted, responsibility to maintain domestic order. The second, by its turn, is grounded on public features, and was named here 'the apolitical politician'. It is characterized by the assumption that the military are great public administrators, exempt from political biases, guided by objective national interests, and technical competencies. In this sense, they present themselves as responsible for protecting the country against private interests, as well as addressing problems civilian institutions are not able to.

These are understandings about the role of the armed forces in Brazil, whose construction was undertaken mainly by the military, but not only, and whose origins can be traced back to the colonial period, even though the consolidation of the Brazilian armed forces as an autonomous and self-conscious institution was better delineated in the First Republic, after 1889. We should remark that while the discourses presented in chapter four assemble a set of arguments in fairly coherent claims, which are aimed at and restricted to supporting a very specific policy, the array of ideas about the armed forces presented in the present chapter is broader and more loosely articulated. That is because, they were produced and reproduced over a long period of time, in different political contexts, and by distinct actors. Even though they are not tightly structured, they are constitutive of the ideational context and social arrangement that allowed the parameters of legitimation previously analyzed to function and present themselves as credible.

The characterization of the Brazilian armed forces, particularly the army, as a pacifying agent, as well as framing pacification as a constitutive element – if not the constitutive element – of what an ideal soldier is supposed to look like, was traced through the way in which the image of the army's patron, Luiz Alves de Lima e Silva, known as Duque de Caxias (Duke of Caxias, in English), has been constructed within the Brazilian military imagination. That is because, Lima e Silva is known by the title of *Pacificador* (“pacifier”, in English), and is the main symbol of the army. It is also interesting to note that terms such as *pacificador* and pacification are constantly present in the military practices of intervening in domestic security. That was the case in conflicts with natives, during the colonial period, as well as in the fight against insurgencies in the XIX century (SOUZA *et al.*, 2017b). Moreover, as mentioned before, in 2010, the military force created to act in Rio de Janeiro was named Pacification Force and was assigned to assist the settlement of *Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora* (Pacifying Police Units, in English). Moreover, the command and control system used to coordinate the military security plan during the Olympic Games Rio 2016 (“Sistema Pacificador garantiu...”, 2016), and later employed in GLO operations, is also called *Pacificador* (VIANA, 2021, p. 247).

The point here is not about the actuality of Caxias' personal features but the array of attributes the army historically congregated into his figure in the attempt to construct a sense of identity. This representation of the Brazilian military sets the broad ideational background of the legitimization process unfolded in the previous chapter. The characteristics ascribed to Lima e Silva and, therefore, to the Brazilian armed forces, were identified and thoroughly delineated by scrutinizing Caxias' laudatory biographies, as well as the articles published in the military review *Defesa Nacional*, which had him as the subject. Three biographies were analyzed: *A vida do grande cidadão brasileiro: Luiz Alves de Lima e Silva*, from 1878, by priest Joaquim Pinto de Campo; *Caxias*, written by Affonso Carvalho, in 1938; and *Caxias: nume tutelar da nacionalidade*, from 1978, by Paulo Matos Peixoto. Moreover, ten articles about Lima e Silva, published in the review *Defesa Nacional*, from 1942 to 2003, were examined – as displayed in Table 4. This publication – founded by a group of military officers, known as *Jovens Turcos* (Young Turks, in English) that had previously received training in Germany, from 1906 to 1912, was considered for the study because it has historically been an important outlet for the military's political activism. Additionally, the availability of the articles published since 1913 allows us to identify the construction of an ideational source over time. Furthermore, the analysis was complemented by secondary sources about the military history and thought in Brazil, which helped to understand the broader context in which the set of ideas about the Brazilian armed forces developed and was perpetuated.

The following sections examine how the Brazilian military framed Duque de Caxias over time, having him as both the major representative of the pacification practices and attributes, and the ideal image of the army. First, an overview of the activities Lima e Silva performed during his carrier is presented, highlighting the strict relation between his title of *pacificador* and his frequent participation in domestic tasks – especially in violent domestic operations. Subsequently, the two major ideational sources circumscribed to the pacifying narrative – the ideal citizen and the apolitical politician – are unfolded. Finally, the last section turns to the connection between the parameters of legitimation and the ideational sources.

Table 4 – Articles in Defesa Nacional review

Year	Author	Title
1942	Colonel Ascânio Viana	Atuação de Caxias como Pacificador
1942	Captain Danillo da Cunha Nunes	Conflito de sentimentos
1942	Lieutenant João Lannes Leal	Caxias
1943	Pedro Americo Weneck	Caxias
1963	Major Ergon Bastos	A ação de Caxias nas crises internas
1986	Eduardo de Castro Bezerra Neto	Caxias é integridade nacional
1986	José Guará	Caxias – Cidadão e Soldado à Serviço do Brasil
1986	Diogo de Oliveira Figueiredo	A visão estratégica de Caxias
2003	Colonel Luiz Carlos Carneiro de Paula	Caxias e a Política
2003	Cláudio Moreira Bento	Recortes históricos sobre Caxias

Source: Elaborated by the author

5.1 Duque de Caxias and Pacification

Even though the Caxias' depiction may have varied over time, depending on the historical context (GOMES, 2014), it has been crystallized in certain attributes pervasively echoed in different historical periods, such as reasonable and conciliating, militarily decisive, law-abiding, custodian of the political and moral order, opposed to irrational disrupters, politically neutral, diligent public administrator, and national unifier. Souza (2001), for instance, analyzed Lima e Silva's 51 biographies and observed that the same way of depicting and characterizing him lingered almost unaltered from the work of Joaquim Pinto de Campos, written in 1878, until the 1980s.

Lima e Silva is hailed for actions of various natures, such as quelling domestic uprisings against the Brazilian monarchy, waging traditional warfare, and assuming political positions. The title of *pacificador*, however, is closely associated with his performance in domestic conflicts. Besides his depiction as someone predestinated to be a great military, the celebrative narrative about Caxias' deeds begins with his participation in the campaign of the Emperor's Battalion against a movement for the independence of Bahia, in 1822. It is said to be the moment when Lima e Silva first showed his attributes as a soldier. Subsequently, he was part of the Brazilian troops in the Cisplatine War (1825-1828), for which he has also been praised.

In 1831, after Emperor Dom Pedro I resigned, Lima e Silva was designated to maintain the order in Rio de Janeiro, which was the Brazilian capital at the time. In the same year, he organized the *Batalhão Sagrado* (Sacred Battalion, in English), composed of military officers that voluntarily patrolled the streets of Rio de Janeiro. Also in 1831, he was entitled to organize Rio de Janeiro's Municipal Guard (BASTOS, 1963), which reveals the propinquity of the figure elected to be the central anchor of the Brazilian military identity with the enforcement of domestic order. Lima e Silva's connection with domestic operations is even more apparent from 1840 when he was nominated governor of Maranhão, entrusted to suppress the uprising that was ongoing in that state, called *Balaçada*. After quelling this movement, in 1842, he was assigned the task of containing liberal revolts that had irrupted in Sorocaba, in the states of São Paulo, and in Barbacena, in the state of Minas Gerais. Immediately after Minas Gerais' campaign, Lima e Silva was nominated governor of Rio Grande do Sul, where the biggest revolt of this period – *Farroupilha* – had been ongoing since 1835, reaching its end in 1845.

Caxias also took part in traditional interstate warfare. Other than the aforementioned Cisplatine War, Lima e Silva was the general commander of the Brazilian ground forces in the Platin War, from August 1851 to February 1852, and, in 1866, was nominated general commander in the Paraguayan War, where he assumed the direction of all Brazilian troops in the conflict. In addition, Caxias held several political positions throughout his life, among which are the Ministry of War (1855-1857), and the presidency of the Cabinet of Ministers on three occasions (1855-1858; 1861-1862; 1875-1878). According to Coelho (1976), the death of Lima e Silva, in 1880, raised a sense of anxiety among the military, for whom the armed forces were unappreciated and treated with hostility by the civilian elite. Officers saw Caxias as responsible for containing the political attacks against the institution. The author argues that the progressive reduction of the military budget and the empowerment of the National Guard reinforced this perception, strengthening Caxias' figure in this moment of uncertainty.

The laudatory narrative about Lima e Silva, however, has its strongest roots in the late 1920 and early 1930, when the praise of his image became an institutional policy. It can be identified in the renewal of official rites and ceremonies. Since that moment, the main figure permeating the armed forces' imagination was General Osório – a military leader during the Paraguayan War – who was gradually outpaced by Caxias. In 1923, the Army Minister determined that from that year Lima e Silva's birthday should be celebrated. Moreover, in 1925, this date became Soldier Day. According to Castro (2002), the effort to invent Caxias as a military symbol had the objective of appeasing divisions and conflicts within the army. It is notable in the official narrative where Lima e Silva is praised for being loyal to the Brazilian Emperor, even in trying times and against his father – who was also a military and politician (NUNES, 1942; WERNECK, 1943). His image, in opposition to Osório, could be seen as useful for conciliating, in the military imagination, the ambiguity between the aim to reproduce the traditional model of a military institution oriented to the defense against external enemies, and the reality of being predominantly deployed domestically, and politically involved.

Described as the perfect soldier, ideal soldier, perfect general, and military symbol, Caxias was constructed in a way that resembles the figure of a saint, to which soldiers should turn for guidance in difficult times (CASTRO, 2002). Accordingly, an article to *Defesa Nacional*, in 1942, referred to his memory as sacred (LEAL, 1942). Following the social construction of Caxias' image, through the attributes ascribed to him, allows us to understand how the Brazilian armed forces assigned themselves a particular role in the Brazilian society, constituting, and disseminating a set of ideational sources, which would set the topography upon which the legitimation struggles took place. These broad ideas about the role of the military institutions in Brazil would be tapped into by actors seeking to legitimate domestic military operations. The present section explores how the attributes constituting Caxias' laudatory image provided two main ideational sources about the Brazilian armed forces, which were perpetuated over time. These ideational sources frame the military as a) the benchmark of citizenship and nationality, in which the parameter of community boundaries is embedded, and b) as the most prepared institution of the state, assuming the burden for the civilian weakness. The chapter proceeds by analyzing at length the construction of each ideational source having the laudatory account about Caxias as the connecting thread. These two characterizations of the armed forces are sectioned for purpose of clarity in exposing the argument, however, they are intimately interwoven.

5.2 The ideal citizen: army as a school of morality

It is highly present in the identity of the Brazilian armed forces a sense of superiority with respect to civilians, who are distinguished into two categories: a political elite, deemed to be corrupt and immoral, and the people, accounted as poor and uneducated. Accordingly, there is a pervasive understanding in the military thought that the armed forces are entitled to guide, educate, moralize, and, if necessary, control both the political elites and the uneducated population. Celso Castro (1990), in his ethnographic research in the military school for officials, showed that this sense of distinctiveness is carefully forged throughout the soldier's training and socialization. Hayes (1991), in his turn, traces this perception of superiority back to the colonial period and identifies in the concept of "armed nation" the idea that the society should be organized according to the military values and patterns of behavior, which he describes as opening society for the armed forces and closing the armed forces from society, i.e. influencing without being influenced.

Under this token, the image of Caxias, in the way it has been constructed within the military thought, is not only a guideline for soldiers but is regarded as the model to be followed by all the Brazilian society. According to an article in *Defesa Nacional*, Lima e Silva was not only "an inspiration for the military (...) but equally for civilians. His life demonstrated the inseparability of the military and citizen qualities" (NETO, 1987, p. 143). The same conception was expressed in a coronel's article in 2003, according to which "there is no incompatibility between the soldier and the citizen. Rather, the better the soldier, the better the citizen" (PAULA, 2003, p. 38). The military distinctiveness in relation to the civil society is grounded on both public and private attributes, being the first related to technical preparedness and the second to moral qualities, each of which will be treated here as a particular ideational source. As priest Joaquim Pinto de Campos put it "such as his [Caxias's] public life is a model, a model is his private life" (Campos, 1936, p. 24). The present section focuses on the private side of this narrative and argues that, through Caxias' depiction, the armed forces presented themselves as the citizenship benchmark, that is, the defining criteria tracing the community's boundaries. The continuity and consistency of this perspective can be observed in the narratives about Caxias, and in the military writings, more broadly.

As mentioned, one of the main conclusions to which the conviction about military superiority over the civilian elite and the population was that the armed forces should educate and moralize civilians, to forge real citizens. It echoes in different groups and lines of thought within the institution. For instance, in the first republican government, after the army overthrew the monarchy in 1889, the only conception in the military thought about their role in society,

according to Coelho (1976, p. 68), was “vague references to a mission to regenerate society”. In this context, Benjamin Constant – widely known as the main representant of the positivist group within the armed forces –, as Minister of War, sustained that the military institution should conciliate its preparation for warfare with its duty to assure the public order, and its educating mission (HAYES, 1991, p. 82).

According to McCann (2007), a few years later, in the decade of 1910, three perspectives addressed the quest about what should be the military role in Brazil. The first, and more influential, was developed in the military review *Defesa Nacional*. From their perspective, the armed force’s primary function was traditional external defense. However, in an undeveloped country such as Brazil, the military institutions would supposedly have the subsidiary, but pressing, role of domestic stabilization, which should be undertaken through civic education. *Defesa Nacional*’s first editorial averred the army “has equally educative and organizing functions to be exercised over the general mass of citizens. A good army is a school (...)”, as well as a “powerful factor in the formation and transformation of a backward and amorphous society”, such as the Brazilian (KLINGER, CARVALHO e REIS, 1913, p. 02, translated by the author).

The second perspective about the military role in the Brazilian society was propagated mainly by the Parnassian poet, Olavo Bilac, and the *Liga de Defesa Nacional* (National Defense League, in English), which drew upon Bilac’s ideas and was supported by the government (McCANN, 2007). He advocated that the military educative function was not less important than the defense encumbrance, as *Defesa Nacional*’s founders often claimed. Rather, for Bilac, the educating mission was the army’s most important duty. He sustained that people in the Brazilian hinterland “are not Brazilians, they are not even real men [humans]: they are living beings without a creative and free soul, such as beasts, insects, and trees. The major extent of the territory is dwelled by illiterate” (BILAC, 1917, p. 6), translated by the author). Under this token, Bilac campaigned for the compulsory military service, arguing that by “militarizing all the civilians” (BILAC, 1917, p. 7, translated by the author) it would be possible to restore patriotism, discipline, and social order.

The third and contrasting, view on the military’s role in society was advocated by Alberto Torres. According to McCann (2007), Torres shared the concern raised by Bilac that Brazil had to be organized but disagreed that it should be done through and by the military, claiming the army prepares soldiers, not citizens. McCann claims that, as might be expected, the approaches of *Defesa Nacional* and Olavo Bilac prevailed in the military though. The author also argues that, in the thirties, the armed forces would bring into play Bilac’s account every

time they sought to strengthen ties with society. In 1939, the poet's birthday was decreed Reservist Day, and in 1966, he became the patron of the military service. It is important to highlight that on both occasions –1939 and 1966 – Brazil was under authoritarian and military-guided regimes.

Furthermore, despite Alberto Torres' divergence in terms of the military role in society, as argued by McCann (2007), his work was mobilized by military leaders advocating the armed forces' involvement in enforcing the domestic order. For instance, Juarez Tavora, leader of the *tenentista* revolt, consistently cited Torres in his writings (MUNDIM, 2007). Torres' thinking would also influence, according to Lentz (2022), the constitution of the Brazilian War College (ESG, in Portuguese), especially when it comes to the notion of a strong state as a mean to solve national problems.

Both prevalent approaches conceived that only by assuming military features, the uneducated population could be converted into citizens, Brazilians or, even, humans. The armed forces are depicted as the benchmark of citizenship. This idea is deepened during the *Estado Novo* dictatorship (1937), which is regarded by Coelho (1976) as the point of institutionalization of a comprehensive doctrine about the role of the armed forces in Brazil, consolidating a particular military identity. The author argues that from the late nineteenth century to 1930, the army experienced a phase of activation, in terms of identity formation, in which they recognized their existence as an autonomous actor, but the question about their role and meaning remained unanswered. The *Estado Novo* was, according to Coelho, the moment in which a comprehensive doctrine about the armed forces and its relationship with society was settled and broadly disseminated. It was followed by a laudatory politics, which can be seen in the exaltation of military qualities and heroes – such as Caxias, as will be further unfolded.

Accordingly, Hayes (1991, p. 164) argues that in this period the military old dream of serving as an educating and disciplining institution was revived. The main figure in the formulation and implementation of the *Estado Novo*'s military doctrine was General Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro. He sustained that the military plan to develop and assure the country's security was hindered by both the political elites' negligence and the people's antimilitarism, which he attributed to supposed racial inferiority (BRETAS, 2008). For Góes Monteiro, it is not possible to have an organized army with a disorganized population (COELHO, 1976). Under this token, he regarded that security would only be reached through development. Góes Monteiro defended that “the most rational way of establishing national security on a solid basis, with the ultimate goal of disciplining the people and obtaining maximum production, is precisely to adopt the principles of military organization”

(MONTEIRO, 1937, p.133 *apud* HAYES, 1991, p. 166, translated by the author). In this sense, besides being the main guardian of domestic and external security, the armed forces were deemed to be the yardstick for organizing all realms of civil society. Under Góes Monteiro's formulations, politics and society should be subordinated to the military demands, since the latter was the real representative of nationality (SVARTMAN, 2006).

The same connection between the military's sense of distinctiveness and its claimed educative function was expressed in 1942, by major Lyra Tavares – who twenty years later, would assume several important positions in the military dictatorship, such as three ministries and a seat in the governing junta of 1969. In an article to *Defesa Nacional*, he averred that the military duty is not imposed by force on the soldier, but “came to existence when the human spirit and human moral, improved through the steps of civilization, liberated themselves from a primitive individualist notion, and sublimated into a superior ideal”, and concluded by framing the military as “morally perfected beings” (TAVARES, 1942, p. 371, translated by the author).

This self-perception leads the author to claim the educative role in society, granting the armed forces the responsibility for social order. It might be highlighted here that this is not only about political or institutional but social order, which implies the defining elements of a community such as its cultures and belief systems. In this sense, in the imagination of the Brazilian armed forces, the elements deemed to draw the line of the community, i.e. the social groups morally included, and the military defining features are enmeshed. According to Lyra Tavares (1942, p. 69, translated by the author), these elements are “the love for the family, the land, and the traditions”. Tavares would reiterate this same idea in other works in the sixties and eighties (TAVARES, 1985).

The military self-granted educative role was also present in the founding principles of the *Escola Superior de Guerra* (ESG) – the Brazilian War College. Inspired by the US National War College, ESG was created in 1949 with the intent to be a place to prepare the political elite, constituted by both military and civilians, and formulate a national project to develop the country. The "Fundamental Principles of the Superior War School", written by Lieutenant Colonel, Idálio Sardenberg (1949), asserts that national security depends not only on the military capabilities but on the general development of the nation. It leads to the conclusion that the institutions responsible for national security have the duty and the right to take care of all aspects related to the country's development, among which are demographic, financial, and economic realms. The document points out that the first encompasses culture and morality.

Therefore, among the military's entitlements in the pursuit of development is defining and enforcing what they deem to be morally and culturally appropriate.

The security-development nexus established here responds to the same logic of the Góes Monteiro's doctrine. In fact, Coelho (1976) claims that the *Estado Novo's* military doctrine informed the National Security Doctrine (DSN, in Portuguese). It was elaborated within ESG and provided an ideological basis for the military coup in 1964, as well as for the subsequent dictatorship (1964-1985). According to him, the connection between security and development implied that the military mode of organization was the most appropriate to regulate society, disciplining the people and assuring the utmost performance in all national activities. Svartman (2006), in contrast, argues that DSN is not merely an update of Góes Monteiro's doctrine, even though it was not new. The author sustains that it was collectively elaborated within ESG, assembling into a coherent discourse, and adjusting to the Cold War mentality, a set of ideational representations of the social world that had for long been circulating among the military.

Under the conception institutionalized and coherently assembled at ESG, the armed forces' political performance was deemed legitimate, given its moral superiority. It can be observed in the military's political activism around the elections of 1955, in which Juarez Távora, an important name of the *tenentista* movement and the ESG's commander from 1952 to 1954, ran for president. Two weeks before the election, EGS organized an event called "the country's moral recovery", in which Castelo Branco – who would assume the presidency after the military coup of 1964 – gave a speech claiming the country had no leadership because only a few politicians embraced the national interests. He reaffirmed the military educative function, arguing that the armed forces promote high civic standards through conscription and contribute to solving ideological and social problems (SVARTMAN, 2006, p. 222). Accordingly, Távora's defeat was attributed to the immature and uneducated population, said to have been lured by the leftists (SVARTMAN, 2006).

The way in which the military dictatorship ended in Brazil did not let space for a meaningful, or any, reinterpretation of the role of the armed forces in their relationship with society. The decision of ending the authoritarian regime came directly from the military government and, hence, was planned and controlled by the armed forces (MATHIAS, 1995; OLIVEIRA, E. R., 1994; SOARES, 2006). It allowed them to move away from the center of the political power without losing their political influence (MORAES, COSTA, OLIVEIRA, 1987), as well as without changing the broad set of ideas about their meaning and role in Brazil (SUCCI JUNIOR, SAINT-PIERRE, 2020).

The continuity of the self-perception of superiority, grounding the educative function, is revealed by Soares (2005). The author analyzed the monographs produced in two military schools – which were a requirement for the students to conclude the course –, from 1985 to 1993, that is, in the first eight years after the end of the dictatorship. The author found that DSN continued to be the main grounds on which arguments were built. Soares also highlighted that in the works he scrutinized, the “nation” was accounted in an infantilizing perspective, being framed as an immature and embryonic entity, which would require supervision from the armed forces.

The recurrence of this understanding over time, as well as the efforts to stabilize and perpetuate it within and through the military institutions, can be identified in the narratives about Caxias, as the army’s symbol. The defining characteristics of what is deemed to be a model citizen are all crystallized in the way his image has been constructed. The laudatory narrative about Caxias is not only evidence of a lingering understanding of the military and the armed forces’ sense of superiority but is also constitutive of this particular ideational source that permeates the Brazilian imaginary and sets the immaterial topography upon which the quests about military missions took place.

We will now detail how this laudatory narrative constructed the armed forces, particularly the army, as the yardstick of citizenship and nationality. One of the personal characteristics for which Lima e Silva is often hailed is his marriage. In his biography, written in 1878, Priest Joaquim Pinto de Campos described Lima e Silva and his wife, Ana Luiza Viana, as the perfect couple in a loving and harmonic matrimony (Campos, 1936). Under the same token, in Caxias’ biography from 1938, Carvalho (1976) depicted him as the perfect husband and claimed Ana Luiza felt the happiest wife in the world. The enmeshment between his depiction as the benchmark of citizenship and the family environment is explicit in Lieutenant Leal’s article, from 1942, according to which “an exemplary citizen, he [Caxias] was the model of the head of household, the loving husband” (LEAL, 1942, p. 170, translated by the author). In 1973, another biographer stated the “home’s tranquility” and the “couple’s love and harmony” were the same “image of sound serenity” with which Caxias served his country (PEIXOTO, 1973, p. 44, translated by the author). Under this acclamatory story, his love for the family is only (and barely) outweighed by his love for the country or, in Tavares’ terms, for the land. A particular anecdote, repeated *ad nauseam*, is the occasion when Ana Luiza asked Lima and Silva to quit the military career and then changes her mind after realizing she could not stand in the way of his duty to the nation.

Another private quality attributed to Caxias that helped to construct the image of what a citizen was supposed to look like, is his religiosity, which is defined in terms of Christian religions – excluding, therefore, the Brazilian traditions of African ascendancy. Priest Campos claimed Caxias only endured Ana Luiza's death because of his great faith. He has also been said to be “loyal to the law, to the order, to God, and to humanity”, framed as “Cristian of solid faith” (LEAL, 1942, p. 169), “Cristian Hero” (LEAL, 1942, p. 171), and “guardian angel of sovereignty” (GUARÁ, 1986, p. 26). Caxias' religiosity is mobilized to a lesser extent than other characteristics, in quantitative terms, notwithstanding it is an important feature to be considered. It has already been a criterion for selecting candidates for the military school, as we will see, and it has also been central to the intellectual work of two very influential names in the Brazilian military though – Juarez Távora and Golbery do Couto e Silva (MUNDIM, 2007).

While emotional and spiritual elements are tapped into only a few times in narratives about the army's *patrono*, one of the most repeated attributes ascribed to him is rationality and the absence of passions in his decisions, which correlates with pragmatism as a parameter of legitimation. The sense of rationally-guided actions is expressed through claims that Caxias was firm and decisive when acting coercively but was also conciliating and sought to peacefully come to terms with the insurgences before resorting to the use of force. In this sense, he would deploy violence only when it was indispensable, and would stop pursuing violent means after the adversary's defeat. Carvalho (1976, p. 153, translated by the author), referring to the *Farroupilha* Revolt, claimed Lima e Silva had known “during the entire course of the campaign to be strong to win, and human to forgive”. Lieutenant Leal (1942, p. 25, translated by the author), in his turn, asserts “his fingers that vigorously wield the sword, had, when necessary, the delicacy and the skill to weave treatises of the finest diplomacy”, which was reaffirmed by Werneck (1943, p. 12, translated by the author), according to whom “strong, harsh, unapproachable before victory, Caxias was the noblest expression of generosity after the triumph”.

This way of depicting the model to be emulated by all soldiers prevailed. Twenty years later, in the sixties, Major Bastos described Caxias as a skillful and meticulous strategist, praising him for his “serenity, firmness, and loyalty” (1963, p. 09), as well as his directive of acting “with energy without losing sight of the advantages of a skillful pacification” (BASTOS, 1963, p. 16, translated by the author). In the seventies, this portrait of Lima e Silva is present in the biography written by Peixoto (PEIXOTO, 1973, p. 39, translated by the author), according to whom Caxias “was not cold, but restrained. Was not emotive, but sensible to the emotion, which he knew how to control”. According to the author, Lima e Silva, conforming to his civic

duty, “tried to avoid blood”, however, “as it was not possible law and order were imposed by force” (PEIXOTO, 1973, p. 85, translated by the author). The same is said to have happened in the *Farroupilha* revolt. The author claims that “the uncompromising toughness with which he [Caxias] fought was, as everyone understood, the only option left to him by the revolutionaries’ stubbornness that had not accepted his dramatic call for a return to the law” (PEIXOTO, 1973, p. 165, translated by the author). Moreover, Lima e Silva is said to have had no vanity and arrogance after the victory.

Accordingly, in the eighties, another article in the military journal *Defesa Nacional*, stated that Caxias developed two complementary and apparently contrasting abilities, “the strength of the military and the flexibility of the statesman (...). He always combined his military action with political conflict resolution. When possible, paved the way for lasting solutions” (NETO, 1987, p. 144, translated by the author). This depiction still endures in the military imaginary. In an article for the bicentennial of Lima e Silva’s birth, in 2003, for instance, Cláudio Moreira Bento, president of the Brazilian Academy of Military Ground Force History (Academia de História Militar Terrestre do Brasil, in Portuguese) at the time, quoted a historian, according to whom the “warrior genius” and the “merciful and clement generosity” congregated into Caxias, who “won mainly by convincing” (BENTO, 2003, p. 43, translated by the author). In 2016, once again this depiction was reproduced, this time by Coronel Umberto Ramos de Vasconcelos, who related Caixas pacification actions to contemporary military domestic operations of Law and Order Assurance. He claimed Lima e Silva employed the army in an “intelligent, tolerant, diplomatic, and compromising way” (VASCONCELOS, 2016, p. 9) translated by the author).

Finally, the military distinctiveness, constructed through Caxias, drew also on racial lines. Peixoto, for instance, related physical characteristics to moral attributes. According to the author, Lima e Silva “has a stable physical and psychic equilibrium. Neither short nor tall, he has a eugenic and healthy constitution. The lines of his face were extremely regular, composing a manly beauty that promptly outstands” (PEIXOTO, 1973, p. 39, translated by the author). It must be emphasized the explicit mention of eugenics while establishing a relation between physical constitution and moral features, which is a common conception among nineteenth-century racial theories, such as social Darwinism (SCHWARCZ, 1993). The author continues, stating that Caixas’ “oval face had not angle or irregularities. His broad head reveals intelligence and confidence. The head, of pure conformation, harmonizes with his privileged physical constitution” (PEIXOTO, 1973, p. 39, translated by the author). Carvalho had also commended Lima e Silva for his physical constitution, arguing that in the Emperor Battalion

“(…) a handsome lieutenant, of medium height, pale, broad shoulders, serene features, brown eyes, head and bust full of nobility and dignity” stood out (CARVALHO, 1976, p. 15, translated by the author).

The acclaiming account about Caixas and, consequently, about the military institution, was relational, that is, it was built upon an antipode. While the military symbol was caring, rational, and physically admirable, the insurgents he fought were irrational, vicious, and physically decadent. Carvalho framed the rebels quelled by Lima e Silva as an “amorphous mass of *caboclos*, *cafusos*, *mamelucos*, *caborés*⁹, people whose veins carry the anxious, suspicious, and vindictive *cariri*¹⁰ blood” (CARVALHO, 1976, p. 71, translated by the author). The author described Raimundo Gomes, the leader of *Balaiada* insurgent movement as “short, fat, arched legs, broad and flat forehead”, and also referred to him as “filthy obese” (CARVALHO, 1976, p. 80, translated by the author). Peixoto, by his turn, after praising Caxias’ physical attributes, depicted Gomes as “physically insignificant, short, fat, *mulato*, closer to black. When walking showed the excessive arcing of his legs, which made him sway while moving”. The author concluded by averring Gomes was intellectually limited and had no bravery (PEIXOTO, 1973, p. 72, translated by the author).

As mentioned, the praising narrative about the military contrasts with the lack of social recognition during the monarchy and the First Republic in Brazil. It was regarded as a place for socioeconomically and racially marginalized groups. An institutional reaction to this dissonance can be identified between 1937 and 1946, during the *Estado Novo* authoritarian government, underpinned by the military. During this period, the War Minister, Eurico Gaspar Dutra, who would become president, from 1946 to 1951, established a strict process of selection for the military schools, justified by the aim to form an institutional elite. This project was heavily grounded on ideological, religious, and racial discrimination. Five directives provided by Dutra determined that the applicants of the Army Officers Training School (*Escola de Formação de Oficiais do Exército*, in Portuguese) had to be born in Brazil, from native Brazilian parents, must come from an organized and well-regarded family, be physically and mentally healthy, should not be colored people, and should not be Jewish, Mohammedan, or atheist (RODRIGUES, 2008, p. 165). Even though, as Rodrigues (2008) indicates, the racialized process of selection ended in 1946, with a new federal Constitution, the narratives about Lima e Silva reveal that the prejudices it entailed endured.

⁹ These are terms employed to indicate mixed racial ancestry such as European and Indigenous (*cabloco* and *mameluco*), African and European (*cafuso*), African and Indigenous (*caboré*).

¹⁰ Indigenous people of Northeastern Brazil.

Moving forward with the characterization of the antipode, while Caixas is pictured as rational, reasonable, and conciliating, insurgents were framed as “fanatic” (GUARÁ, 1986), troublemakers, criminals (BASTOS, 1963), truculent (VIANA, 1942), evildoer (VASCONCELOS, 2016), brutal, grotesque, and merciless (CARVALHO, 1976). According to Peixoto (1973), they were “primitive people”, “uneducated mass”, “primary men”, who believed in the “sorcerer”. The present narrative, which grounds a broader understanding about the role of the armed forces in society, as well as a particular military identity, reinforced the notion that the country is dwelled by a group of people who did not respond to a set of moral, religious, and racial criteria – determined by socioeconomic and military elites, in consonance with European modern ideals. For this reason, this group was regarded as responsible for the country’s disorder and underdevelopment. In this context, the armed forces granted themselves the responsibility and the right to impose (and to define the meaning of) order, as well as put themselves in the position of the benchmark of citizenship, tracing the community’s boundaries.

While this subsection focused on how private features constituted the ideational sources stemming from the pacification narrative, it also entails a public side in which the military institution is represented as the most technically prepared entity, which will be unfolded in the following subsection. It is important to stress that the private and public sides of this narration are intrinsically entangled. In this sense, this division is made here for clarity purposes only.

5.3 The apolitical politician: armed forces as the most prepared institution

The idea that the military are an island of modernity, rationality, technical competence, and order within an ocean of disorder, irrationality, and corruption has for long been prevalent in the Brazilian armed forces’ imagination. As argued, this self-image of superiority is grounded on a twofold assumption. First, Brazilian society is composed of a largely illiterate population and an incompetent self-interested political elite. Second, the armed forces are a modern, technically robust, and politically neutral institution, guided by the national interest, instead of private ones. Both assumptions encompass attributes assigned to the military that led the Brazilian armed forces to endow themselves with the right and duty to educate the uneducated people, as unfolded in the last section, and to intervene politically when they deemed public interests were under threat. We have previously explored the ideational source constituted by the private qualities underpinning the military self-representation – the ideal citizen. The focus of this section, instead, is the set of public characteristics upon which this narrative is built, forging the ideational source we call here the apolitical politician.

It encompasses a threefold characterization of the military as: a) the most technically prepared institution; b) the most diligent and efficient public administrator; and c) exempt from political biases, even when acting politically. These three adjectives underpin the ideational source explored here, which is characterized by the combination of contradictory claims about political neutrality and the legitimacy to intrude in national politics, due to the technical and administrative competence. This oxymoron is at the core of the military identity in Brazil, being ubiquitously present in the official narrative about Caxias, the army's symbol. It is clearly expressed, as well, in the Brazilian chronic military's political autonomy.

The enmeshment of public administration and military activities was characteristic of the colonial period in Brazil. The first Portuguese attempt to systematically control the territory consisted in dividing the colony into large portions of land, each of which was assigned to a private custodian, who had both military and political power and formed popular militias. Moreover, the first regular troop in the country was established by Tomé de Souza, sent by Portugal as the general governor of the colony, invested of both political and military authority. Moreover, the poorly trained military instrument was assigned to all sorts of tasks, such as the construction of public buildings, policing, and fiscal supervision (SODRÉ, 2010).

The multitude of non-military activities carried out by the army is not a particularity of the colonial period. Building construction, public order maintenance, and different administrative assignments were characteristic of the military's day-to-day work after the independence. Hayes (1991) sees the roots of the armed forces' sense of superiority in their constant employment to compensate for deficiencies of the incipient civilian institutions. It is important to note, however, that in this particular moment, and for a long time after it, the armed forces had a very low level of organization and corporative cohesion, being constituted mostly of criminals (SODRÉ, 2010). During the monarchy, the military service was part of the penitentiary system, which impacted negatively the army's social image, causing resentment among officers (McCANN, 2007). At the same time, Hayes (1991, p. 19, translated by the author) claims that "when carrying out police activities (...) it is possible that they [the military] had a feeling of moral superiority in respect to those who despised them".

It is also important to stress that the military self-acclamatory depiction, which forged the ideational sources investigated in this chapter, was constructed in opposition to a pronounced suspicion of liberal politicians regarding the armed institution. During the Empire, political groups in the parliament feared that the military could be used against them, in favor of absolutism, and forwarded measures to weaken the armed forces. Similarly, the constant jurisdictional disputes between the military commander, which had troops stationed in every

province, and the provincial governors were also a source of uneasiness. Liberals considered it a threat to the constitutional order, given the low level of military obedience to the civilian authority. These tensions worried the military institution, which feared being dissolved (McBETH, 1972). The issue intensified after Dom Pedro I, supported by the armed forces, closed the Congress, in 1824. It happened in the context of parliamentary debates about a new constitution, which included restraining the army's domestic deployment (HAYES, 1991). According to McBeth (1972), the liberals' campaign against the emperor and his army did not stop until the former abdicated, in 1831, and the latter were deeply undermined.

After the Paraguayan War (1864-1870), the army expected to receive more popular and political appreciation, since they had succeeded in the conflict, despite being ill-equipped and poorly trained. However, it did not happen, provoking resentment among officers, who had, after the war, acknowledged the pressing need to better prepare the troops (COELHO, 1976). In this context, as Dudley (1976) showed, in contrast to what the traditional civil-military relations literature would expect (HUNTINGTON, 1996), the endeavor of professionalizing the Brazilian armed forces triggered their politicization. That is because the little attention the military's endeavor of professionalization found among politicians led them to decide taking the problem into their own hands.

Besides the generation of officials that actually fought the Paraguayan War, Castro (1995) calls attention to another group within the armed forces, the "military youth" (*mocidade militar*, in Portuguese), which had a central role in the monarchy overthrow. This group was not in the army during the conflict with Paraguay, and their military education took place in the Praia Vermelha Military School, known for its focus on exact sciences, as well as for its affinity with Auguste Comte's positivism, ingrained in the students' socialization. According to the author, the sense of superiority nurtured by this group was grounded on the idea that Brazil found itself in an early stage of development, in the terms posed by Comte, and that they were the ones who could lead the country to a more advanced one.

The tension between armed forces and civilian politicians, as well as the roots of the military self-image, which places them above the normal politics, is clearly expressed in the episode that came to be known as the Military Question – a series of skirmishes between the high ranked military and the imperial government, between 1883 and 1887. The question at stake was whether officers could publicly express their political opinion, which ended favorably for the military. After officers were punished for criticizing the government, Deodoro da Fonseca, one of the main figures in this episode, uttered that "the soldier is obedient but not servile" (McCANN, 2007, p. 37), expressing the understanding that they were the ones to

decide whether to obey or not the politicians, as well as disclosing the ambiguity between their duty to be loyal to the government and their sense of superiority. It is interesting to note that while expressing outrage with the punishment of two officers for expressing their political opinions, Deodoro claimed that if Caxias were alive, he would not allow the armed forces to be disrespected in this way. This “idealization of the absent”, as Coelho (1976, p. 47) called it, shows Lima e Silva’s central place in the military identity that started to take shape during this period.

This episode informed the military movement that overthrew the monarchy in 1889. McCann (2007, p. 37, translated by the author) argued that while deposing the emperor, the armed forces “put themselves above the law, claiming a special status that conferred them a supranational connection with the *patria*”. Accordingly, the first government of the Brazilian republic was a military government, and its first president, a Marshal – Deodoro da Fonseca. During his presidency, the military saw their wage and the armed forces’ budget soar (McCANN, 2007). It is also notable the increasing number of military assuming political positions.

The notion of the army’s superiority and the effort to counteract the political campaign against the military institution has been crystallized in the first republican constitution of 1891. Its 14th article, provided, for the first time, that the armed forces are permanent national institutions, withstanding proposals of dissolving them. It also established that the functions of the armed forces were both external defense and domestic assurance of law and order. Plus, and most importantly, it determined that the military should be obedient to the constitutional institutions “within the limits of the law”. This last disposition left room for the armed forces to deny any order if they considered it to exceed the law (HAYES, 1991). In practice, in a limit situation – but not only – they were the ones to define what is illegal and what is acceptable. Therefore, the army’s sense of superiority, as an apolitical politician, was institutionalized in the national constitution of 1891.

The limited obedience argument persisted in the military thought. It can be found, for instance, in the writings of Juarez Tavora, who commanded the *Escola Superior de Guerra* (ESG), from 1953 to 1954. Justifying the military uprising he had been part of in 1924, Tavora argued that “when the government obeys the law, the armed force must support it, even if it must fight the people themselves. However, when governments mutilate the law and disrespect the Constitution, it is up to the armed force to defend it, even if it is necessary to destroy, provisionally, the constituted power” (TAVORA, 1926 apud SVARTMAN, 2006, p. 135, translated by the author).

According to him, it is legitimate because the weak and illiterate masses, as he regarded them, were not able to liberate themselves from the immorally and corrupt elites. At the same time, Tavora avers "the beneficial interference of the armed force has not been limited to allowing the people to discard their tyrants (...)", but it works also as a "protective shield against the excesses of the popular indiscipline" (TAVORA, 1926 apud SVARTMAN, 2006, p. 136, translated by the author). Therefore, he regarded the military as above normal politics, being entitled to define what order and national interest are, as well as to quell any disruption arising from either the political elite or the general population. This conception stemmed from the fact that they not only identified themselves as the ones who know and represent, the true national interest but that they are the only institution capable of defending and pursuing it.

The apolitical politician self-perception is observed in the *Jovens Turcos*'s writings in their journal *Defesa Nacional*. While rejecting politics, characterizing it as partisan politicking when it did not conform to their world view, this military group considered the army to have a natural place in the national politics, since they are regarded as the country's only organized institution (KLINGER, CARVALHO e REIS, 1913). This is a close point of convergence between Góes Monteiro's military doctrine and the thought of the group behind *Defesa Nacional*'s editorial line, as Pinto (1999) indicated. It is explicit in Góes Monteiro's famous statement about making the army's politics, not politics within the army. In this context, the general averred the army is an essentially political institution, therefore, the problem is not acting politically but the military involvement in partisanship.

In this sense, the military is presented as neutral, and guided by national interest, in opposition to biased and self-interested party politics, which leads to a second point of convergence between Góes Monteiro's doctrine and *Defesa Nacional*'s editorial stance. Both regarded that the idea of neutral armed forces, which renounce participating in national political direction, is suitable for European developed countries, while underdeveloped states, such as Brazil, need the armed forces to impose internal order and foster national development (LENTZ, 2022). The military tutelage could only be suspended, and the armed forces directed to their (supposed) regular activities, when the country have reached a "high degree of civilization" (KLINGER, CARVALHO e REIS, 1913, p. 1).

Moreover, in Góes Monteiro's intimate connection between national security and development, the armed forces, regarded as the only organized institution in the country, are entitled to get involved in economic policies, and in the administration of the state more generally, in order to fulfill their duty of protecting the country against internal and external threats (PINTO, 1999). As argued before, this same rationale can be found in EGS's intellectual

productions (SARDENBERG, 1949), as well as in the military regime that ruled the country from 1964 to 1985.

The inability of the transition to democracy to meaningfully transform the role of the military – in terms of socially shared ideas about the institution and its self-understanding – can be heard in the national survey undertaken, in 2013, with officers of the Brazilian army. The military were questioned about factors that undermine or weaken democracy in the country. The answers of the 2423 officers participating in the query were mainly divided between “low educational level of the population” (49%), and corruption (39%). Moreover, it is interesting noting that among the older and better-ranked officers prevailed the conception that low educational level jeopardizes democracy in Brazil, and early career military tended to deem that Brazilians do not know how to properly choose their political representatives (CARVALHO, 2019).

The three characteristics of the apolitical politician ideational source – a) the most technically prepared institution; b) diligent and efficient public administrator; and c) absence of political biases –, expressed in the power struggle and mutual distrust between armed forces and political elite, can be observed in the narratives about Caxias. In the praising story about Lima e Silva, the military picture themselves as laying beyond the normal political game, as well as the definer of the true national interests. Under this logic, whatever the military comes to politically define as the right course of action – be it underpinning a political order or overthrowing it – was framed by them as the true public interest, the most rational, and politically neutral decision available.

The main historical episode upon which the laudatory narrative was drawn to assign these characteristics to Caxias was the repression of the *Balaiada* revolt. All of Lima e Silva’s acclamatory biographies analyzed here, highlighted the speech he gave when he first arrived in Maranhão to combat the uprising. Although Lima e Silva had been nominated not only as the military commander but also the state’s governor, in his first statement directed to the local community, he averred: “more military than political, I want even to ignore the name of the parties that, unfortunately, exist among you” (CAMPOS, 1936; CARVALHO, 1976; PEIXOTO, 1973). Conversely, the insurgents, as an inverted image, were said to be motivated and instigated by politics (CARVALHO, 1976; PEIXOTO, 1973; VIANA, 1942).

This speech is repeatedly tapped into by the stories about Caxias, forging the image of an apolitical politician, a sign of technical neutrality. Colonel Viana (1942) and Major Bastos (1963), for instance, sustained that Lima e Silva put himself outside the local political disputes and implemented a military policy that forced rioters to lay down their arms. According to

Peixoto (1973), Caxias had such an aversion to the two political sides in dispute in Maranhão that he refused to mention their names. The author claimed this was the only correct attitude possible in that situation, and sustained it was responsible for reducing the conflict intensity.

Even in situations less ambiguous than the campaign against the *Balaçada* revolt, when the military and political functions clearly overlapped, Lima e Silva was framed as an apolitical politician. While acting as parliamentary, Caxias was said to have “remained general even being senator” and that “politics needed him more than he needed politics” (CARVALHO, 1976, p. 156, translated by the author). The effort to dissociate the military from the political in the laudatory narrative about Lima e Silva, who assumed political positions during most of his life, is also observed when Peixoto (1973, p. 233) argued that Caxias “would not stay away from the political realm for a long time, although it was not an activity he liked”. This contradictory but functional image, in terms of legitimating their actions, remained in the military imaginary, which can be illustrated by the Colonel de Paula (2003), many years later, arguing that Caxias acknowledged that the army is called to solve the problems that politicians are not able to solve, because the national interest must prevail. He also suggested politicians should have the military’s ethics as a model to be followed.

Moving forward, the military is characterized, through Lima e Silva, not only as remaining outside politics – even when in political positions. It is also pictured as a better and more rational public administrator. Campos, for instance, claimed that, in Maranhão, Caxias took measures to “reach the economy, moralize the administration, and restore discipline” (CAMPOS, 1936, p. 53, translated by the author). In his turn, Carvalho (1976), claimed that Maranhão was in a state of anarchy and disorganization when the military intervenor arrived there. According to his biographer, Lima e Silva ordered the region not only by organizing the military but also by taking actions of public administration such as providing tax concessions to the local businesses.

Carvalho framed Caxias as a “genius, a solid administrator, (...) a technician of general ideas, a competent professional, an energy in action” (CARVALHO, 1976, p. 82). Bastos (1963, p. 11) also praised his “administrative zeal” in Maranhão, claiming he acted as a real “magistrate”, and listing his actions such as increasing the number of police officers, enforcing the law, repairing churches, military unities and public buildings, cleaning rivers, setting up crops, and reorganizing the mail service.

In the seventies, Peixoto (1973) reiterated this depiction, stating Caxias moralized the public administration in Maranhão, and pointed out once more the measures taken to protect and fiscally support business in the region. De Paula (2003), in his turn, claimed the

responsibility with the public good shown by Caxias, stemmed from his military background. Furthermore, in 1878, Campos had also exalted Lima e Silva's performance as Head of the Council of Ministers. According to the biographer, his administration was "one of the more strict in discipline" and "economical in public spending", "whoever goes to the details of it, will recognize the constant care of the organizer, the administrator (...) experienced military chief to whom the state entrusts the guard of his honor and his most dear interests" (Campos, 1936, p. 400, translated by the author).

Furthermore, Lima e Silva is said to have always supported, defended, and abided by the law. The main episode tapped into by the law-abiding narrative is the abdication of Dom Pedro I. When the pressures against the emperor intensified and part of the army turned against him, including Lima e Silva's father, Caxias stood by Dom Pedro I. He is said to have joined the rioters in *Campo de Santana*, where they were concentrated, only after being authorized by the emperor. In this context, Carvalho (1976, p. 39, translated by the author) depicts Lima e Silva as a "rigid opponent of revolts and revolutions" and "impervious to any idea of rebellion" (CARVALHO, 1976, p. 42, translated by the author). Nunes (1942) reiterated that despite the difficult circumstance and the contradictory feelings it caused to Caxias, he maintained his loyalty to legality. In the seventies, this depiction was once more reproduced by Peixoto (1973, p. 26, translated by the author), according to whom Lima e Silva "was not affected by the spirit of rebellion", "did not hesitate, putting his duty above his feelings", and that "being soldier since the age of three, he [Caxias] was convinced that his mission was to serve authority and the law".

The law-abiding narrative also draws upon Lima e Silva's performance against domestic insurrections. Viana (1942, p. 12, translated by the author), for instance, assures "Caxias always intervenes obeying the law" and "never wields the sword to oppress and terrify, but to restore order and discipline, guaranteeing tranquility and security". Twenty years later, Bastos (BASTOS, 1963, p. 11, translated by the author) reinforced that Lima e Silva was "uncompromising in the compliance with the law. Peixoto (1973, p. 73), in his turn, claimed Caxias has always put the law and justice above personal glories and popularity. This depiction of Lima e Silva was perpetuated and translated to the image of the armed forces in Neto's argument (1987, p. 136), according to whom "Caxias actualized, in his life example, the principles that inspire the constitutional attributions of the armed forces".

Finally, besides the public administrator features attributed to Lima e Silva, it is also inscribed in the laudatory narrative the military self-image of technical excellence, assigning to the armed forces the competence to solve all sorts of issues that no other national institution

could adequately address. To convey this image, all biographies, as well as the military articles analyzed in this chapter dwelled on Caxias' tactical decisions during the repression of the domestic insurgencies, describing at length the strategic planning, the movement of troops, and operational methods.

The ideational sources unfold here – model citizen and the apolitical politician – are inscribed in the broad image of the Brazilian armed forces as agents of pacification, which was crystallized and made explicit through the mythology around Duque de Caxias. In the next section, we proceed by arguing that this ideational topography provided a propitious social context to the parameters of legitimation to thrive and be credible. At the same time, it provided the raw material without which these arguments could not have been crafted in the first place.

5.4 Ideational sources and the legitimating discourses

It is important to start this section by stressing that we do not mean to imply any strict causal relation – of the kind 'X generates Y' – neither between the ideational sources and the discourses of legitimation nor between the ideational sources and the military operations. It is argued, however, that when these discourses were crafted and performed, they did so on a pre-existent ideational topography, that is, a set of historically constructed and disseminated notions about what the Brazilian armed forces are, and which role they have in Brazilian society. The collection of ideas constructed through the narrative about the military as agents of pacification provided legitimating actors with ideational resources to make a convincing case, as well as a social arrangement in which their argument would be received as plausible and credible. Ideational sources, therefore, do not cause the domestic deployment of the armed forces but provide the conditions of possibility for the parameters of legitimation, discursively articulated, to have sufficient adherence to be consolidated as an apparent consensus about the fairness of these operations.

This section further explores these interconnections, showing how the broad and enduring notions about the Brazilian armed forces are made present in the apparent consensus about domestically deploying the military in Brazil. As argued before, ideational sources have a more loosely connection with the arguments than parameters of legitimation, since they are not planned or intended to be a coherent narrative about a particular policy. The apparent consensus is constituted of five major arguments: there is a crisis of violence; the armed forces are a technically prepared and efficient instrument; despite any possible problem, it is a pragmatic response, since there is no other option in such pressing circumstances; it is legally

provided; we are dealing with unreasonable and well-armed criminals who did not comply with our principals of morality. The narrative about the armed forces as agents of pacification, by its turn, entails two major ideational sources: the armed forces are the benchmark of citizenship, and the military are the most technically capable and reliable institution in the country.

Five major points of contact are useful to unveil the intersection between parameters of legitimation and ideational sources. The first is the notion that the armed forces are reliable to respond to crises that civilian institutions are not able to cope with – in any area. As shown in the laudatory narrative about Caxias, this understanding was historically propagated by the military institutions, being constitutive of the armed forces' identity. This notion is implied in the intersection of criticality and pragmatism, as parameters of legitimation. That is, the claims that the military is the obvious choice, or the only possible salvation, in the face of the collapse of public security. It can be illustrated by deputy Jair Bolsonaro's claim in 2010, according to which "every time the Brazilian people needed the armed forces, particularly its army, in difficult times, be it to maintain democracy, such as in 1964 [i.e. military coup], be it to maintain law and order (...) we [the military] are remembered" (BRASIL, 2010a, p. 49265).

Similarly, in 2012, the army's commander, Enzo Peri, in his speech for the Soldier Day, praised Lima e Silva as a model soldier and stated that "such as in Caxias' times, the army knows it will continue to be called upon to act in adverse situations, of non-normality (...) even in low-intensity action, for which it has been employed" (PERI, 2012, translated by the author). These statements sharply convey the idea that the armed forces are ready to promptly respond to any trying situation civilians are not able to address, which is constantly reframed to encompass all kinds of military domestic actions. It permeated the sense of inevitability and obviousness of the apparent consensus forged in the cases analyzed before.

A second, and closely related, nodal point is the idea that the military is the most, if not the only, organized and technically prepared institution in the country. This image that has been nurtured by the armed forces in their self-praising account and mobilized many times to justify different kinds of domestic interventions throughout the Brazilian history, provides propitious grounds for the parameters of effectiveness and preparedness to succeed. As the last chapter showed, several claims about the military aptness to act in urban areas relied less on detailed appraisals of technical conditions and more on the confidence in the armed forces' competence. Traces of this conception can also be identified in the argument that the military, when acting in domestic operations, avoid confrontations and, when it happens, employ only the force necessary to achieve their objective. The discourses about rational and efficient use of violence, which would supposedly confer legitimacy to the state's violence, is an important feature of the

ideal military image, unfold in this chapter, and pervaded the previously detailed claims about preparedness and effectiveness.

Other than the parameter of technicity, narratives framing military violence as rational, proportional, and, therefore, trustworthy – such as in the official history about Lima e Silva insurgencies quelling and in the official discourses about GLO operations – tap into the parameter of legality and the law-abiding image of the armed forces. As previously elaborated, Caxias and, by extension, the Brazilian military, have been historically said to act strictly within legality, not exceeding their mandate for individual reasons or abusing power in the operations against insurgents. For instance, in his discourse for the Soldier Day in 2012, Enzo Peri also claimed the army uses the force “legally and in the necessary proportion”, and, in line with Lima e Silvas’ praising biographies, argued that the military training entails “the professional and the human being (...), combining skillfulness with honor, and firmness with the spirit of conciliation” (PERI, 2012, translated by the author).

As for their political interference, when the military did act in contradiction to the law, in political coups, for instance, they claimed to have exceeded legality in the name of legality, which is crystallized in the armed forces’ self-granted autonomy to decide when to obey. Under this token, in 2017, Luiz Eduardo Rocha Paiva, a reserve general, published an article of opinion in one of the largest newspapers in the country, in which he mentioned the military coup of 1964, argued that the political elite uses its power to legislate for its personal gains, and claimed “the military [political] intervention will be legitimate and justifiable, even without legal support, if the aggravation of the political, economic, social and moral crisis leads to the failure of the federal powers” (PAIVA, 2017, translated by the author).

This ambiguous relationship with the law resounds in the cases analyzed in chapter four and provides legitimating actors with a favorable ideational ground to present their claims. As has been shown, in the military actions against drug traffickers in Rio de Janeiro, the parameter of legality was mobilized, on the one hand, to sustain that the operations had been ordered by the civilian government, following, therefore, the due procedures. On the other hand, it was used to defend that the soldiers carrying out the operations refrained themselves from using excessive force, rigorously complying with the rules of engagement. Nonetheless, when concerns were raised about the military disrespecting these rules, including killing innocents, the response was to either claim it had been used only the proportional force – which has been willingly accepted by military courts (VIANA, 2021) – or that the rules were too restrictive and should be adjusted.

Moving forward, the laudatory narrative that forged, under the argument of objective, rational, and technical administration, the image of the military as an apolitical politician, helps to anchor the political neutrality narrative inscribed in the parameter of technicity, as well as the pragmatism claim. In this sense, the political decision of deploying the armed forces is framed as the objective course of action, while the restraints to this decision are said to be politically guided and, consequently, flawed.

Finally, claims about criticality, technical preparedness, pragmatism, and legality congregate and depend on the existence of an internal enemy, responsible for disorder and violence. This group is defined both by its assumed warlike features, which would supposedly require military equipment and training, and by moral and subjective characteristics depicted as flawed, irrational, and, therefore, irreconcilable. The notion of the military as responsible for defeating groups and individuals deemed not to respond to moral principles has been consistently constructed and reproduced in the praising narratives about the armed forces in the image of Caixas. As argued, under this representation of the military role, this institution is presented not only as a defense instrument but as the yardstick of nationality and citizenship, setting the line of community. In this sense, the parameter called here community boundaries finds enabling grounds in the set of ideas circumscribed in the 'ideal citizen' ideational source. That is because this parameter operates precisely by excluding and including individuals based on predefined moral criteria. Moreover, the inclusion/exclusion conception is also important to sustain the sovereignty parameter of legitimation since the differentiation is necessary to establish a sense of invasion or occupation.

Therefore, putting together the parameters of legitimation – mobilized to advocate the violence rightfulness – the rhetoric strategy – the form through which claimants articulate their arguments –, and the ideational topography, upon which this legitimation struggle takes place, provides a tridimensional view of the interplay between actors, ideas, and social arrangement that crystallizes an apparent consensus about the acceptability or not of a particular act of violence. Moreover, observing these points of contact allows us to capture and unravel the inescapable co-constitution of agency and social structure in the process of drawing and redrawing the line of acceptability.

6 CONCLUSIONS

Addressing a normalized violent practice is normatively trying. While framing certain forms of employing the military as abnormal implies clear normative opposition and contestation, describing the taken-for-grantedness of a historically recurrent violent practice might be misinterpreted as approving the phenomena under exam. During the construction of the present dissertation, this matter has been often brought about by commentators in conferences' presentations and peer reviewers in academic journals. I have been alerted that by describing the normalization of the military domestic deployment, this work could be wrongly appropriated by actors defending this kind of force deployment, as a way to claim that once it is a normalized undertaken in Brazil, there is nothing to question about it. Putting in this work's terms, it could nourish normality as a parameter of legitimation. It reveals a normative dilemma, characteristic of the empirical approach to legitimacy: while critically addressing and describing how a particular security policy came to be deemed obviously needed and expected, it leaves room for reinforcing its sense of normality and legitimacy.

On the other hand, also embedded in this concern, the naturalization of the military domestic deployment has been put in doubt, while presetting this research's results. It has been contended that doing something wrong repeatedly does not naturalize it. It would be only a wrong course of action taken time and again. The central point in the present thesis, however, is precisely mapping the process through which certain forms of violence are regarded as right, necessary, and desirable. The basic question is who or what traces the line between right and wrong. While in the theoretical inside/outside conception the analyst put him/herself in the position of defining what is normal and abnormal, for the framework developed here, it depends on a social process that creates an apparent consensus, not the analysis' normative stance. In this sense, the empirical evidence provided in the last two chapters showed that the dominant discourse on the domestic deployment of the military in Brazil forged a sense of obviousness about this kind of force deployment.

I share the normative stances critical to the deployment of the military against the civilian population, in a kind of operation that proved itself to be ineffectual in terms of public security. I also acknowledge the fundamental importance of the epistemic communities that after the end of the many military dictatorships in South America embraced the inside/outside framework as a way to push back the military political power, regarding the armed forces' domestic involvement – both in politics and in public security – as an abnormality, in a historical context struggle to reaffirm the early democratic system against a potential renewal of military

authoritarianism. However, assuming an *a priori* position about normality and abnormality, or right and wrong – i.e. fitting reality into theory – does not allow us to correctly grasp this process that has been undergoing for decades, or centuries if we consider the entire Brazilian history, despite its assumed exceptionality. It leads us back to the explanatory gap prompting this thesis. That is, the difficult to account cases in which the use of military violence within domestic borders is socially and legally expected, as well as changing patterns of acceptance and rejection of domestic military operations, when addressing it through the conventional inside/outside framework.

Under this token, the second chapter argued that to tackle this gap it is necessary to move away from the benchmark of normality traditionally guiding the argument about the blurred division between internal and international security, as well as police and armed forces. It sustained that the inside/outside framework is grounded on the theoretical coalescence of the limits of political authority, community, and physical territory, and showed that these categories are not fixed but socially and historically shaped and reshaped. In this sense, sovereignty, national community, and territory are not objective descriptions of ‘things’ with meaning in themselves. Rather, they are a vaguely defined set of ideas, signified and resignified according to historical contexts and political agency, pushing forward and backward the limits of the acceptable – or desirable – use of force.

To grasp this movement and make sense of violence legitimization, the third chapter provided an analytical framework aimed at identifying patterns of continuity or transformations in the acceptance or rejection of the use of force. It addresses the legitimization of the armed forces’ deployment as a communicational process, in which ideas are mobilized, constructed, recast, and repurposed, as a way to trace the lines of the acceptable action. The discourses are scrutinized and mapped out through five constitutive elements: referent object; positive or negative appraisal; parameters used to claim the legitimacy or illegitimacy of an action; ideational sources setting the ground on which the parameters are put at play; the rhetorical strategies through which both parameters and ideational sources are persuasively communicated. In this sense, it is possible to account the co-constitution between agency and social structures. On the one hand, the ideational topography both provides actors with the raw material to craft their claims and limits what can be authoritatively said. On the other hand, socially shared ideas have to be mobilized, refined, and articulated – i.e., it must be mediated by agency – to impact social acceptance or rejection of a certain use of violence.

Chapter four, in its turn, applied the framework previously developed to the Brazilian case, thoroughly unraveling how criteria such as emergency, technical competence,

pragmatism, legality, moral exclusion, or inclusion of certain groups, and claims about territorial and political control, structured the public debate about the armed forces domestic deployment, forging a hegemonic legitimating discourse. The same pattern of parameters mobilized to sustain the military internal intervention was observed in three timeframes: 1994-1995, 2010-2012, and 2017-2018. This dominant discourse, therefore, perpetuated over time, giving sense, and an authoritative stance for the armed force to be allocated in domestic security operations.

Finally, chapter five showed that the construction of this dominant discourse is not only grounded on the agency and discursive ability of its advocates. Claimants are embedded in a social arrangement, constituted by ideas historically constructed and intersubjectively shared about the role of the armed forces. This ideational topography, on which the struggle for legitimation unfolds, provided the conditions of possibility for actors to craft their discourses in the way they did, as well as for their statements to resonate as credible and reasonable. It is argued that the shared image of the Brazilian armed forces, particularly the army, is structured around the figure of the military as an agent of pacification (*Pacificador*, in Portuguese), which is composed of two ideational sources: the ideal citizen and the apolitical politician. The first pictures the armed forces as the benchmark of nationality, tracing the community boundaries, while the second frames the armed force as technically extraordinary and politically neutral.

The approach undertaken in this dissertation allows us to disclose on which grounds violence acceptance is built, unraveling the bias and prejudices responsible for its approval. It is relevant both theoretically and politically. For the research agenda, as has been argued, it helps surmounting a gap in the scholarly literature, improving our understanding of cases in which the domestic deployment of the armed forces, deemed an exception or a disruption of normality by major part of the works on this subject, is socially and legally expected. It also provides us with analytical tools to address shifts from violence acceptance to rejection. Politically, it contributes to contesting the sense of obviousness around the use of force, as well as for sharply exhibiting the logic sustaining violence approval. For instance, in chapter five, the inquiry about the ideational sources, providing propitious ground for the dominant discourse on the Brazilian domestic military operations, displayed it is rooted in exclusionary, militaristic, anti-democratic, and colonial ideas.

It is exclusionary because it is based on divisionary notions, segregating those who need to be protected from those deemed to be threatening and, therefore, must be militarily targeted. The quelled population is regarded as morally and racially inferior, untrustworthy, irrational, and violent. This distinction between “we” and “them” within the state’s territory and among

fellow citizens – in which homogeneity is supposed by the traditional inside/outside framework – has been based on socioeconomic, religious, and race discrimination, as it is sharply displayed in the laudatory narrative crafted around Caxias.

Furthermore, in the military self-praising image, the gatekeeper, tracing and sustaining this division, is the armed forces, the military's values, and behavior. It leads us to the second set of ideas underpinning the domestic mobilization of the armed forces for public security in Brazil: militarism. Despite the complex debate and the wide range of definitions (MABEE; VUCETIC, 2018), militarism is regarded as a belief system that prioritizes military actions and values to the detriment of civilians, transferring military mentality and behavior to the civilian sphere, and legitimating the use of force (EASTWOOD, 2018; PION-BERLIN, 2018). As has been presented, the image of the military as agents of pacification implies not only that the armed forces are the benchmark for one to be accounted as a member of the national community, but it also hails them as the most – and only – organized, technically competent, and politically neutral entity in the country. Accordingly, militaristic means and ways of action are regarded as suitable and desirable forms for dealing with any state or political issue, regardless of its propinquity with military or defense matters. Coercion, particularly military force, is regarded as an all-encompassing solution.

The self-depiction of the Brazilian armed forces is also embedded in colonial thinking and civilizational anxiety. Fanon traced three possible responses of the colonized population to colonization: completely accepting, as a fact of nature, the idea of civilizational superiority with which the colonizers frame themselves; interiorizing the colonial stigma and resisting it at the same time; and utterly disregarding the hierarchy between races and civilizations. Gani (2021) further divided the second kind of response into two: fleeing and transferal. The first is characterized by the desire to be akin to the colonizer, which is expressed in mimicry, as a way to escape the anxiety triggered by the sense of inferiority. The second consists in creating hierarchies within the colonized community and ranking oneself at the top of it (but below the colonizer). The Brazilian military identity, developed in chapter five, reveals that they are doing both fleeing and transferring.

On the one hand, the military claims that the modern European conception of neutral and externally-aimed armed forces is the ideal model for a military institution. However, they sustain it is unfeasible in underdeveloped countries, such as Brazil, in which domestic and political order are to be organized. In this sense, the Brazilian military internalized the colonial thinking, acknowledging, as a certain fact, that Brazil was (and is) in an early phase of development, while Europe represents the final stage to be reached. On the other hand, while

assuming themselves as inferiors, in a colonial structure, the military create an internal hierarchy, according to which the armed forces are the only source of modernization, while the general population and political elites are to blame for the underdevelopment. Accordingly, the mismatch between the (assumed) normal way of organizing and deploying the state's instruments of violence and how it is actually deployed, in other words, the Brazilian military ambiguity between the desire to be modern, emulating European armed forces, while assigning themselves roles deemed exceptional – for which they blame the unmodern population –, can be read as both a sign and a product of colonial anxiety.

Finally, it is anti-democratic. Democracy is certainly very ambiguous and complex to define. However, on a very basic ground, it is perhaps safe to state that different notions of democracy would have a minimum agreement around the idea that in this kind of political regime, the legitimacy of politicians' decisions and policies is grounded on popular elections – whether it is sufficient or not is another query that does not concern us right now. Under this token, every state institution, including the armed forces, are instruments to implement the elected political project. The Brazilian military, however, in its identity formation, forged an understanding according to which they are not only an autonomous entity, but are above the political game, legality, and the popular choice. It is clear in the notion of obedience with limits, pervasively disseminated in the military laudatory narrative. They grant themselves the right to decide when a law is worth obeying, to control political and social order, and, ultimately, to decide in exception.

The exclusionary, militarist, colonial, and undemocratic set of ideas that provided both the raw material for the legitimating discourses to be crafted and the propitious social ground for the domestic mobilization of the instrument of lethality to be accepted and desired in Brazil, is not exclusive of this kind of security practice or the empirical cases addressed in this thesis. The same ideational topography, constituted by both social expectations about the armed forces, as well as the military identity, pervades the totality of the armed forces' relations with the Brazilian state and society. It can be observed in the armed forces' interference in politics, be it by imposing itself or being called upon, in coups and institutional ruptures, or elections. Therefore, even though the domestic deployment of the armed forces in security operations does not have a causal relation with the increasing political involvement of the military, as has been discussed, these two sets of practices share the same ideational roots.

Beyond the empirical assessment of the Brazilian case, this work's defining question is the issue often downgraded as background noise or settled as an a priori universal departing point by literature on military missions and civil-military relations, i.e. what is normal about

deploying the armed forces? That is, how does the mobilization of the state's instrument of lethal violence come about as acceptable and desirable? Tackling it as a process of legitimation takes us beyond the normality/abnormality dichotomy permeating political thought, as well as conventions on right and wrong when it comes to understanding organized violence.

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